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TILE JUVENILE COURT MEETS THE PRINCIPLE OF
OFFENSE: PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT, AND THE
DIFFERENCE IT MAKES
BARRY C. FELD
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision In re Gault' transformed the
juvenile court into a very different institution than that envisioned by its
Progressive creators. 2 Judicial and legislative efforts to harmonize the
juvenile court with Gault's constitutional mandate have modified the pur-
pose, process, and operation of the juvenile justice system. The Progressives
envisioned a procedurally informal court with individualized, offender-
oriented dispositional practices. The Supreme Court's due process decisions
impose procedural formality on the juvenile court's traditional, individual-
ized-treatment sentencing schemes. As the juvenile court system deviates
from the Progressive ideal, it increasingly resembles, both procedurally and
substantively, the adult criminal court system.3
This Article analyzes the changing sentencing practices of the juvenile
court. Contemporary juvenile courts increasingly focus on the offense com-
mitted-the "Principle of Offense," rather than on the youth's "best inter-
ests"--in their sentencing decisions. Changes in juvenile courts' "purpose
clauses" to emphasize characteristics of the offense rather than the offender
reflect the ascendance of the Principle of Offense. Moreover, the trend of
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1966; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1969; Ph.D. (Sociol-
ogy), Harvard University, 1973. This research was supported by the University of
Minnesota Law Alumni Association's "Partners in Excellence" program. I received
exceptional research assistance from Ms. Susan Pasch, 1987, University of Min-
nesota Law School. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at Yantai Univer-
sity, Yantai, People's Republic of China, June, 1987, and at the 1987 Annual Meeting
of the American Society of Criminology, Montreal, Canada. I received constructive
critical comments from several colleagues including: Jeffrey Fagan, Robert Levy,
and Lloyd Ohlin. Any remaining deficiencies stem from my failure to heed their wise
counsel.
1 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court,
69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 141-42 (1984); see also D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205
(1980); E. RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERI-
MENT 148 (1978).
3 Feld, supra note 2, at 142; Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative ReJrm and the
Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 MINN. L. REV.
167, 241-42 (1981).
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juvenile courts to employ a "justice model," which prescribes the appropri-
ate sentence on the basis of "just deserts" rather than "real needs,"
reflects a movement away from a rehabilitation-treatment based model.
Recent legislative changes in juvenile sentencing statutes and correctional
administrative guidelines emphasize proportional and determinate sentences
based on both the present offense and prior record, and dictate the length,
location, and intensity of intervention. The shift in emphasis from treatment
to punishment is also illustrated in dispositional decisionmaking processes
and the harsh reality of juvenile correctional confinement.
These changes serve to both indicate and advance the substantive and
procedural criminalization of the juvenile court. Emphasis on punishment,
rather than treatment, of delinquents raises fundamental questions about the
adequacy of procedural protections in the juvenile court. Affording juveniles
procedural parity with adults as a prelude to punishment, however, raises
the issue of whether there is any need for a separate juvenile court system.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Progressive Juvenile Court-Procedural Informality and
Individualized, Offender-Oriented Dispositions
The social history of the juvenile court is an oft-told tale. 4 Economic
modernization brought with it changes in family structure, the function of
the family in society, and a new cultural perception of childhood. 5 Rapid
4 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 2; see also J. INVERARITY, P. LAUDER-
DALE & B. FELD, LAW AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL
LAW 173 (1983); A. PLATT, THE CHILDSAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
(2d ed. 1977); S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE 1825-1920 (1977);
Empey, The Progressive Legacy and the Concept of Childhood, in JUVENILE JUS-
TICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS 3 (1979); Feld, The
Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 473-78 (1987); Fox, Juvenile
Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909); Rothman, The Progressive Legacy:
Development of American Attitudes Towards Juvenile Delinquency, in JUVENILE
JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS 34 (1979).
For information on economic modernization and industrialization in the United
States, see generally S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914 (1957);
R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); G. KOLKO,
THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATIVISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY
1900-1916 (1963); D. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM (1977); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER
1877-1920 (1967); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE
1900-1918 (1968).
For analysis of changes in family structure and function as the result of economic
THE PRINCIPLE OF OFFENSE
industrialization and urbanization fostered the Progressive movement, many
of whose programs shared a unifying child-centered theme. 6
The Progressives introduced a variety of criminal justice reforms at the
turn of the century-probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and the
juvenile court-all of which emphasized open-ended, informal, and highly
flexible policies to rehabilitate the deviant.7 Discretionary decisionmaking
modernization, see generally: C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 178-209 (1980); J. KETT, RITES
OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT (1977); C. LASCH,
HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 6-10 (1977); S. ROTHMAN,
WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE: A HISTORY OF CHANGING IDEALS AND PRACTICES, 1870
TO THE PRESENT (1978); E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1975);
TURNING POINTS: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS ON THE FAMILY (J.
Demos & S. Boocock eds. 1978).
Demographic changes in the number of children and a shift of economic functions
from the family to other work environments altered the roles of women and children.
Especially within the upper and middle classes, a more modern conception of
childhood emerged in which children were perceived as corruptible innocents whose
upbringing required greater physical, social, and moral structure than had previously
been regarded as prerequisite to adulthood. The family, particularly women, as-
sumed a greater role in supervising a child's moral and social development. For
analysis of the modernization of the family and the changing conception of childhood,
see generally: AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL
HANDBOOK (J. Hawes & N. Hiner eds. 1985); P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD
(1962); deMause, The Evolution of Childhood, in THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD (L.
deMause ed. 1974); J. GILLIS, YOUTH AND HISTORY: TRADITION AND CHANGE IN
EUROPEAN AGE RELATIONS 1770-PRESENT (1974); D. HUNT, PARENTS AND CHIL-
DREN IN HISTORY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FAMILY LIFE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE
(1970); B. WISHY, THE CHILD AND THE REPUBLIC (1968).
6 The Progressives' policies, embodied in juvenile court legislation, child labor
laws, child welfare laws, and compulsory school attendance laws, reflected the
changing cultural conception of childhood. See, e.g., R. WIEBE, supra note 5, at 169;
L. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 1876-1957 (1961); J. KETT, supra note 5, at 221-27; Empey, supra
note 4; S. TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA (1982); W. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN
AMERICA 45-47 (1970).
7 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 43; Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, in BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-28 (1964). The Progressives' re-
liance on the State to implement their social reforms reflected their perception of the
benevolence of state action, the ability of government to correct social problems, a
confidence in their own values, and a belief in the propriety of inculcating those
values in others. They experienced no reservations in their attempts to "Amer-
icanize" the poor and immigrants and employed a variety of agencies of assimilation
and acculturation in an effort to create sober, virtuous, middle-class Americans. See
Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the Progressive Era, in DOING GOOD:
THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE 67, 74-76 (1978).
1988]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68: 821
pervaded Progressive criminal justice reforms; diagnosis of the causes of
delinquency and prescribing a cure required an individualized approach that
precluded uniform treatment or standardized criteria.
The Progressive criminal justice reforms reflected basic changes in the
ideological assumptions about the sources of crime and deviance. Posi-
tivism-the effort to identify the antecedent variables that cause crime and
deviance-challenged the classic formulations of crime as the product of
conscious free-will choices.8 Positivist criminology regarded deviance as
determined rather than chosen, and sought to identify the causes of crime
and delinquency. By attributing criminal behavior to external forces, the
Progressive movement reduced an actor's moral responsibility for crime
and thus focused on efforts to reform rather than punish the offender.
Criminology borrowed both methodology and vocabulary from the medical
profession; pathology, infection, diagnosis, and treatment provided popular
analogues for criminal justice professionals. The conjunction of positivistic
criminology, the use of medical models in the treatment of criminals, and the
emergence of social science professionals gave rise to the "Rehabilitative
Ideal." 9
The juvenile court movement attempted to remove children from the adult
criminal justice and corrections systems and provide them with individ-
ualized treatment in a separate system. The Progressives envisioned juvenile
court professionals using indeterminate procedures, substituting a scientific
and preventative approach for the traditional punitive scheme of the criminal
law, to achieve benevolent goals and better society. 10 Under the guise of
parens patriae, juvenile courts emphasized treatment, supervision, and con-
trol rather than punishment and allowed the State ever wider discretion to
intervene in the lives of young offenders." As a result, the juvenile court's
8 D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 5 (1964); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at
50-51; Allen, supra note 7, at 26.
9 A flourishing rehabilitative ideal requires both a belief in the malleability of
human behavior and a basic moral consensus about the appropriate directions of
human change. Moreover, a rehabilitative ideal requires agreement about ends and
means; the Progressives believed both in the virtues of their social order and that new
social sciences provided them with the tools to bring about systematic human
change. See F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 11-15 (1981) [hereinafter DECLINE OF REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL]; Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal Justice,
27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 151-53 (1978); Allen, supra note 7, at 25-26 (1964).
1 See A. PLATT, supra note 4, at 43-47; E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 35-42;
Mack, supra note 4, at 109-11.
" See, e.g., Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, II (Pa. 1838) (justifying the establish-
ment of the House of Refuge, which offered aid to homeless and destitute youth, on
the basis of parens patriae); Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of
"Parens Patriae," 22 S.C.L. REV. 147, 181 (1970); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From
Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205, 207-10 (1971).
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jurisdiction over "status" offenses encompassed situations that might pre-
viously have been ignored."2
In separating child from adult offenders, the juvenile court system also
rejected the jurisprudence and procedure of adult criminal prosecutions.
Courtroom procedures were modified to eliminate any implication of a
criminal proceeding; a euphemistic vocabulary and a physically separate
court building were introduced to avoid the stigma of adult prosecutions.13
To avoid stigmatizing a youth, hearings were confidential, access to court
records limited, and children were found to be delinquent rather than guilty
of committing a crime. Juvenile court proceedings concentrated on the
child's background and welfare rather than the details surrounding the
commission of a specific crime. Consequently, juries and lawyers were
excluded from juvenile court proceedings, as were the rules of evidence and
formal procedures.
The system proffered by the Progressives left judges, assisted by social
workers, to investigate the problematic child's background, identify the
sources of the misconduct at issue, and develop a treatment plan to meet the
child's needs. Juvenile court personnel enjoyed enormous discretion to
make dispositions in the "best interests of the child." Principles of psychol-
ogy and social work, rather than formal rules, guided decisionmakers. The
court collected as much information as possible about the child-his life
history, character, social environment, and individual circumstances-on
the assumption that a scientific analysis of the child's past would reveal the
proper diagnosis and cure. The overall inquiry accorded minor significance
to the offense committed by the child, as it indicated little about the child's
"real needs." At hearings and dispositions, the court directed its attention
first and foremost to the child's character and lifestyle.
Dispositions continued for the duration of minority, and were indetermi-
nate and nonproportional. The courts were given maximum discretion to
allow for flexibility in diagnosis and treatment. The offense that brought the
child before the court affected neither the intensity nor the duration of
intervention because each child's "real needs" differed.
12 Illicit activities, such as smoking or truancy, and conduct that reflected inappro-
priate values, such as immorality, stubbornness, vagrancy, or living a wayward, idle,
and dissolute life, subjected youths to pre-delinquent intervention by the courts to
supervise their upbringing. See A. PLATT, supra note 4, at 137-38; Schlossman &
Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the
Progressive Era, 48 HARV. EDUC. REV. 65, 70, 81 (1978).
13 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 92-93 (1967); D.
ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 217-18; E. RYERSON, supra note 2.
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B. The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court-Procedural
Formality and Individualized, Offender-Oriented Dispositions
With the Supreme Court's decision in Gault, mandating procedural safe-
guards in the adjudication of delinquency, judicial focus turned toward the
determination of legal guilt or innocence of the minor. The Court's "con-
stitutional domestication" of the juvenile court system altered the objective
of the pre-sentencing stage of juvenile adjudication from "saving" an of-
fender's "soul" to proof of the minor's commission of a criminal offense. In
so doing, Gault fundamentally altered the operation of the juvenile court.
In Gault, the Court reviewed the history of the juvenile justice system and
the traditional rationales for denying procedural safeguards to juveniles:
hearings involving juvenile offenders were not adversarial; the adjudication
of delinquency was civil, not criminal; and a child was entitled to custody,
not liberty, when the State acted as parens patriae.14 In rejecting these
traditional rationales, the Court observed that "unbridled discretion, how-
ever benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and
procedure" and concluded that the denial of procedural rights frequently
resulted in arbitrariness rather than "careful, compassionate, individualized
treatment." 15 Although the Court hoped to retain the potential benefits of the
juvenile process, it insisted that the "claimed benefits of the juvenile court
process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment nor folklore should
cause us to shut our eyes" to the realities of recidivism, the failures of
rehabilitation, the stigma of a "delinquency" label, the breaches of confiden-
tiality, or the arbitrariness of the process.' 6
Several factors contributed to the Court's decision in Gault to impose
procedural safeguards on the juvenile justice process: the adjudication of
juveniles as delinquent for behavior that would be a criminal offense if
committed by adults; the attendant stigma of delinquency/criminal convic-
tions; and the realities of juvenile institutional confinement.' 7 The juvenile
court system's failure to live up to the Progressive ideal provoked the Gault
Court to mandate elementary procedural safeguards, including the right to
advanced notice of charges, a fair and impartial hearing, the right to the
assistance of counsel, including the opportunities to confront and cross-
examine witnesses; and the protections of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination. 18
Despite its critical dicta, the Court narrowly confined its decision to the
adjudicatory hearing at which a child is determined to be a delinquent, with-
out considering the entire procedural apparatus, jurisdictional reach, or
14 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967).
15 Id. at 18-19.
16 Id. at 21-25.
17 Id. at 27-29.
18 Id. at 31-57.
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dispositional practices of the juvenile justice system. 19 The Court noted that
its procedural requirements would in no way impair the unique procedures
for processing and treating juveniles separately from adults; 20 it asserted,
however, that the procedural safeguards associated with the adversarial
process were essential to both the determination of truth and the preserva-
tion of individual freedom. 21
In subsequent juvenile court decisions, the Supreme Court elaborated
upon the procedural and functional equivalence between criminal and delin-
quency proceedings. In In re Winship, 22 the Court decided that proof of
delinquency must be established "beyond a reasonable doubt" rather than
by the lower civil standards of proof.23 Because there is no explicit constitu-
tional provision regarding the standard of proof, the Court in Winship first
held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was a constitutional requirement
in adult criminal proceedings and then extended that same requirement to
juvenile proceedings both to insure accurate fact-finding and to constrain
governmental overreaching.
24
19 Id. at 13. There are numerous works that discuss the narrow holding in Gault
and the limitations on juvenile procedural rights. See, e.g., McCarthy, Pre-Adjudica-
tory Rights in Juvenile Courts: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U.
PITT. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (1981) (analyzing limitations on juveniles' procedural
rights); Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime:
Proposal .jr a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 661-63
(1980).
20 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
21 Id. at 20-21; see also Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudi-
cation-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346-47 (1967) (arguing that
procedural due process ensures the reliability of the guilt-determining process and
ensures respect for the dignity of the individual). The dual functions of procedural
safeguards-to provide factual accuracy and prevent governmental oppression-
were clearly implicated by the Court's holding that the privilege against self-incrim-
ination applied to delinquency adjudications. Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50; see also Feld,
supra note 2, at 154-56 nn.46-47. By recognizing the applicability of the privilege
against self-incrimination, juvenile adjudications could no longer be characterized as
either "non-criminal" or "non-adversarial," since the fifth amendment privilege is
both the guarantor of an adversarial process and the primary mechanism for main-
taining a balance between the state and the individual. Compare, e.g., Gault, 387
U.S. at 50, with Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) ("The Court in Gault was
obviously persuaded that the State intended to punish its juvenile offenders ... 
(emphasis added)).
22 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
23 Id. at 368.
24 Id. at 361-67. It is helpful to compare the Winship Court's treatment of the
standard of proof in delinquency cases with the standard of proof required by the
Court for involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill. Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (holding that only "clear and convincing" evidence is necessary
as the standard of proof). In Addington the Court continued to equate criminal and
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Similarly, in Breed v. Jones ,25 the Court held that the protections of the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibited adult criminal
re-prosecution of a youth previously convicted on the same charges in
juvenile court. 26 The Court posited a functional equivalence between an
adult criminal trial and a delinquency proceeding, describing the virtually
identical human and institutional costs implicated in both-"anxiety and
insecurity," "heavy personal strain," and the increased burdens of the
juvenile system as it became more procedurally formalized. 27 In light of the
potential consequences, the Court concluded that there was little basis to
distinguish a delinquency proceeding from a traditional adult criminal pros-
ecution .28
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania ,29 the Court halted the extension of pro-
cedural rights of juveniles to that of full parity with adult criminals by
denying a constitutional right to jury trials in state delinquency proceed-
ings. 30 The Court held that the due process standard of "fundamental fair-
ness" in juvenile proceedings, as interpreted and applied in Gault and
Winship, emphasized "accurate fact-finding"-an objective as easily at-
tained by a judge as a jury . 3 In suggesting that due process in the juvenile
context required nothing more than accurate fact-finding, however, the
Court departed significantly from its prior analyses of the dual functions
of juvenile court procedures: to assure accurate fact-finding and to protect
against government oppression. 32 By identifying accurate fact-finding as the
delinquency proceedings, distinguishing both from involuntary commitment proceed-
ings:
The Court [in Winship] saw no controlling difference in loss of liberty and
stigma between a conviction for an adult and a delinquency adjudication for a
juvenile. Winship recognized that the basic issue-whether the individual in fact
committed a criminal act-was the same in both proceedings. There being no
meaningful distinctions between the two proceedings, we required the state to
prove the juvenile's act and intent beyond a reasonable doubt....
... Unlike the delinquency proceeding in Winship, a civil commitment pro-
ceeding can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution.
Id. at 427-28.
25 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
26 Id. at 541.
27 Id. at 528-29.
28 Id. at 530.
29 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
30 Id. at 545.
31 Id. at 543.
32 See supra note 21-24 and accompanying text; see also Feld, Reference of
Juvenile Offenders Jor Adult Prosecutions: The Legislative Alternative to Asking
Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 602-05 (1978).
Justice Brennan's opinion in McKeiver notes that protection from governmental
oppression is a fundamental element of procedural justice, but one that might be
afforded by an alternative method than that of ajury trial, such as a public trial that
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sole underlying rationale of the fundamental fairness doctrine, the Court
ignored its analysis in Gault which held the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination to be necessary in order to protect against gov-
ernment oppression, even though accurate fact-finding might be compro-
mised .33 Invoking the mythology of the sympathetic, paternalistic juvenile
court judge, the McKeiver Court denied that protection against government
oppression was required3 4 and rejected the argument that the inbred, closed
nature of the juvenile court system could affect the accuracy of fact-find-
ing.31
The McKeiver Court was concerned that requiring jury trials would dis-
rupt the traditional juvenile court and its adjudicative practices. 36 The Court
would render the adjudicative process visible and accountable to the community.
See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553-55 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). The
McKeiver decision involved two cases, one initiated in Pennsylvania and the other in
North Carolina, both of which had raised the issue of jury trials in juvenile proceed-
ings. Although Justice Brennan acknowledged that delinquency prosecutions were
not criminal proceedings for purposes of implicating the sixth amendment right to a
jury trial and required only the "essentials of due process and fair treatment," id. at
553, he differentiated between the Pennsylvania and North Carolina proceedings.
Justice Brennan noted that "the States are not bound to provide jury trials on
demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests
that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve." Id. at 554. He noted that the
availability of trial by jury protects the individual against oppression by providing a
mechanism to appeal to the conscience of the community. Id. at 555. The Pennsyl-
vania juvenile procedures permitted a public trial, which Justice Brennan regarded as
providing a functional equivalent safeguard for the core values protected by the right
to ajury trial. See id. at 554-55. Justice Brennan dissented in the North Carolina case,
however, because North Carolina procedures either permitted or required the exclu-
sion of the public, and the public had in fact been excluded from the proceedings,
thus precluding any "protection against misuse of the judicial process." Id. at 556;
see also Feld, supra note 2, at 158-60, 262-66 (discussing Justice Brennan's opinion in
McKeiver).
33 See Feld, supra note 2, at 154-59 nn.46-47.
31 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
35 According to the Court, concern about procedural safeguards such as jury trials
to assure accurate fact-finding and protection against governmental oppression ig-
nores the notion of benevolence and compassion as the premise of the juvenile court
system. See id. at 550-51.
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of evidence,
about the juvenile court judge's possible awareness of the juvenile's prior record
and of the contents of the social file; about repeated appearances of the same
familiar witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation officers and social
workers-all to the effect that this will create the likelihood of pre-judgment-
chooses to ignore, it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of
sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.
Id.
36 Id. at 550.
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noted the potential adverse impact of jury trials on the informality, flexibil-
ity, and confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings;3 7 to institute this last
remaining formality of the criminal process would make juvenile courts
virtually indistinguishable from criminal courts and raise the more basic
question of whether there is any need for a separate juvenile court. 38
Although the McKeiver Court found faults with the juvenile process, it
asserted that jury trials would not correct those deficiencies but would
instead make the juvenile process unduly formal and adversarial.3 9 Yet the
Court did not consider: possible advantages due to increased formality in
juvenile proceedings;40 whether its earlier decision in Gault had effectively
foreclosed renewed concern with flexibility and informality; nor why formal-
ity at the adjudication stage was incompatible with therapeutic dispositions.
Most importantly, the McKeiver Court did not analyze the crucial distinc-
tions between treatment in juvenile courts and punishment in criminal courts
that justified different procedural safeguards for each forum.41 No factual
record of dispositional practices or conditions of confinement was reviewed
by the Court in its deliberation over whether juvenile court intervention was
punishment or treatment. 4 The Court simply noted that the ideal juvenile
37 Id.
38 Id. at 551 ("If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be
superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate
existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the
moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.").
3 The McKeiver Court noted that providing for trial by jury in juvenile court
"would bring with it . . . the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the
adversary system and, possibly, the public trial." Id. at 550.
40 One of the Court's rationales for imposing procedural formality onto juvenile
delinquency proceedings was that "[d]epartures from established principles of due
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967).
41 The Court has held that fundamental fairness in adult criminal proceedings
requires both factual accuracy and protection against governmental oppression. For
example, the Court has said that "[p]roviding an accused with a right to be tried by a
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
42 Compare McKeiver with Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986). In Allen, the
Court denied petitioner the protections of the fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination in a "sexually dangerous person" commitment proceeding. Since
the privilege is only available when the State purports to "punish," the Court's ruling
was based, in part, on petitioner's failure to disprove the State's assertion that it
provided treatment, rather than punishment:
Petitioner has not demonstrated, and the record does not suggest, that "sexually
dangerous persons" in Illinois are confined under conditions incompatible with
the State's asserted interest in treatment. Had petitioner shown, for example,
that the confinement of such persons imposes on them a regimen which is
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court system is "an intimate, informal protective proceeding, ' 43 even while
acknowledging that the "ideal" is seldom, if ever, realized. 44
The Progressive creators of the juvenile court envisioned a benevolent
treatment agency in which informality and flexibility facilitated discretionary
decisionmaking in the "best interests of the child." Despite the subsequent
procedural formalization of the juvenile court in Gault, the Supreme Court in
McKeiver remained ideologically committed to the traditional "treatment"
rationale of the juvenile court. In accepting the assertion that juvenile courts
are "rehabilitative" rather than punitive, the Court did not examine either
how juvenile court treatment differed from traditional criminal law punish-
ment or whether there was any corresponding need for procedural protec-
tions against government oppression. Thus, the Court never analyzed the
fundamental basis for not affording juveniles all criminal procedural
safeguards.
Despite the McKeiver Court's reluctance to hasten the demise of the
juvenile court system, its earlier decisions in Gault and Winship drastically
altered the form and function of the juvenile court. By emphasizing pro-
cedural regularity in the determination of criminal guilt as a prerequisite to a
delinquency disposition, the Supreme Court shifted the focus of the juvenile
court from the "real needs" of a child to proof of the commission of criminal
acts. 45 As the next sections of this Article will show, the underlying purposes
and sentencing framework ofjuvenile courts increasingly reflect the substan-
tive goals of the criminal law.
essentially identical to that imposed upon felons with no need for psychiatric
care, this might well be a different case. But the record here tells us little or
nothing about the regimen at the psychiatric center, and it certainly does not
show that there are no relevant differences between confinement there and
confinement in the other parts of the maximum-security prison complex .... We
therefore cannot say that the conditions of petitioner's confinement themselves
amount to "punishment" and thus render "criminal" the proceedings which led
to confinement.
Id. at 373-74.
See generally B. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS
IN INSTITUTIONS (1977) (examining conditions of confinement in juvenile correctional
facilities); Feld, supra note 2, at 258-62.
4' See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
41 Id. at 547-48.
45 See, e.g., In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1984)
(denying petitioner ajury trial in a juvenile proceeding, but urging the Supreme Court
to reconsider prior decisions in light of evidence that juvenile court proceedings have
taken on many attributes of criminal trial proceedings). In Javier A., the Court noted
that "juvenile proceedings now feature the same contests over admission of evidence
as adult proceedings since only proof admissible in a criminal trial can be used to
support a finding the juvenile committed the criminal offense." Id. at 960, 206 Cal.
Rptr. at 419.
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III. THE PRINCIPLE OF OFFENSE IN JUVENILE COURT: JUST DESERTS IN
SENTENCING PRACTICES
Justice White's concurrence in McKeiver highlighted some distinctions
between 'treatment" in juvenile courts and "punishment" in criminal pro-
ceedings. Whereas the criminal law punishes morally responsible actors for
making blameworthy choices, the juvenile justice system regards juveniles
as less culpable or responsible for their criminal misdeeds. Justice White
noted:
For the most part, the juvenile justice system rests on more determinis-
tic assumptions [than the criminal justice system]. Reprehensible acts
by juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent
choice but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other
forces beyond their control. Hence the state legislative judgment not to
stigmatize the juvenile delinquent by branding him a criminal; his con-
duct is not deemed so blameworthy that punishment is required to deter
him or others. Coercive measures, where employed, are considered
neither retribution nor punishment. Supervision or confinement is
aimed at rehabilitation, not at convincing the juvenile of his error simply
by imposing pains and penalties. Nor is the purpose to make the juvenile
delinquent an object lesson for others, whatever his own merits or
demerits may be. A typical disposition in the juvenile court where
delinquency is established may authorize confinement until age 21, but
it will last no longer and within that period will last only so long as his
behavior demonstrates that he remains an unacceptable risk if returned
to his family. Nor is the authorization for custody until 21 any measure
of the seriousness of the particular act that the juvenile has performed.4 6
The non-proportional, indeterminate length of juvenile dispositions and
the "eschewing [of] blameworthiness and punishment for evil choices"
satisfied Justice White that "there remained differences of substance be-
tween criminal and juvenile courts." 47 Justice Stewart's dissent in Gault
articulated a similar distinction between the sentencing practices in the
juvenile and adult criminal justice systems, observing that "a juvenile pro-
ceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and
purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The object of the one is
correction of a condition. The object of the other is conviction and punish-
ment for a criminal act."' 48 Accordingly, the McKeiver Court assumed that
the juvenile system provided only positive rehabilitative treatment and thus
required no further special safeguards against government encroachment on
individual rights. By contrast, the Court understood retributive criminal
punishment in the adult criminal process to require additional procedural
guarantees in order to prevent governmental oppression.
46 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 552 (White, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 551-52.
48 Gault, 387 U.S. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The fundamental justification for denying jury trials in delinquency pro-
ceedings and, more basically, for maintaining a juvenile justice system
separate from the adult one is based on the differences between punishment
and treatment. 49 Yet, part of the McKeiver Court's failure to distinguish
between punishment and treatment in the contemporary juvenile justice
system stems from a lack of analytical clarity about the conceptual differ-
ences between the two justifications for intervention. Punishment involves
the imposition by the State, for purposes of retribution or deterrence, of
burdens on an individual who has violated legal prohibitions. 50 Treatment,
by contrast, focuses on the mental health, status, and future welfare of the
individual rather than on the commission of prohibited acts.51
Conceptually, punishment and treatment are mutually exclusive penal
goals. 52 Both make markedly different assumptions about the sources of
criminal or delinquent behavior. Punishment assumes that responsible,
free-will moral actors make blameworthy choices and deserve to suffer the
prescribed consequences for their acts.5 3 Punishment imposes unpleasant
consequences because of an offender's past offenses. By contrast, most
forms of rehabilitative treatment, including the rehabilitative ideal of the
juvenile court, assume some degree of determinism.54 Whether grounded in
psychological or sociological processes, treatment assumes that certain an-
tecedent factors cause the individual's undesirable conditions or behavior.
Treatment and therapy, therefore, seek to alleviate undesirable conditions in
order to improve the offender's future welfare .55
49 See, e.g., Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework
jbr Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791
(1982). Gardner argues that "unlike the criminal law, juvenile justice responds to the
status of children in need, treating them for what they are rather than punishing them
for what they have done." Id. at 791.
For a comprehensive review of the Supreme Court's analysis of the punishment/
nonpunishment distinctions, see generally, Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976).
50 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF LAW 4-6 (1968).
" See H. PACKER, LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 23-28 (1968); Allen, supra
note 7, at 25; Allen, supra note 9, at 2-3.
'2 See Feld, supra note 2, at 248-49 nn.415-16; Gardner, supra note 49, at 793-94
n.16, 815-16.
53 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 50; A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 49 (1976) (rejecting the rehabilitative ideal as unworkable
and unjust, concluding that the severity of an offender's sentence should reflect the
severity of the offender's crime).
' See D. MATZA, supra note 8, at 5.
55 See D. GIBBONS, CHANGING THE LAWBREAKER: THE TREATMENT OF DELIN-
QUENTS AND CRIMINALS 130 (1965). See generally Feld, supra note 32, at 530-40
(discussing the underlying assumption of treatment in juvenile justice).
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In analyzing juvenile court sentencing practices, it is useful to examine
whether the sentencing decision is based upon considerations of the past
offense or the future welfare of the offender. When a sentence is based on
the characteristics of the offense, it is typically determinate and proportional,
with the objective of retribution or deterrence. The decision is based upon an
assessment of past conduct-the present offense and any prior criminal
record. When a sentence is based upon characteristics of the offender,
however, it is typically open-ended, non-proportional and indeterminate,
with the goal of rehabilitation or incapacitation .56 The decision is based upon
a diagnosis or prediction about the effects of intervention on an offender's
future course of conduct.
It is also useful to distinguish the bases of such dispositions. David Matza
has described the Principle of Offense as a principle of equality: an effort to
treat similar cases in a similar fashion based on a relatively narrowly defined
frame of relevance. 51 Matza observes:
The principle of equality refers to a specific set of substantive criteria
that are awarded central relevance and, historically, to a set of consid-
erations that were specifically and momentously precluded. Its mean-
ing, especially in criminal proceedings, has been to give a central and
unrivaled position in the framework of relevance to considerations of
offense and conditions closely related to offense like prior record, and
to more or less preclude considerations of status and circumstance.5 8
By contrast, the Principle of Individualized Justice differs from the Principle
of Offense in two fundamental ways. First, the Principle of Individualized
Justice is much more inclusive;
[i]t contains many more items in its framework of relevance. . . . The
principle of individualized justice suggests that disposition is to be
guided by aful understanding of the client's personal and social charac-
ter and by his "individual needs." [Secondly, t]he consequence of the
principle of individualized justice has been mystification.. . . [I]ts func-
tion is to obscure the process of decision and disposition rather than to
enlighten it. 5
9
56 See, e.g., In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978).
The Felder court noted that "[t]he distinction between indeterminate and determi-
nate sentencing is not semantic, but indicates fundamentally different public policies.
Indeterminate sentencing is based upon notions of rehabilitation, while determinate
sentencing is based upon a desire for retribution or punishment." Id. at 377, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 533; see also TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 11-14 (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, supra
note 53, at 11-26. For a criticism of the use of the rehabilitative ideal in our criminal
justice system, see N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 13-20 (1974).
57 D. MATZA, supra note 8, at 14.
58 Id. at 113-14.
59 Id. at 114-15.
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By including all personal and social characteristics as relevant, without
assigning controlling significance to any one factor, individualized justice
relies heavily on the "professional judgment" of juvenile court adminis-
trators 60
In the adult dispositional framework, determinate sentences based on the
offense increasingly supersede indeterminate sentences as "just deserts"
displaces rehabilitation as the underlying sentencing rationale. 61 The Pro-
gressives' optimistic assumptions about human malleability are challenged
daily by the observation that rehabilitation programs fail to consistently
rehabilitate and by volumes of empirical evaluations that question both the
effectiveness of treatment programs and the "scientific" underpinnings of
those who administer the enterprise. 62
Proponents of "just deserts" reject rehabilitation as a justification for
intervention for a number of reasons. First, they argue that an indeterminate
sentencing scheme vests too much discretionary power in presumed experts.
60 Matza argues that -[because] the kinds of criteria it includes are more diffuse
than those commended in the principle of offense .. . [one] consequence of the
principle of individualized justice has been mystification." Id. at 116.
61 See J. PETERSILIA & S. TURNER, GUIDELINE-BASED JUSTICE: THE IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR RACIAL MINORITIES (1985). The report notes:
By 1985, at least 25 states had enacted determinate sentencing statutes, 10 states
had abolished their parole boards, and 35 states had mandatory minimum sen-
tence laws. . . . [M]any states and jurisdictions had established formal guidelines
for sentencing decisions (e.g., prison vs. probation, length of sentence), for
determining supervision levels for parolees and probationers, and for parole
release.
Id. at 1. For arguments critical of the rehabilitative ideal as a goal of penal reform and
supportive of model prison programs based on punishment, see generally AMERICAN
FRIENDS SERV. COMM., A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA:
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 45-53 (1970); D. FOGEL, "WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF... "
THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS 260-72 (2d ed. 1979); N. MORRIS, supra note
56, at 45-50; R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS (1979); A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 53, at
49-55.
62 There have been numerous studies of the efficacy of both juvenile and adult
correctional programs in rehabilitating offenders. Few have encouraged proponents
of rehabilitation. See generally D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND
PAROLE SYSTEM (1964); G. KASSEBAUM, D. WARD & D. WILNER, PRISON TREAT-
MENT AND PAROLE SURVIVAL: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT (1971); L. SECHEREST,
S. WHITE & E. BROWN, THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (1979);
Fishman, An Evaluation of Criminal Recidivism in Projects Providing Rehabilitation
and Diversion Services in Neir York City, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283 (1977);
Greenberg, The Correctional Effect of Corrections, in CORRECTIONS AND PUNISH-
MENT Ill (D. Greenberg ed. 1977); Law & Whitehead, An Analysis of Juvenile
Correctional Treatment, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 60 (1988); Martinson, What Works?
Ouestions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974); Robinson
& Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67
(1971).
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Second, they point to the inability of such clinical experts to justify their
differential treatment of similarly situated offenders based on validated
classification schemes with objective indicators. Finally, opponents of re-
habilitation emphasize the inequalities, disparities, and injustices that result
from therapeutically individualized sentences. 63 "Just deserts" sentencing,
with its strong retributive foundation, punishes offenders according to their
past behavior rather than on the basis of who they are or who they may
become. Similarly situated offenders are defined and sanctioned equally on
the basis of relatively objective and legally relevant characteristics such as
seriousness of offense, culpability, or criminal history.
The same changes in sentencing philosophy are appearing in the juvenile
process as well. However, "just deserts" sentences for juveniles have
important implications for McKeiver's therapeutic rationale and procedural.
implementations. The inability of proponents of juvenile rehabilitation to
demonstrate the effectiveness of parens patriae intervention has led an
increasing number of states to incorporate "just deserts" sentencing princi-
ples into their juvenile justice systems. The underlying premises of "just
deserts" are that a juvenile's personal characteristics or social circum-
stances do not provide a principled basis for determining the length or
intensity of coercive intervention and that "only a principle of propor-
63 See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 61, at 124-44. An
analysis of the impact of the American Friends Service Committee's Struggle for
Justice summarizes its premises:
[C]riminal justice practitioners had never developed the technical capabilities
required to implement the [treatment] model. Evaluations of rehabilitation pro-
grams had consistently failed to find persuasive evidence for the success of
treatment; after fifty years of research on the prediction of criminality, post-
release recidivism still could not be predicted accurately. The prospects of major
improvement in these areas were questioned on theoretical grounds: If crime is
not the product of an individual pathology, then it cannot be "cured." ...
Going beyond this technical criticism, the [AFSC] Working Party rejected
coerced therapy as undignified and potentially repressive, and attacked individ-
ualization in sentencing as a violation of fundamental norms of distributive
justice and proportionality . . . . Where decisions are/unstructured by law,
regulation, or even meaningful guidelines and are for the most part unreviewed
and unchecked, decisions supposedly to be made on the basis of criteria related
to rehabilitation can be and sometimes are made on the basis of other criteria
that are legally irrelevant and discriminatory in their impact, such as race, class,
sex, life style, and political affiliations .... Seen in this light, rehabilitation was
not merely a laudable goal that scientific research had unfortunately failed thus
far to achieve, but something far more insidious-an ideology that explained
crime in highly individualistic terms and legitimated the expansion of administra-
tive powers used in practice to discriminate against disadvantaged groups and to
achieve covert organizational goals.
Greenberg & Humphries, The Cooptation of Fixed Sentencing, 26 CRIME & DELINQ.
206, 207-08 (1980); see also Lopez, The Crimes of Criminal Sentencing Based on
Rehabilitation, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 533 (1981).
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tionality (or "deserts") provides a logical, fair, and humane hinge between
conduct and an official, coercive response.''64
Whether a juvenile receives punishment based on his past offense or
treatment based on his personal characteristics may be answered by examin-
ing several aspects of juvenile courts' sentencing practices: the decision
whether a youth should be transferred to criminal court for prosecution and
punishment as an adult;6 '5 the explicit legislative purposes of contemporary
juvenile codes; the sentencing framework used for making juvenile disposi-
tions; the actual sentencing practices of the juvenile court; and the condi-
tions of confinement in juvenile institutions. Such an examination reveals
that despite persisting rehabilitative rhetoric, the dispositional practices of
the contemporary juvenile court increasingly are based on the Principle of
Offense and reflect the punitive character of the criminal law.
Concluding that juvenile courts punish rather than treat raises fundamen-
tal questions about the quality of procedural justice in juvenile courts, since
the failure to provide all criminal procedural safeguards is justified by the
"alternative purpose" of treatment. Moreover, many juveniles currently
may serve longer sentences than do their adult counterparts convicted of
similar offenses. Juveniles' equal protection challenges to legislative
classifications imposing longer terms for juveniles than for adults for similar
offenses consistently have been rejected on the grounds that juveniles re-
ceive "treatment" rather than punishment.6 6 If juvenile courts punish, then
64 Cohen, Juvenile Olkenders: Proportionality vs. Treatment, 8 CHILDREN'S RTS.
RPT. 1, 3 (1978).
65 See Feld, supra note 4, at 471.
66 The California Supreme Court in People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375,
131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976), limited the maximum sentence that could be imposed upon
an adult misdemeanant committed to the California Youth Authority to the maximum
length that could be imposed on an adult sentenced for the same offense. By contrast,
in People v. Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 601 P.2d 549, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1979), the court
refused to apply the Olivas adult sentence limitations when sentencing juveniles to
the Youth Authority and upheld a longer term imposed on a juvenile than could be
imposed on an adult sentenced for the same offense. In so doing, the court em-
phasized that unlike "punitive" sentences for adults,
[t]here has been no like revolution in society's attitude toward juvenile offend-
ers. It is still true that "[j]uvenile commitment proceedings are designed for the
purposes of rehabilitation and treatment, not punishment."
Id. at 554. See generally Vallandigham, People v. Olivas: The Concept of Personal
Liberty' as a Fundamental Interest in Equal Protection Analysis, 4 HASTINGS CON.
L. Q. 757 (1977); Note, People v. Olivas: Equalizing the Sentencing of Youthful
Olfenders with Adult Maximums, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 389 (1977); Note, Equality
of Sentencing Between Juveniles and Adults: A Logical Extension of People v.
Olivas, 10 PACIFIc L. J. 161 (1978).
The lengths of sentences that could be imposed on adult misdemeanor defendants
sentenced under Youth Corrections Acts are generally limited to those that can be
imposed on other adult offenders. See, e.g., United States v. Amidon 627 F.2d 1023,
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the underlying basis for distinguishing juvenile and adult sanctions is elimi-
nated. Finally, if juvenile courts in fact punish without safeguards of the
criminal process in a fashion frequently more severe than could be legally
imposed upon a similarly situated adult, is there any remaining justification
for a separate system for adjudicating young offenders for committing crimi-
nal offenses?
A. The Purpose of the Juvenile Court-Distinguishing Punishment From
Treatment
The Progressives envisioned, and the McKeiver decision endorsed, a
model of the juvenile court as a benevolent treatment agency making dispo-
sitions in the "best interests of the child." ' 67 Because the McKeiver Court
subscribed to the view that juvenile courts rehabilitate rather than punish, it
did not analyze further the differences between "treatment" and "punish-
ment." The Court, however, has developed criteria in other contexts to
answer the question whether seemingly punitive and coercive governmental
intervention constitutes punishment.68 For example, in Kennedy v. Men-
1026 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting conclusions that the rehabilitative purposes underlying
the YCA justify a longer confinement); cf. United States v. Lowery, 726 F.2d 474,
477-78 (9th Cir. 1983).
By contrast, the adult maximum sentence lengths provide no limitations on the
sentences that may be imposed upon juveniles sentenced within the juvenile court.
See Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Texas 1969). In rejecting the juvenile defen-
dant's equal protection challenge to a longer sentence, the court concluded that there
was a rational basis for the legislative classification.
Since the purpose of the legislation is to salvage youthful offenders, it requires
no straining of the judicial imagination to find the existence of a reasonable
relationship between the legislative purpose and the use of age as the classifying
trait .... [I]f the difference in treatment is founded upon an arguably rational
basis, the legislative decision is determinative. The Legislature could have
concluded that children, as a class, should be subject to indefinite periods of
confinement ... in order to insure sufficient time to accord the child sufficient
treatment of the type required for his effective rehabilitation. The conclusion
might be based on physiological and psychological differences between children
and adults, the types of crime committed by children, their relation to the
criminal world, their unique susceptibility to rehabilitation, and their reaction as
a class to confinement and discipline, as well as reformative treatment.
Id. at 945; see also In re K.V.N., 116 N.J. Super. 580, 283 A.2d 337 (1971) (classifica-
tion based on age, calling for longer sentence for same offense for juvenile than for
adult, does not violate equal protection).
67 The McKeiver Court noted that although the guiding consideration for courts of
law dealing with threatening conduct should be the protection of the community,
rehabilitating offenders through individualized treatment is still the most appropriate
manner to deal with juvenile offenders. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 546 n.6.
68 See generally Clark, supra note 49.
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doza-Martinez69 the Court identified factors that determine whether a par-
ticular State sanction or imposition is punitive:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purposes assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may
often point in different directions.70
Even when a State incarcerates on the basis of underlying conduct that is
criminal, however, the Court must still determine whether the purpose of the
confinement is penal. In Allen v. Illinois 71 the Supreme Court considered the
distinctions between "punishment" and "treatment" in deciding whether a
person incarcerated under a "Sexually Dangerous Persons Act" was enti-
tled to invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Even
though commitment under the Act was triggered by the filing of criminal
charges and accompanied by many of the safeguards of a criminal proceed-
ing, the Court endorsed psychiatrically "compelled" testimony once it con-
cluded that commitment was "essentially civil in nature" and that the aim of
the statute was to provide "treatment, not punishment. ' 72 While acknowl-
edging that a "civil label is not ... dispositive," the Court concluded that
because the statutory purpose was to provide "care and treatment" and
commitment was indeterminate,
the State has disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for the
treatment of those it commits, and established a system under which
committed persons may be released after the briefest time in confine-
69 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
70 Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986)
(holding that proceedings under Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act did not
amount to "criminal" proceedings within the meaning of the fifth amendment's
guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination). Note that even when the State
incarcerates on the basis of underlying conduct that is criminal, the Court must still
determine whether the purpose of the confinement is penal. Id. at 367-70. See also
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
71 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
72 Id. at 367 (quoting People v. Allen, 107 Il1. 2d 91, 99-101, 481 N.E.2d 690, 694-95
(1985)). The dissent in Allen pointed out that "[a] goal of treatment is not sufficient, in
and of itself, to render inapplicable the Fifth Amendment, or to prevent a character-
ization of proceedings as 'criminal'.... if this were not the case, moreover, noth-
ing would prevent a State from creating an entire corpus of 'dangerous person' stat-
utes to shadow its criminal code. . . .The goal would be 'treatment'; the result
would be evisceration of criminal law and its accompanying protections." Id. at 380
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ment. The Act thus does not appear to promote either of "the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence. '7
3
The Court distinguished its denial of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in Allen from its holding in Gault by noting that
[t]he Court in Gault was obviously persuaded that the State intended to
punish its juvenile offenders, observing that in many States juveniles
may be placed in "adult penal institutions" for conduct that if commit-
ted by an adult would be a crime. Here, by contrast, the State serves its
purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually dangerous persons by
committing them to an institution expressly designed to provide psychi-
atric care and treatment.7 4
Finally, the Court concluded that Allen had failed to negate the State's claim
of "treatment" by failing to show that the nature of his confinement was
"essentially identical to that imposed upon felons with no need for psychiat-
ric care .... ,,15 The Court acknowledged, however, "that the conditions of
... confinement [could] amount to 'punishment' and thus render 'criminal'
the proceedings which led to confinement."71 6
The inquiry into the distinction between punishment and treatment may be
advanced by applying the Mendoza-Martinez and Allen criteria to a scenario
in which a juvenile offender is incarcerated in a state training school follow-
ing conviction for conduct that would be a felony if committed by an adult.
Institutional confinement is a restraint that has been historically regarded as
punishment and is generally invoked by the courts in a delinquency proceed-
ing upon proof of mens rea and criminal behavior.7 7 Nevertheless, incarcera-
73 Id. at 369-70 (citations omitted).
14 Id. at 373 (emphasis in the original) (citation omitted). In distinguishing Gault,
the Allen Court subtly shifted the rationale of the Gault Court's fifth amendment
holding. The Allen Court implied that it was the possibility of placing ajuvenile in an
adult penal institution that required recognizing the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Allen, 478 U.S. at 373. The Court's rationale for allowing the privilege in Gault
was considerably broader: "[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarcera-
tion against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.' "In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 50 (1967). It was the "deprivation of liberty" per se that accounted for the Gault
ruling, the Court noting "the equivalence . . . of exposure to commitment as a
juvenile delinquent and exposure to imprisonment as an adult offender . I... "d.
7' Allen, 478 U.S. at 373. The dissent in Allen emphasized that the commitment
authorized far longer imprisonment than a criminal conviction and the "stigma
associated with an adjudication as a 'sexually dangerous person' is at least as great as
that associated with most criminal convictions and 'is certainly more damning than a
finding ofjuvenile delinquency.' "Id. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1975)).
76 Id. at 374.
7 See generally Gardner, supra note 49, at 809-15 (suggesting a conceptual frame-
work to identify the punitive aspects of the juvenile justice system in order to assess
juvenile rights); Shepherd, Challenging the Rehabilitative Justification Jor Indeter-
inmate Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System: The Right to Punishment, 21
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tion is not characterized as punitive if done for the "alternative purpose" of
treatment, as was purportedly the situation in Allen, and if deemed propor-
tional to its therapeutic purpose.7 8 Despite lingering rhetoric of rehabilitation
as an "alternative purpose," the contemporary juvenile court system in-
creasingly and explicitly resembles a punitive institution.
Most states' juvenile court statutes contain a "purpose clause" or pream-
ble, a statement of the underlying rationale of the legislation intended to aid
the courts in interpreting the statute. Thus, examining a juvenile code's
purpose clause provides one insight into the goal of juvenile court interven-
tion. 79 Since the creation of the original juvenile court in Cook County,
Illinois, in 1899, the historical purpose of juvenile court law has been
to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, prefer-
ably in his own home, as will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and
physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; to
preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible,
removing him from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or
safety or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded
without removal; and, when the minor is removed from his own family,
to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible
equivalent to that which should be given by his parents .... 80
Many states included this statement of purpose from the original Illinois
juvenile court act in the preamble to their juvenile codes.81 Some states
provided the additional purpose of "remov[ing] from a minor committing a
ST. Louis U.L.J. 12, 35-40 (1977) (criticizing indeterminate sentencing schemes of
juvenile system in light of its frequent failure to provide adequate treatment and
exploring ajuvenile's right to punishment that is not disproportionate to the offense);
Simpson, Rehabilitation as a Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 984 (1976) (criticizing rehabilitation as a justification for the juvenile
justice process and proposing a juvenile system similar to the adult one).
78 See Gardner, supra note 49, at 810.
79 Professor Gardner analyzed the Supreme Court's "punishment" decisions and
concluded that one of the Court's criteria is the intended purpose of the sanction.
"[F]rom its earliest views in Cummings to its most recent opinion in Wolfish, the
Court consistently has focused upon the intent of the alleged punisher as an essential
element to determine the presence or absence of punishment." Id. at 816-17.
80 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 701-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972). The original statute, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. x, y (1899), provided simply:
This act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purpose may be carried
out, to-wit: That the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as
nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents, and in all cases where
it can properly be done the child be placed in an improved family home and
become a member of the family by legal adoption or otherwise.
81 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.1 (West 1904); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.474 (2)
(1919); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-2 (1944); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-1 (1931). See
generally Feld, supra note 2, at 250; Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New
Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 523 (1984).
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delinquency offense the taint of criminality and the penal consequences of
criminal behavior, by substituting therefore an individual program of coun-
selling, supervision, treatment, and rehabilitation. "82
Forty-two of the states' juvenile codes contain a statement of legislative
purpose or similar preamble.83 Within the past decade, however, ten state
legislatures-almost one-quarter of states with a legislative purpose state-
ment or preamble in their juvenile law statutes-have redefined the purpose
of theirjuvenile courts. 84 These recent amendments ofjuvenile code purpose
clauses downplay the role of rehabilitation in the child's "best interest" and
acknowledge the importance of public safety, punishment, and individual
accountability in the juvenile justice system. One of the distinguishing
characteristics of the "new" juvenile law is that "in many jurisdictions
accountability and punishment have emerged among the express purposes of
juvenile justice statutes.''8 5
82 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B: 111 (1979); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-
01 (1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (Anderson 1969); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-101 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 631 (1967).
83 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-27-302 (1975); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West
1976); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102 (1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 902 (1953);
FLA, STAT. ANN. § 39.001 (West 1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-1 (1971); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 571-1 (1965); IDAHO CODE § 16-1801 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 701-2
(Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1 (West 1978); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 232.1 (West 1904); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1601 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 3002 (1977); MD. ANN. CODE § 3-802 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119,
§ 53 (West 1906); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.I (West 1939); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.011 (West 1959); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-103 (1979); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 211.011 (Vernon 1957); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102 (1947); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-246 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.031 (1949); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169B:1 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-21 (West 1929); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1-2 (1953); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 1962); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-516 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01 (1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.01 (Anderson 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1129 (West 1968); OR. REV.
STAT. § 419.474 (1959); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301 (Purdon 1972); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 14-1-2 (1944); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-470 (Law. Co-op. 1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-2 (1909); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101 (1970); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01 (Vernon 1943); UTAH CODE ANN. 78-3a-1 (1953); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 631 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227 (1950); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 13.40.010 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.01 (West 1955). (Note: Date
refers to the year that the juvenile code purpose clause was originally adopted).
84 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-27-302 (1987); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West
1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2)(a) (West Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1
(1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1 (Burns 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.011(2)
(West 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01(2) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-227 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (Supp. 1988); W. VA.
CODE § 49-1-1(a) (1986).
85 Walkover, supra note 81, at 523.
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The state of Washington, for example, revised its juvenile code along the
lines of the "justice" model, with an emphasis on retributive punishment
and "just deserts" rather than individualized treatment.8 6 The Washington
statute's purpose clause reflects these new goals.87 The revised Washington
code, however, excludes jury trials in juvenile proceedings.8"
The Minnesota legislature also redefined the purpose of its juvenile
courts.8 9 Minnesota derived its new statement of purpose from the Juvenile
Justice Standards, which recommend jury trials and determinate sentences
86 See, e.g., A. SCHNEIDER & D. SCHRAM, A COMPARISON OF INTAKE AND
SENTENCING DECISION-MAKING UNDER REHABILITATION AND JUSTICE MODELS OF
THE JUVENILE SYSTEM (1983) [hereinafter INTAKE AND SENTENCING DECISION-
MAKING]; A. SCHNEIDER & D. SCHRAM, A JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY FOR THE JUVENILE
COURT (1983) [hereinafter A JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY]; Clements, Symposium: Juvenile
Law Preface, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 285 (1979) (symposium on the revised Washington
juvenile code); Walkover, supra note 81, at 528-33.
87 The purpose clause of the Washington juvenile code states:
It is the intent of the legislature that a system capable of having primary
responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful
offenders ... be established. It is the further intent of the legislature that youth,
in turn, be held accountable for their offenses and that both communities and the
juvenile courts carry out their functions consistent with this intent. To effectuate
these policies, it shall be the purpose of this chapter to:
(a) Protect the citizenry from criminal behavior;
(b) Provide for determining whether accused juveniles have committed of-
fenses as defined by this chapter;
(c) Make the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal behavior;
(d) Provide for punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal
history of the juvenile offender;
(e) Provide due process for juveniles alleged to have committed an offense;
(f) Provide necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile of-
fenders;
(g) Provide for the handling of juvenile offenders by communities whenever
consistent with public safety;
(h) Provide for restitution to victims of crime;
(i) Develop effective standards and goals for the operation, funding, and
evaluation of all components of the juvenile justice system and related ser-
vices at the state and local levels; and
(j) Provide for a clear policy to determine what types of offenders shall
receive punishment, treatment, or both, and to determine the jurisdictional
limitations of the courts, institutions and community services.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (Supp. 1988).
'8 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.021.
89 "The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to be
delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by main-
taining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and by
developing individual responsibility jor lawful behavior." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.011(2) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added); see also JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS, STANDARD 1.1 (1980). See generally Feld, supra note 3,
at 197-203.
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that are proportional to the seriousness of the offense and injury.90 Although
Minnesota's new punitive purpose clause marks a fundamental philosophical
departure from its previous rehabilitative orientation,9 the legislature did
not provide for jury trials in juvenile proceedings.9 2
Similarly, other states have redefined the purpose of their juvenile courts
to include the following objectives: "correct juveniles for their acts of
delinquency"; 93 "provide for the protection and safety of the public";
9 4
"protect society . . . [while] recognizing that the application of sanctions
90 See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND SANCTIONS, STANDARDS 5.2, 6.2 (1980); JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO ADJUDICATION, STANDARD 4.1(A) (1980).
Changes in purposes clauses are more than cosmetic. Recently, for example, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals based its decision to transfer a youth from juvenile to
criminal court on the language of the amended purpose clause. See In re D.F.B., 430
N.W.2d 475 (Minn. App. 1988). In the D.F.B. decision, the court of appeals em-
phasized that
the 1980 amendments [to the purpose clause] reflect a shift in legislative attitude
regarding punishment as a goal of juvenile courts. Prior to the amendments the
stated purpose of those courts was to secure care and guidance, and to serve the
welfare of the minor child. . . . Prior to 1980, legislative concentration had been
directed toward rehabilitating all errant youths, not to punish them ...
Subsequent to the 1980 amendment .... [flor youths charged with the commis-
sion of a crime, a more punitive approach [has been] emphasized ...
Id. at 478.
91 See Feld, supra note 3, at 197-98.
912 Id. at 196. Moreover, in In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1987), the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a juvenile could not voluntarily waive juvenile
court jurisdiction in order to obtain a jury trial in an adult criminal proceeding. "The
legislature could, and apparently did, conclude that allowing a juvenile to waive
juvenile court jurisdiction for some perceived short-term benefit ignores the best
interests of the State in addressing juvenile problems as well as the overall interests
of the juvenile." Id. at 840.
93 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-27-302(b)(2) (1987).
9' CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1988). An earlier version of the
California purpose clause, adopted in 1976, provided that the purpose was to "pro-
tect the public from criminal conduct by minors; to impose on the minor a sense of
responsibility for his or her own acts." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (1976). The
current version of the purpose clause also authorizes "punishment that is consistent
with the rehabilitative objectives" and charges juvenile courts to "consider the
safety and protection of the public" as well as the best interests of the minor in
making its decisions. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1988). However,
the legislature qualifies its "punitive" thrust by insisting that " '[p]unishment,' for
the purposes of this chapter, does not include retribution." Id. A recent task force
examining juvenile justice administration in California also concluded that "[t]he
Juvenile Court Law of California, founded on the concept of rehabilitation, has been
amended to emphasize punishment and accountability as legitimate goals of the
system." PRIVATE SECTOR TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 3
(March 1987).
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which are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all
cases"; 95 "render appropriate punishment to offenders"; 96 "protect the
public by enforcing the legal obligations children have to society" ;97 "pro-
tect the welfare of the community and to ... control the commission of
unlawful acts by children"; 98 "protect the community against those acts of
its citizens which are harmful to others and ... reduce the incidence of
delinquent behavior"; 99 and "reduce the rate of juvenile delinquency and
... provide a system for the rehabilitation or detention of juvenile delin-
quents and the protection of the welfare of the general public." 100
Some courts recognize that these changes in legislative purpose clauses
signal basic changes in philosophical direction, "a recognition that child
welfare cannot be completely 'child centered.' "101 Courts, as well as legisla-
tures, increasingly acknowledge that "punishment" may be an acceptable
purpose of a juvenile court's "therapeutic" dispositions. In State v. Law-
ley, ' 0 2 the Washington Supreme Court reasoned that "sometimes punish-
ment is treatment" and upheld the legislature's conclusion that "account-
ability for' criminal behavior, the prior criminal activity and punishment
commensurate with age, crime and criminal history does as much to rehabili-
tate, correct and direct an errant youth as does the prior philosophy of
focusing upon the particular characteristics of the individual juvenile."' 03
Similarly, in In re Seven Minors,'0 4 the Nevada Supreme Court endorsed
punishment as a legitimate purpose of its juvenile courts:
By formally recognizing the legitimacy of punitive and deterrent sanc-
tions for criminal offenses juvenile courts will be properly and some-
what belatedly expressing society's firm disapproval of juvenile crime
and will be clearly issuing a threat of punishment for criminal acts to the
juvenile population.105
95 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2)(a) (West Supp. 1988).
96 HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1985).
97 IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1 (Burns 1980).
98 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01 (2) (Vernon 1986).
99 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227 (1988).
100 W. VA. CODE 49-1-1(a) (1986).
101 See, e.g., State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 409 n.8 (W. Va.
1980) (holding that a juvenile court cannot justify incarceration in a secure facility
based on rehabilitation alone; specific factors must support such a disposition). In
In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1984), the court analyzed
changes in juvenile purpose clauses and concluded that "[i]n 1984 the emphasis is on
protecting the citizens of the state of California from the child." The court also noted
that "the United States Supreme Court had recognized the actual purposes already
were similar to those of the adult criminal system." Id. at 958, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
102 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
103 Id. at 656-57, 591 P.2d at 773.
104 99 Nev. 427, 664 P.2d 947 (1983).
105 Id. at 932, 664 P.2d at 950.
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The court suggested that, in order to effect this purpose, "[j]uvenile courts
should be able to fashion reasonable punitive sanctions as part of disposi-
tional programs in delinquency cases."106 Possible sanctions include restitu-
tion, compensation for crime victims, and incarceration in detention
facilities and jails. 10 7
In State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert,08 the West Virginia Supreme Court
provided a comprehensive and thoughtful examination of the tensions be-
tween punishment and treatment in juvenile proceedings and the social
control functions of juvenile court intervention.
[I]t is now generally recognized that caring for the juvenile and control-
ling the juvenile are often quite contradictory processes. Much of our
juvenile law at the moment is predicated upon a healthy skepticism
about the capacity of the State and its agents to help children when they
are incarcerated in one of the juvenile detention facilities. Thus, the
control ofjuveniles and the treatment ofjuveniles (if that expression can
be used without conjuring Kafkaesque images) are frequently irrecon-
cilable goals. Furthermore, children can be dangerous, destructive,
abusive, and otherwise thoroughly anti-social, which prompts an en-
tirely understandable expectation in society of protection, even if we
have matured beyond expecting retribution. 10 9
After describing the often conflicting goals of juvenile court intervention and
the operational limitations of the rehabilitative model, the D.D.H. court
concluded:
In reaching the conclusion that rehabilitation alone does not exhaust the
goals of ajuvenile disposition, and that responsibility and deterrence are
also important elements in our juvenile philosophy, we have not simply
embraced a conservative theory that juvenile delinquents need to be
punished. Liberals and conservatives alike may find solace in this opin-
ion because we acknowledge what has been an unspoken conclusion:
our treatment looks a lot like punishment. At first glance an agreement
among commentators at both philosophical poles may appear strange;
however, both share the conclusion that treatment is often disguised
punishment. Liberals are pleased that juvenile courts must exercise
restraint in resorting to questionable "treatments" at the dispositional
stage and conservatives are pleased that it has been admitted that
punishment can be a viable goal of any given juvenile disposition.
While the conservatives talk about punishment as "retribution" and
the cornerstone of "responsibility," the liberal child advocates speak
in terms of the "right to punishment." Once the rehabilitative model is
accepted, the next fight is always to show that "treatment" is often a
caricature-something worthy of a story of Kafka or a Soviet mental
106 Id. at 436, 664 P.2d at 953.
107 Id. at 436 n.8, 664 P.2d at 953 n.8.
108 269 S.E.2d 401 (W. Va. 1980).
109 Id. at 408-09 (footnotes omitted).
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SAEi retfers to the minimum age for institutional commitment if ststed or where it differs from the mmum age for
delinquency jurisdiction. Maximom age refers to the age at which -jveni -court jurisdiction or sentence terminate auitonat-
ially_
O~FFENDER- O ETEDfl Indeterminate refers to the iaximim lengths of sentences pins ay additional extensions where
the indeternminacy is defined by a fixed time p~eriod rather than the maxinsim age of jurvenile court jurisdiction.
'''Yeer Adopted'' refers to the year that offense-oriented sentencing statutes or administrative guidelines were adopted.
A. COnE * 12 15-65(d) (1<=86) provides that evidence of any felony ''is sutficient to ststain a finding that the child is in
need of care or rehabilitation''; sash a tieding is a jurisdictional prerequisite to disposition.
AtAssiA SeAr- 47. 10-080 (1987) aithortzes commitment for amimt peiod of two years with the passibility of one
additional two-year exiension, except thai the initial commitment or extension may not extead beyond the minor s nineteenth
birthday. The statote also allows an additional one year of supervision ater age 19 with the jovenile's consent.
6 A~riona' s Ilepartment of Corrections adopted specific guidelines for the confinement of jti'vnites, porstiant to which youths
geclssfid nth= asis oFf teir os se~iou of-V nean ana-l -i t-rm of confine en fr prid of three to
eighteen months are pressnited, See tecxi notes 274-78 and accompanying teat,
CAr- WEL- a INs". COnE § 1769(a) (West 1984) provides that juveniles comitted to the California 'outh Authorty
""shall - .- be discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control or when the person reaches his or her 21st birthday,
whichever occic's later '.. "" owever, 6 t769(b) authorizes incarceration until age twenty flve of joveniles committed by a
juvenile cot for the commission of one of the catalogued offenses listed in C_ WE. e' a lNS'. COne _i 707(") (West 1914)_
'Thie catalogtie of offenses listed inclade avariety at niajor felonly offenses co -imitted by luveniles sixteen yeaLrs old or older. See
Feldspratextnote2.at507n.3 tra discssion of 707(b).
The decision to release juveniles committed to the California 'ooth Authority is made by an independent Yotthful
Offender Parole Board ('''OPfl'j, Se CA.i WiLt. r .ConE 6 4951-57 (West 184) The YOPr uses seven offcnse
categories to classify a youth for parole ehgibility, bascd on the seriousness of the commitment offense, a juvenile's parole
consideration date may range from lcss than one to seven years. See text notes 288 95 and accompaying text.
SCOLn. Rine. S'sT. § 19-1-103(28) (1986) defines a "violent jveneil offender asa youth thirteen years or older who is
adjuidicated, or whose probation is revolted, for a violent offense. Violent off enses inclhude cines in which a deadly weapon is
used oran elderly or handicapped person is the victim, murder, kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery, arson, and senious assault.
See Cni o. flEe. ST- § 16-11-309(2) (1986)
I° Corn- fle. Svi-Ar. § 19 1 103(23-5) (1986) definles a "'repeat juvenile offender"' as any yooth. previously ~djiudicated a
delinquent, who is subsequcntly adjudiceted or has probation revoked on the basis of conduct that would be a felony COn.
Ree. SeA- 19--1t-03(19.5) (1986) defines a 'mandatory sentence ofender'' as a juvenile with two print delinquency
adtjsdications or a delinquency adjudication with probation revoked who is snbsequoently adjtidicated delinqunent
C Otrn flee- SeAr[. § 19-1 103(2-1) (1986) dletines an "'aggravated juvenile offender'' as any youth twelve years or older
convicted of first or scond degree intolder, or any yoiitht sixteen years or older with aprior felony conviction whotis
subsequently adjudicatd deli uent for a violent offense
CoON. fiNn. S§AT- ANN. § 46b-141 (West 1980) provides that delinquency dispositions shall he indeteminate ip to a
of two years, with the possibility of one additional two year extension. If a juvenile is sentenced as juvenile
offender, the m minitial commitment is fotur years with the possibility of a additional two year extension.
ii Coon Gon- S-r,,. SeNN. § .lrb-120 (West 1980) defines "serous juvenile offense" as anyone of thirty-nine seriOUS
offenses, icltiding honmocide, assault, kidnapping, ai',i certain categories of burglary noad larcenly ' The dcteroilinate sentcncing
prneisionoperatesr whcn the juvenile would normally lic transferi-ed to crimlinal coon foi p~rosecution as anl adolt, but ithc
juvenile snort retains joris]itton_ See tel trou taxi note 2, at 141-42.
SD.C. ConE ANN- § 12322(a)(2) (1981) authorizes an indeterminate sentence of op to two yers, with procisions for
additioinal onieye extenions ui to tweity-oue Y.eas of age., the axiui age of jurisdiction.
s CAx. COne An-. 15-11-41(b) (1985) provides that delinquct youths (yoths commitied foi nondesignated felonies) are
committed to the I1ivision of -otith Services (the '13YS' ) for two years, although they may be discharged erlier_ In addition,
the D'S maay petition Ifs committing cntire for one additional two -year extension.16 The Georgia Dlivision of 'Youth Services has developed a five-category systeml for classifying committed youth, based on
public risl. institutional risk. and avariety ofmedical, eduational,and vocatonalneeds. A youth's minimumnndnaximun
length of slay are determined by pibtic risk classification, with ihe lowest risk-level youths serving foor to six months, and the
highest risk-levol yooths servtng eighteen to twenty months. See text notes 281-83 and accompanying texi
CA. COne ani § 15-11-37(b)-(d) (1985) defines two categores of dosignated felonies' those that allow for discretionary
mandatory minmu sentences, and those that reiluire the imposition of mandatory minimiim sentences. Foiirteen major
offeases aredefinedasdesignatedfelonies ifcommitted bya juvenile 13ormoreyeas ofage.inclodingmorder, manslaughter.
rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, and arson The juvenile coon retains discretion as to whether to impose a 'strictive
custody'' designated felony sentence 'Youths committed to the DYVS dcsigoated tetons are placed in custody for an miiial
live-year period- For designated felonies that result in seriotis physical injuiry In a pertson who is si sty two yeairs of a ge or older,
or for burglars with two prior borgiary adjudications, sentencing to 'resictive custody'' is m'ndatory.
0' Ox_ COnE Ann. § 15 1 1-37(e)(1) (1985) provides that a youth sentenced tinder the ''"designated felony'" provision is placed
in the custody of the flYS for a fleyear period, with the initial twelve to eighteen months served in confinement.
0' .W_ flEs' STrs- 6 571-48 (1985) allows a sentcncing coon, as a condition of probation, to incarcerate a jtenile far a
''term not to exceed one year..."
icL- ANN. SriT- . 37, para_ 805-35 (Smith-Itrd Sopp_ 1987) defines a flahitual Jovenile Oflender' as any youth with
two prior delinquency adjudications who is sobsequently convicted of one of a number of designated violent offenses that
incliide miurder, manslaughter, criminal sexoat assault, robbery, burglary, and arson_ An " "Habitual Juvenile Offender'' moust he
committed to the fepanment of Corections until his twenty-first birtiday withoi possoitiility ot parole
Inn. Cone Anr. § 3164-15.6 (West Sep. 1988) provides th a thn twelve yeas of age may not committed
to the Deparment of Corections, except for a child of age ten or eleven w-ho is convictei of murder
Iows ConE An § 232.53 (West 1985) provides that dispositions automatically terminate wvhen a chitd beomes eighteen
years of age. except that dispositional orders entered after achild has attauned the age of seventeen years gdsixmnonths, hot
prior to the age of eighteen, terminate one yea after the date of disposion
IKAN. STAr. ANN 6 38-1663(f) (1986) iestritts commitments to the State's youth center to those juvenile offenders who are
thirteen years of age or older and either have been adjiodicated for Class A. B, oi C felonies or have a pior delinqulency
adjudication_
S La- Cone Joe Pane art 89 (West 1988) provides two ages of automatic termination eighteen years old if the youth is
under the age of thirteen at the time of sentencing, and twenty-one years old if the youth is between the ages of thirteen ad
seventeen at the time of sentencing.
se- flee SAs- ANN- tit- 15, § 3316(2)(A) (Supp 1988) provides that commitmenis terminate at age eighteen, onless thc
coont expressly esiends the commlltmcent to age twenty-one_
154M0. CaS. St IUn. Pens ANN..1 3-825(b) (1984) provides a three-year imit on dispositions, although the court may renew
its order until a child becomes twenty-one yeas old
ttnD fee, SssAT. § 43 286 (1984) prohibits confining ynths tinder the age of twelve in stats training schools unless the
youth has violated p~robation or has com~mitted an additiona offense inch that the coont flilds the intetests of the jitveonile and thc
welfare of the community depend on the youth's com-mitment. -he tnmiage reiuirement does not apply in te event that
the pi cicot delinquency proceedinlg is for n.ird.- ... - -- .. h-'
2'NE- fne. SeAr- § 210.180 (Mielue 1955) anthories iistitutional ciinsmitments of delinquents between the ages of eight
and eighteen years of age Nes', fi- S--a- § 62-271 (Michie 1955) authorizes a coont that les placed a delinquent on probation
in place the youth in a courty jail or 'tate prison for violations of probation if the yonth is between the ages of eighteen and
twenty -one_
11 It ce4 . S'r. ANN 6 169-B['30 (Suopp- 1988) prohihits institutonaliation o minors tinder the age of elece unless the
coon has consulted with and exhausted all other placement options
n Ns _. flee S-r'T. oNN. § 169-f8, 19(111) (Sipp. 1988) authorizes dispositional jurisdiction op to the age of nineteen ever a
minor found to be delinquent after the youth's seventeenth birthday_
m eonplete di scuission of the 7ew Jersey juvenile sentencing statutes may be found in the Article at notes 169-83 and
accompanying text.
SN.J. ias. ANN § 2A'4A-44(c)(l) (West 1987) piohhiBts iticaieeration of juvetiles age eleven or youngei, excep t those
convicted of aron or crimes of the first or second' degiee
I N.J. S-tr, Ann, 6 2A'4A 47 (West 1987) provides that delinquency juiusdiction ends at age eighteen or one year from the
date of the dispositional order, except in cases involving mcarceration
Sili N.Y FAs. Cx Se'r 4 353.3(5) (Mectinuicy 1983) imposes a maximum oulter limit on iho length of a juvenile s initiol period
of placement: eighteen months for felonies and twclvc months for onidemar_
fit N." PAY- Cx. Acr § 301 2(8) (Mtcilutey 1983) provides an extensive lisi of "designated felony acts" that includes first
and second degree murder, first degree manslauighter, first degree kidnapping, first doegree arson, first degree assault, first and
second degree robbery, first and second degree burglary and first degree rape. nder the provisions of NY1 FYs Cr Are
S301.2(8) (McfKiinney 1983) some of the less serious designated felonies require a prior conviction of second degree assault,
second degree robbery, or another designated felony. .Y. PsiY. Cx. At , 301.2(9) ('c)Cinney 1983) defines Class A
designated felonies as any crime of first or second degree murder, first degree kidnapping, or first degree arson, if committed by
a juvenile thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years of age.
36 N.Y_ F__. C. Sex § 353.5(3) (McKfnney 1983) provides for a mandatory restrictive placement where thc victim oi a
designated felony is sixty two veers of age or older and tftrs serous pysical iniry.
it C- o.n- STAT- 7A 652(h)(1)(2) (1986) provides that a juvenile may be committed for an indetinite period p to the
juvenile's eighteenth birthday, or a definite term of no greater than two years, if the juvenile is over the age of fonreen, has been
previously adjudicated dehinquent for two or more felonies, and has previously been committed.
S Ni .3. CenT. Cone § 27--20--36(2) (Supp. 1987) provides that dispositionas are indeterminate toe a moaimium period of two
years and renewable foi additional two year periods
9 hI .5. CENx- Cone _ 27-20-36(6) (Supp. 1987) provides that all dtspositional orders affecting a youth who has attained the
age ot twenty years terinates and that youth is discharged from further obligation or control 1. CNT ConE 6 27 21 02
(Supp. 1987) provides that the state youth authority shall retain jurisdiction over the youth until the youth reaches the age of
eighteen.
40OII flEe. Cone. Sno. 56' 2151.353(4)-(6) (rage's Supp. 1987) aulthore mandatory m~inimnum sentences of six mntths or
one year witl the maximum length of sentence the youth's attainment of age twenty one. Youths convicted of murder ai
confined until age twenty-one.
41i O s. StA- An. tit- 10, 6 1139 (West 1987) establishes a minimum age often years old for institutional commitment and
a "mai mage of eighteen yeais old, with a possible extension to age nineteen pursuant to a court order
t 'Feno. COne SNN § 37 -- 1
3 7
(a>(l)( 13) u authoris institutional confinement tot a "determnlate period ot
time,' limitedonly by them xi mlength of the adult sentence,-foranyjovenilccoovictcdoaClssffe.nyoradjudicated
for three sep-ate telony offenses at least one of which resulted ininstitutional confinement, oranyjovende within six months of
his nineteenth birthday at the time of his adjudication of delinquency
'IT , COne ANN. f§ 39 2 702 (1982) defines a Class 2 felony as any of the following first or second degree murder
(excluding vehicolar homicide), angravated rape or seattal battery, aggravated kidnapping, rubbory accomplished by use of a
deadly weapon, aggravated arson, conspiracy to take human life or to commit a felony on the person of anothei assault with
intent to commit murer with bodily injury to the victim, the manutacture, delivery, sale, or possession of certaii controlled
sub-stances assault from ambush with a deadly weapon; or willful injury by explostves.
i 'Ean rFAM. COon ANN. 4 53.045 (Supp. 1989) allows a prosecutor to refer a juvenile petition to a grad jury if the youth is
charged with murdcr, capital murdcr, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, deadly assault on a law enforcement
officer, corrections officer, or court participant, or criminal attempt of capital murder I. t'sn. Cane Ann. 6 54.04(3) (Supp.
1989) provides that if the giand jury approves the petition a-d the juvenile is convicted of the of-ns- chaged, a determinate
sentence of up to thirty years is perotissible.
titUAn COne ANN 6 62A--7-01(14) (Supp. 1988) defines " youth offender'' as aerson over the age often and under the age
of twenty-one enlnitted by the juvenile court to the custody of the Division of 'onth Corections.
'VT_ STr- Ann- hi- 33, 6 632(a)(1)(c) (1982) pt-ovides that a yooth alleged to have sommnitted an act before the age of tan
that would be murder if committed by an adult may be sbject to delinquency proceedings.
NZ- STAT. Sn, tit. 33. 5 634(b) (1981) provides for the juvenile court in its discretion, to retan jorisdiction over a youth
up to the age of twenty-one if the youth has been found in have commnitted a delinquent act_
V T r ANN tit- 33, § 658(a) (Supp 1988) provides tihat dispositional orders are for an indeteminate period to be
"reviewed oneand one-half years from the dateentered and eachoneand one-half yeaisthereefter,'' terminating when the
child becomes eighteen years aid.
WAst_ fle Coe ANN. .S 13.40.300(c) (Sup 1989) provides for the extension of juvenile coon jurisdiction over a yonth
beyond the age of eighteen to the a of tey n if the court makes a foat finding that sn-h an extension is required to
allow for the execution ad entorcement of the court's disposition.
io WAStt_ fle CO E An § 13-40-020(1) (Sup- 1989) defines "Serious Offender" as ay individual fifteen years of age or
older who has been convicted of committing certain designated crimes, including a Class A. felony, first degree manslaughter,
second degree rape, second degree assanlt, second degree kidnapping, and second degree robbery.
WaIn. flee Coon AN 6 13_40 160(1) (Supp. 1989) provides that in the case of a serious offender, the court may impose a
dispnsition ontside the stadard range if a disposition within the standard range would effectuate a manifest injustice
S WSH- fEe COne Ann 6 13.40-020(13) (Supp- 1989) defines a "Middle Offender" as one who has committed an offense
who is neither a Minor Offender or a first offender nor a Serious Offender
WAs. ne COne ANN 6 13.40- 160(4) (Supp. 1989) provides that a court may impose a maimum sentence if imposition
of a sentence within the stada-d range for a Middle Offender would effectuate a manifest injustice.
4WASi. fRe- COnE Ann- 6 13-40.020(14) (Supp- 1989) defines a "minor or first offender"' as an inldividual sixteenl years of
age or younger whose current offense (or offenses) and criminal history tafi entirely within vannots combinations of minor
current offenses or prior convictions.
'S WASH flee COon ANN § 13.40-160(2) (Supp- 1989) provides that the court, if it deterines that the imposiltion of
community suoervision would effectuate a maiifest injusice, may impose asentence beyond community supervision.
0' W. V.. Cone6 49-5-13(Supp 1988) prvidescommitment gesoften to eightsen years of age for amaleyouth, while W
VA. Coe § 28-3-2 (1986) provides commitment ages of twelve to eighteen years of ago tor a female youth.
WIS STAT. ANN_ 4834(4)(m) (West 1987) limits the institutional confinement ofjuveniles to those convicted f foffenses
that, if committed by a adult, could result in incarceration of the offender for six months or more, ad the youth has been found
to be a danger to the pubtlic d to be in need of restrictive custodial treatment.
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hospital. Therefore, while the conservatives throw up their hands be-
cause they believe punishment works better than treatment, the juvenile
advocates return increasingly to punishment on the grounds that pun-
ishment is much less punishing than "treatment." 110
Unlike D.D.H., however, many legislatures and courts fail to consider
adequately whether a juvenile justice system can explicitly punish without
simultaneously providing criminal procedural safeguards such as a jury
trial.' Although a legislature certainly may conclude that punishment is an
appropriate goal and a legitimate strategy for controlling young offenders, it
must provide the procedural safeguards of the criminal law when it opts to
shape behavior by punishment. Any ancillary social benefit or individual
reformation resulting from punishment is irrelevant to the need for such
procedural protections. Confinement of ajuvenile for a determinate sentence
based on the nature of the offense committed still entails a loss of liberty
imposed explicitly to punish violations of the criminal law, regardless of
whether the length of confinement is shorter than for a similarly situated
adult and the place of incarceration is not called a "prison."
B. Dispositional Practices and the Juvenile Court's Sentencing
Framework
While the legislative purpose clause states whether the intent behind a
juvenile's disposition is punishment or treatment, analyzing the juvenile
court's statutory sentencing framework and dispositional practices may also
indicate whether there is a therapeutic "alternative purpose." When based
on the characteristics of the offense, the sentence usually is determinate and
proportional, with a goal of retribution or deterrence. When based on the
characteristics of the offender, however, the sentence is typically indetermi-
nate, with a goal of rehabilitation or incapacitation." 2 The theory that
correctional administrators will release an offender only when he is deter-
mined to be "rehabilitated" underlies indeterminate sentencing. When sen-
tences are individualized, the offense is relevant only for diagnosis. Thus, it
is useful to contrast offender-oriented dispositions, which are indeterminate
and non-proportional, with offense-based dispositions, which are determi-
nate, proportional, and directly related to the past offense. 1 3
110 Id. at 415-16. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
' West Virginia is among the small minority of states that provides for jury trials
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6 (1980).
112 See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 61; N. MORRIS, supra
note 56; H. PACKER, supra note 51, at 23-28; Allen, supra note 7, at 25.
'3 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text; see also INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMIN.-AM. BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND STANDARDS RELATING TO
SANCTIONS (1980).
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1. Indeterminate Sentencing in Juvenile Court
Historically, the premise of sentencing in the juvenile court system was
the "best interests" of the child-offender implemented through indetermi-
nate and non-proportional dispositions. 114
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl
committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he
is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interests of the
state to save him from a downward career. It is apparent at once that the
ordinary legal evidence in a criminal court is not the sort of evidence to
be heard in such a proceeding. 115
Judicial inquiry focuses not on a youth's prior conduct but rather on the
development of a program to alleviate the conditions that caused the youth's
delinquency. The delinquency disposition entails a variety of assumptions:
the causes of the "delinquency," its course if left untreated, the appropriate
forms of intervention to alter those conditions, and the ultimate prospects of
success; in short, it requires diagnosis, classification, prescription, and prog-
nosis.1 1 6 Because one cannot predict accurately the length of rehabilitative
therapy necessary to ensure success, sentences are characteristically inde-
terminate.
As Table I indicates, the contemporary juvenile sentencing provisions of
114 Conceptually, juvenile delinquency is a legal hybrid, falling between criminal
law and mental health civil commitments. See, e.g., Cohen, Juvenile Offenders:
Proportionality vs. Treatment, 8 CHILDREN'S RTS. REP. 2 (1978); Schultz & Cohen,
Isolationism in Juvenile Court Jurisprudence, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD
21 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976). From its inception, juvenile court intervention was
deliberately flexible, individualized, and highly discretionary to afford maximum
latitude to juvenile justice administrators. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 58-60,
248-60.
115 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909). Appellate
court judges, as well as their juvenile court counterparts, emphasize the civil and
therapeutic nature of juvenile court intervention. In In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109
A.2d 523 (1954), for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted:
The proceedings in [a juvenile] court are not in the nature of a criminal trial but
constitute merely a civil inquiry or action looking to the treatment, reformation
and rehabilitation of the minor child. Their purpose is not penal but protec-
tive,-aimed to check juvenile delinquency and to throw around a child, just
starting, perhaps, on an evil course and deprived of proper parental care, the
strong arm of the State acting as parens patriae. The State is not seeking to
punish an offender but to salvage a boy who may be in danger of becoming one,
and to safeguard his adolescent life. Even though the child's delinquency may
result from the commission of a criminal act the State extends to such a child the
same care and training as to one merely neglected, destitute or physically
handicapped.
Id. at 603-04, 109 A.2d at 525.
116 The ability to diagnose the causes of delinquency and prescribe cures for it has
been critiqued extensively. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 32; Feld, supra note 4.
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most states reflect their Progressive origins. Following an adjudication of
delinquency, the state statutes typically offer a range of sentencing alterna-
tives-dismissal, probation, out-of-home placement, or institutional con-
finement-and give the juvenile court judge broad discretion to impose an
appropriate disposition."' Some legislatures instruct the court to consider
the "least restrictive alternative '" 8 when choosing among dispositional
options in the child's "best interests.""' 9
Most juvenile sentences are indeterminate; confinement ranges from one
day to a period of years until the offender reaches the age of majority or
some other statutory age.120 In Gault, for example, fifteen-year-old Gerald
Gault allegedly made "lewd phone calls" for which he was committed to the
State Industrial School "for the period of his minority [that is, until age 21],
unless sooner discharged by due process of law.' ,12' An adult convicted of
the same offense would face a fine of fifty dollars or imprisonment for a
maximum of two months.122 While the majority of indeterminate juvenile
sentencing statutes continue for the duration of minority or some other
maximum age,'12 3 a minority prescribe a statutory maximum sentencing
period for juvenile offenders, typically two years with judicial authority to
extend for an additional two years or more. 124 Most adolescent offenders,
however, reach the age necessary for statutory termination of their sentence
before the initial maximum sentencing period, plus any extension can be
117 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11 (Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-48
(Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.52 (West 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1330
(Law. Co-op. 1985).
1"I Professor Cohen has noted that
[s]tatutory guides for the selection of dispositions and for the conduct of disposi-
tional proceedings are virtually nonexistent. The "best interests of the child"
and "the protection of the community" represent the most frequently used
statutory language and are so obviously broad and inherently contradictory as to
call for little comment.
Cohen, supra note 114, at 2.
119 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-436(3) (1985) (advocating the "least restrictive
disposition consistent with the best interest and welfare of the juvenile and society
.. "); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.52(1) (West 1985).
0 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2322(f) (1981) (age 21); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.11(c) (West Supp. 1988) (age 19); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.082 (1985) (age 20).
121 Gault, 387 U.S. at 7-8.
122 See id. at 8-9.
123 With the reduction of the age of majority from 21 to 18, some jurisdictions
continue dispositions even beyond the age of majority. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.181 Subd. 4 (West 1986) (age 19). See generally Forst, Fisher & Coates,
Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing of Juvenile Delinquents: A National
Study of Commitment and Release Decision-Making, 36 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 7 (1985).
124 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(1)(3)(A) (1984) (two-year sentence maxi-
mum with two-year extension; sentence not to extend beyond 19th birthday). See
generally Forst, Fisher & Coates, supra note 123, at 9.
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completed. Within the broad range of sentences authorized by the juvenile
law statutes, the judge's authority is virtually unrestricted.
Even states that subscribe to traditional indeterminate sentences for
juveniles increasingly recognize the significance of the "Principle of Of-
fense" as a dispositional constraint. The North Carolina legislature requires
its judges to "select the least restrictive disposition ... that is appropriate to
the seriousness of the offense, the degree of culpability indicated by the
circumstances of the particular case and the age and prior record of the
juvenile. '1 25 Similarly, Iowa judges must consider "the seriousness of the
delinquent act, the child's culpability as indicated by the circumstances of
the particular case, the age of the child and the child's prior record.' '1 26
Oklahoma courts must consider a juvenile's violent, aggressive, or assaul-
tive behavior, and habitual or multiple serious acts of delinquency in making
institutional placements.12 7
2. Legislative and Administrative Changes in Juvenile Court Sentencing
Statutes-De Jure Dispositional Decisionmaking
The punishment-treatment dichotomy is most explicit in the context of the
decision whether to imprison juveniles. In the vast majority of indeterminate
jurisdictions, the judge's sentencing power ends with a commitment to the
state's juvenile correctional agency. 128 Thereafter, the juvenile correctional
authority or a parole board determines when a youth should be released from
custody.
Table I summarizes juvenile sentencing legislation among the states. The
column "Age" refers to the minimum age, if any, for institutional confine-
ment and the age at which juvenile court jurisdiction terminates automat-
ically. The column "Offender Oriented" refers to the maximum length of an
indeterminate sentence, whether it be the maximum age of jurisdiction or
some statutorily fixed period.
Indeterminate sentencing schemes typically include an unspecified period
of confinement with a wide range between the minimum and maximum
125 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-646 (1986).
126 IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.52(1) (West 1985).
127 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1138 (West 1987).
128 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080 (1984). In In re Welfare of M.D.A. v.
State, 306 Minn. 390, 237 N.W.2d 827 (1975), the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed
the allocation of commitment and release authority between the juvenile court and
the commissioner of corrections. The court concluded that the "statute places the
authority over final dispositions of juveniles exercised [in Minnesota] by the juvenile
court in the hands of the commissioner of corrections once the juvenile court has
committed the delinquent child to his custody.... [T]he Juvenile Court Act does not
confer jurisdiction upon the juvenile court to review a decision of the commissioner
of corrections to release a juvenile. . . . [S]uch a decision is properly that of the
commissioner acting alone." Id. at 829-30. See generally Forst, Fisher & Coates,
supra note 123, at 5-6.
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length; a release decision made after incarceration and based, in part, on
behavior during confinement; and a release decision based on progress
toward rehabilitation rather than on formal standards . 29 The columns under
"Offense Oriented"--"Determinate" and "Mandatory Minimum"-sum-
marize the elements of a determinative sentencing framework. The column
labeled "Commitment Discretion" indicates whether the judge retains sen-
tencing discretion or must impose the sentence mandated. The final column,
"Year Offense Criteria Added," shows when the legislature, the correc-
tional administrators, or both adopted offense criteria to govern commit-
ments and releases.
In contrast to the indeterminate sentencing schemes, a determinate sen-
tencing framework usually includes a presumptive sentence or narrow dis-
positional range; an early determination of length of institutional stay set
either at the time of adjudication or shortly thereafter; and a sentence based
on formal, articulated standards that are proportional to the seriousness of
the youth's present offense, any prior record, and age. 130 To the extent that
the length of the sentence is determined by a judge at trial or shortly after
commitment, it reflects the offender's prior conduct. Alternatively, if the
sentence is determined by an administrative agency during the later stages of
confinement, it is more likely to reflect the offender's conduct during
confinement. 13,
The statutes summarized in Table I reveal that about one-third of the
states currently use offense-based criteria to regulate decisions on juvenile
institutional commitment and release. These determinate and mandatory
minimum sentencing provisions require judges to consider the present of-
fense, the prior record of the youth, or both.
(a) Determinate Sentences in Juvenile Court. For most of this century,
theories of positivism and the use of confinement for utilitarian, preventive,
or rehabilitative purposes dominated sentencing practices. 3 2 Indeterminate
sentences were the norm as long as the view prevailed that offenders should
129 See, e.g., Forst, Fisher & Coates, supra note 123, at 4. Professor Alan Der-
showitz notes:
The indeterminate sentence is not a unitary concept of precise definition. It is
a continuum of devices designed to tailor punishment, particularly the duration
of confinement, to the rehabilitative needs and special dangers of the particular
criminal (or more realistically, the category of criminals).
A sentence is more or less indeterminate to the extent that the amount of time
actually to be served is decided not by the judge at the time sentence is imposed,
but rather by an administrative board while the sentence is being served.
Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinements: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 297, 298 (1974); see also INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR
Ass'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS 24 n.6 (1980).
130 Forst, Fisher & Coates, supra note 123, at 4.
131 Dershowitz, supra note 129, at 301-02.
132 See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 129, at 297; Zalman, The Rise and Fall of the
Indeterminate Sentence, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 45, 87 (1977).
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be treated rather than punished, that the duration of confinement should
relate to rehabilitative needs, and that therapists possessed the scientific
expertise to determine an offender's progress toward reform. Indeterminacy
is based on the assumption that the goal of rehabilitation can be achieved and
that the technical means to achieve it are available. 133
The precipitous decline of support for the rehabilitative ideal in the 1970s
stemmed from dissatisfaction over empirical results. The apparent failure of
the rehabilitative effort reawakened the quest for penal justice. Courts
sentenced similarly situated offenders on the basis of relatively objective
factors such as their offenses. 134 In a justice system in which reform of
offenders remains elusive, the quest for consistent sentencing acquires
greater allure.
1) Washington. The most dramatic departure from traditional parens
patriae juvenile rehabilitation occurred in 1977, when the State of Washing-
ton enacted "just deserts" sentencing principles for its juvenile justice
system.'35 The primary goals of the new legislation were to assure individual
and systemic accountability through presumptive sentencing guidelines. 13 6
133 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 129, at
26. As the American Friends Service Committee noted:
The underlying rationale of [the indeterminate sentencing] model is deceptively
simple ... [lit would save the offender through constructive measures of refor-
mation, protect society by keeping the offender locked up until that reformation
is accomplished, and reduce the crime rate not only by using cure-or-detention
to eliminate recidivism, but hopefully also by the identification of potential
criminals in advance so that they can be rendered harmless by preventive
treatment .... Carried to an extreme, the sentence for all crimes would be the
same: an indeterminate commitment to imprisonment, probation, or parole,
whichever was dictated at any particular time by the treatment program. Any
sentence would be the time required to bring about rehabilitation, a period which
might be a few weeks or a lifetime.
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 61, at 37.
134 See, e.g., F. ALLEN, supra note 9; INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR
Ass'N, supra note 129, at 26-27; authorities cited supra notes 58, 61-63 and accom-
panying text.
135 See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.0 (Supp. 1988). See generally Krajick, A Step
Toward Determinacy Jor Juveniles, CORRECTIONS MAG. 37 (Sept. 1977); see also
supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
136 A JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY, supra note 86, at 2.
Presumptive dispositions, proportionate to the offense, age, and prior criminal
record of the offender, were viewed as mechanisms to achieve greater uni-
formity among youths who had committed similar types of offenses as well as
greater uniformity from one area of the state to another. It was generally
believed that youths from rural areas of the state were being institutionalized for
offenses that would not even be filed in King county [Seattle]. Those who framed
the law wanted the disposition to be based on the act that was committed rather
than on the "needs of the child," or the "past social history," or the child's
"best interests," as these presumably benevolent criteria were believed to have
produced inequity and unfairness.
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Legislative guidelines emphasized uniformity, consistency, proportionality,
equality, and accountability, rather than rehabilitation.137 Under these guide-
lines, presumptive sentences for juveniles are determinate and proportional
to the age of the offender, the seriousness of the offense, and the juvenile's
prior record. 38
As summarized in Table 1, the Washington juvenile code creates three
categories of offenders-serious, middle, and minor-with presumptive
sentences and standard ranges for each. 39 A sentencing guidelines commis-
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). The principle legislative sponsor of Washington's pre-
sumptive sentencing asserted that the rationale for the scheme was "to hold
youngsters more accountable for their crimes by dealing with them according to the
nature and frequency of their criminal acts rather than on the basis of their social
background and need for treatment." Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile
Code: An Introduction, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 289, 308 (1979).
13' Becker, supra note 136, at 307-08. Becker notes "the new law moves away
from the parens patriae doctrine of benevolent coercion, and closer to a more
classical emphasis on justice. The law requires the court to deal more consistently
with youngsters who commit offenses .... Serious offenders are to be incarcerated
as a matter of public safety." Id. at 307.
13' See WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(c), (d) (Supp. 1988). See generally
B. FISHER, M. FRASER & M. FORST, INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT AND RELEASE
DECISION-MAKING FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF DETERMI-
NATE AND INDETERMINATE APPROACHES, WASHINGTON STATE-A CASE STUDY
(1985); A JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY, supra note 86; Clements, supra note 86. One scholar,
commenting on Washington's juvenile sentencing statute, noted:
A presumptive sentencing scheme plays a key role in ensuring juvenile ac-
countability for offenses committed. Presumptive dispositions are tied to the
youth's age, the offense committed, and the history and seriousness of previous
offenses. The statute provides both upper and lower limits on the standard
dispositional range and sets out aggravating and mitigating factors for sentencing
within the range. Dispositions can be made outside the standard range only
where to do otherwise would create a manifest injustice .... Juvenile sentenc-
ing practice may be said to no longer focus on the "needs" of the offender.
Rather, dispositions are carefully tailored to hold juveniles accountable in pro-
portion to the culpability of their acts and their criminal history.
Walkover, supra note 81, at 530-31. Professors Patrick and Jensen note that
[t]he new juvenile code in Washington codifies a philosophical shift in the
treatment of juvenile offenders. Traditionally, the juvenile courts have acted as a
quasi-rehabilitative agency which, in loco parentis, "benevolently" protected
the welfare of a youth in need of help. The new juvenile code, however....
limits the juvenile court's function to that of trier of fact and holds the juvenile
offender accountable to society for his actions. The juvenile will no longer be
treated as a delinquent possessing a misguided perception of society; rather, he
will be classified as an "offender" of society who must be dealt with in a like
manner.
Patrick & Jensen, Changes in Rights and Procedures in Juvenile Olffnse Proceed-
ings, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 313, 313 (1979).
139 These categories of offenders are defined in WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.020(1), (13), (14) (Supp. 1988).
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sion developed dispositional and presumptive length-of-stay guidelines in
the form of standard ranges (in weeks) that are proportionate to the serious-
ness of the present offense, age, and prior record. 140 The sentencing judge
has the responsibility of classifying a youth as a minor, middle, or serious
offender, but he cannot set indeterminate sentences for the offenders. In-
stead, the judge refers to a dispositional schedule that prescribes the stan-
dard range of sentences for a youth with that offense record.' 41 The judge
may deviate from the presumptive guidelines only by finding with "clear
and convincing evidence" that following the dispositional guidelines would
produce a "manifest injustice.' ' 42 Any disposition outside of the standard
range may be appealed by the State or the juvenile. 143 The guidelines provide
that a first or "minor" offender may not be institutionalized, while the most
menacing "serious" offender must be institutionalized for 125 weeks to
three years.144 After a youth is incarcerated, institutional staff make security
level assignments, facility placements, and program recommendations. A
release date must be set by the time a youth has served sixty percent of the
minimum sentence imposed. 45
An evaluator of the revised Washington code concluded that it improved
juvenile sentencing practices: "Sentences in the post-reform era were con-
siderably more uniform, more consistent, and more proportionate to the
seriousness of the offense and the prior criminal record of the youth than
were the sentences in the rehabilitation system which existed before
1978. ' 146 The evaluation also reports that while referrals to juvenile courts
increased, commitments to correctional facilities declined, resulting in "a
substantial and marked reduction in the severity of sanctions .... ,147
Another study of Washington's sentencing practices noted a clear correla-
tion between the seriousness of the offense and a youth's length of stay. 148
140 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.030(1)(a) (Supp. 1988) (stating that the
"juvenile disposition standards commission shall propose to the legislature ...
ranges which may include terms of confinement and/or community supervision
established on the basis of a youth's age, the instant offense, and the history and
seriousness of previous offenses .... ).
141 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.160 (Supp. 1988). Illustrative copies of the
Washington dispositional guidelines are reproduced in F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G.
Dix & R. PARNAS, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESS 846-51 (3d ed. 1985).
141 WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 14.40.160(1) (Supp. 1988). The Washington code
defines "manifest injustice" as "a disposition that would either impose an excessive
penalty on the juvenile or would impose a serious, and clear danger to society in light
of the purposes of this chapter." Id. at § 13.40.020(12).
141 Id. at § 13.40.160(1).
144 F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, supra note 141, at 849-51.
145 B. FISHER, M. FRASER & M. FORST, supra note 138, at 19, 24-25.
146 INTAKE AND SENTENCING DECISION-MAKING, supra note 86, at 76.
147 Id. at 30-31.
j48 See B. FISHER, M. FRASER & M. FORST, supra note 138. Professors Fisher,
Fraser, and Forst's report notes that while the average length of stay in a Washington
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Despite increased uniformity, certainty, and proportionality at sentencing,
Washington's juvenile code revisions have been criticized. Professional
commentators concede that institutional commitments declined in the first
years following the new juvenile code's adoption. They note, however, that
as more youths acquired extensive prior records, the number of youths
incarcerated has increased, while the average length of stay has dropped to
keep pace with the increase in commitments. 1 9 The commentators con-
cluded that "the Washington experience does not justify emulation, either in
terms of its success or cost benefit.'
150
In State v. Lawley, 1" 1 the "just deserts" philosophy of Washington's new
juvenile code was challenged, the defendant arguing that the legislative
changes in purpose and sentencing practices had made the proceedings
essentially criminal in nature and thus entitled him to a jury trial. The
Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that the legislature's attempts to
hold juveniles accountable for criminal behavior and to punish them on the
basis of their present and past offenses might seem to convert juvenile court
proceedings into criminal proceedings. They found, however, that the legis-
lation authorized treatment as well as punishment and required that juveniles
be incarcerated in facilities other than adult penal institutions. 152 The Lawley
training school is approximately six months, burglars serve nearly nine months and
robbers more than seventeen months. Id. at 31-32. Moreover, offense-related vari-
ables correlated highly with a youth's length of institutional stay. Id. at 33. While a
youth's post-commitment conduct in the institution also correlated with the length of
the institutional stay, this follows from the use of presumptive sentencing ranges-
youths who obey the rules are released at the end of their minimum range, whereas
youths who run away or receive numerous disciplinary write-ups are likely to serve a
maximum sentence. Id. at 38-39.
149 A. BREED & R. SMITH, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A MODEL OR AN
IDEOLOGY? 25-27 (on file at the Boston University Law Review); see also INTAKE
AND SENTENCING DECISION-MAKING, supra note 86, at 24.
The average number of commitments to the Department of Juvenile Rehabilita-
tion dropped substantially after the legislation was implemented and remained
below the 1975-1978 commitment rate for more than two years. . . . [H]owever,
the number of youths committed increased steadily from its lowest point ...
until by the last half of 1981, commitments were higher than they had been in the
pre-reform era.
Id. This increase is attributed to "the gradual build-up of prior criminal history [that]
has increased the number of [criminal history score] points for juveniles committing
their second, third, fourth, and subsequent offenses. Thus, the increase in commit-
ments may be due primarly [sic] to the increased number of prior adjudicated [and
diverted] offenses." Id. at 30.
,50 A. BREED & R. SMITH, supra note 149, at 27.
151 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
152 Id. at 657, 591 P.2d at 773. The Washington Supreme Court was guided by a
post-Gault decision, Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968). Estes
denied a right to ajury trial because delinquency hearings were non-criminal proceed-
ings where a juvenile could
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court reasoned that punishment may sometimes serve as treatment and held
that the legislature could permissibly conclude that "accountability for crim-
inal behavior, the prior criminal activity and punishment commensurate with
age, crime, and criminal history does as much to rehabilitate, correct and
direct an errant youth as does the prior philosophy of focusing upon the
particular characteristics of the individual juvenile." 53 Thus, although Law-
ley's sentence was determinate and proportional, the court held that a jury
trial was not constitutionally required. In subsequent decisions, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court emphasized that since treatment is not formally
precluded, the juvenile justice system is not the equivalent of the adult
criminal process.. 4 Washington courts, however, have experienced consid-
be offered the benefits of an informal hearing at which rules of fairness and basic
procedural rights are observed. Such results can be obtained without the formal-
ity of a jury trial. One of the substantial benefits of the juvenile process is a
private, informal hearing conducted outside the presence of a jury.
Id. at 268, 438 P.2d at 208. The Lawley court rejected the defendants argument that
the Estes decision should not rule because of the significant changes in the juvenile
code in 1977, concluding that the new code did not differ enough from the pre-1977
juvenile code to merit a jury trial. 91 Wash. 2d ai 656-58, 591 P.2d at 772-73.
Evaluation of the objectives of the Washington legislature clearly contradict the
Lawley court's analysis. Professors Schneider and Schram conclude:
[Tihe philosophy of the law is unambiguous. There is no attempt to incorporate
the new approach, with its emphasis on accountability, uniformity, propor-
tionality, and due process into a system in which rehabilitation and treatment are
still viewed as the most important goals . . . . In Washington, treatment and
rehabilitation are important objectives insofar as they might contribute to a
reduction in recidivism, but they are not the primary goals and, most impor-
tantly, decisions regarding the processing of cases are not to be made in terms
of the treatment needs of the youth.
INTAKE AND SENTENCING DECISIoN-MAKING, supra note 86, at 1-2 (emphasis
added).
15' Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d at 656-57, 591 P.2d at 773-74. Other courts have been more
sensitive to the Orwellian "double-think" idea that "sometimes punishment is treat-
ment." See, e.g., In re L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
("Reason does not permit a distinction between punitive incarceration and a so-
called 'placement' to 'teach you discipline,' a disposition explained as the end of
personal choice and as a consequence of breaking rules."); see also Gammons v.
Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148, 696 P.2d 700 (1985) (Feldman, J., dissenting).
Allowing criminal prosecution and punishment without proof of mens rea by the
simple expedient of calling such prosecution "civil" or "rehabilitative" confers
too much dignity on juvenile court euphemisms. It is only to the love-struck poet
that stone walls do not a prison make, nor iron bars a cage. To the rest of
mankind, to be "awarded" to the department of corrections and put behind
stone walls or iron bars is to be in prison, even if it is called "juvenile rehabilita-
tion."
Id. at 153, 696 P.2d at 705.
'5 See, e.g., State v. Rice, 48 Wash. 2d 384, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982). The Rice court
allowed juveniles' sentences to exceed the adult statutory maximum for those of-
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erable difficulty in treading the fine linu between the "twin principles of
rehabilitation and punishment. ' ' 15
The dissent in Lawley argued that a jury trial is required because juvenile
court proceedings first decide whether the youth committed the alleged
offense and then punish the offender proportionally to that offense. The
dissent's analysis of the Washington purpose clause and sentencing legisla-
tion differed sharply from that of the majority:
In these provisions the legislature has made it clear that it is no longer
the primary aim of the juvenile justice system to attend to the welfare of
the offending child, but rather to render him accountable for his acts, to
punish him, and to serve society's demand for retribution. While the
punishment prescribed may well be less than that imposed upon offend-
ing adults for the same offense, it nevertheless involves . . .a loss of
liberty. . . . The present act focuses upon the purposes which are
generally served by adult criminal law.1 5
6
The dissent reasoned that although the Supreme Court in McKeiver was
reluctant to impose the requirement of jury trials on states still pursuing the
"rehabilitative ideal" in their juvenile systems, once the Washington legisla-
ture reshaped the purpose and practices of the state's system so as to punish
offenders, the judiciary had no choice but to recognize that jury trials were
required.'15
fenses on the grounds that in the juvenile system, unlike the adult system, there
exists a policy of "responding to the needs" of offenders. Id. at 392-93, 655 P.2d at
1150. The court noted that
[t]he [Juvenile Justice Act] has not utterly abandoned the rehabilitative ideal
which impelled the juvenile justice system for decades. It does not embrace a
purely punitive or retributive philosophy. Instead, it attempts to tread an equato-
rial line somewhere midway between the poles of rehabilitation and retribution.
Id. at 393, 655 P.2d at 1150-51. The dissent in Rice, however, noted that apart from
the fundamental shift in sentencing philosophy, "[a] juvenile still shares with an adult
offender the one feature that overwhelms the differences between their circum-
stances-they are both incarcerated against their will." Id. at 408, 655 P.2d at 1158
(Dore, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 394,655 P.2d at 1151; see, e.g., In re Smiley, 96 Wash. 2d 950,640 P.2d 7
(1982) (holding that the juvenile court was entitled to maintain concurrent jurisdiction
regarding a sentence for a past juvenile offense, even though the juvenile had
committed a post-majority offense); In re Erickson, 24 Wash. App. 808, 604 P.2d 518
(1979) (holding that juvenile sentences, like adult criminal sentences, constitute
punishment for crimes sufficient to fall within the constitutional exception to involun-
tary servitude); In re Trambitas, 96 Wash. 2d 329, 635 P.2d 122 (1981) (holding that
the time that juveniles are held in pre-adjudication detention must be credited against
their eventual sentences).
156 State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 662, 591 P.2d 772, 775-76 (1979) (Rosellini,
J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 663-64, 591 P.2d at 776 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). See generally Feld,
supra note 2, at 251-56; Walkover, supra note 81, at 530-31.
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Less than a decade later, in State v. Schaaf,158 the Washington Supreme
Court reexamined and affirmed its decision in Lawley. The issue in Schaaf,
as in Lawley, was whether a jury trial was constitutionally required because
of changes in Washington's juvenile justice system. In other words, did
"Ujuvenile proceedings remain rehabilitative in nature and distinguishable
from adult criminal prosecutions?" 1 5 9 Although the Schaaf court's principal
concern was the administrative impact of jury trials on the juvenile justice
system' 60 the court proferred other reasons the juvenile an adult sys-
tems were not analogous.
The fact that juveniles are accountable for criminal behavior does not
erase the differences between adult and juvenile accountability. The
penalty, rather than the criminal act committed, is the factor that distin-
guishes the juvenile code from the adult criminal justice system ...
[T]he purpose of the juvenile system is to provide an alternative to
incarceration in adult correctional facilities. 161
While the Schaaf court recognized that some of its prior decisions acknowl-
edged the similarities between juvenile and criminal courts, 162 it insisted that
the juvenile court legislation had not completely rejected the ideal of re-
habilitating juvenile offenders.163 The court noted that the continued pres-
158 109 Wash. 2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987).
159 Id. at 5, 743 P.2d at 242.
Il Id. at 3, 743 P.2d at 241.
While we recognize the importance of the right to trial by jury, we also recognize
the realities of life, and the enormous impact that jury trials would have on the
juvenile justice system. We question whether the system, as presently struc-
tured, could even begin to absorb jury trials in juvenile cases without a restruc-
turing of the entire legal system.
ld.
161 Id. at 7, 743 P.2d at 243.
162 See, e.g., State v. Q.D., 102 Wash. 2d 19, 23, 685 P.2d 557, 560 (1984) (entitling
juveniles to use the common law infancy mens rea defense because -[b]eing a
criminal defense ... [it] should be available to juvenile proceedings that are criminal
in nature"); State v. Bird, 95 Wash. 2d 83, 88, 622 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1980) (holding that
juvenile offenses are in certain situations sufficiently analogous to crimes to allow
trial courts to suspend juvenile sentences); State v. Erickson, 24 Wash. App. 808,
809, 604 P.2d 513, 514 (1979) (holding that ajuvenile disposition order "constitute[s]
'punishment for crime' sufficient to fall within the constitutional exception to in-
voluntary servitude").
163 109 Wash. 2d at 10, 743 P.2d at 244 (1987). The court relied on language from its
decision in State v. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d 384, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982).
[W]hile the [Juvenile Justice Act] shares with the adult system the purposes of
rendering a child accountable for his acts, punishing him and exacting retribution
from him, such purposes are tempered by, and in some cases must give way to,
purposes of responding to the needs of the child. . . . [Tihe [Juvenile Justice Act]
has not utterly abandoned the rehabilitative ideal which impelled the juvenile
justice system for decades. It does not embrace a purely punitive or retributive
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ence of other informal and flexible procedures distinguished juvenile from
criminal courts. 164
Justice Goodloe, writing the dissent in Schaaf, argued that Washington's
legislature and juvenile courts "have so far departed from a 'rehabilitative'
model of juvenile justice as to render any differences from adult criminal
justice too minor to justify the withholding of the right to a jury trial.' '1 65
Reiterating the Lawley dissent, Justice Goodloe analyzed earlier Washington
decisions that emphasized "the similarities between the juvenile and the
adult criminal justice system,'"1 66 and noted that legislative changes per-
mitted the transfer of some juvenile offenders to the Department of Correc-
tions for adult incarceration without the benefit of a jury trial.167 The dissent
concluded that "[t]he reality of the [Juvenile Justice Act] is that rehabilita-
tion no longer remains a substantial goal of the juvenile criminal justice
system ."168
2) New Jersey. As part of a comprehensive juvenile code revision, the
New Jersey legislature instructed juvenile courts to consider the characteris-
tics of an offense and the criminal history of the offender when sentencing
and provided for enhanced sentences for certain serious or repeat offend-
ers. 169 New Jersey's code revisions reflect a desire to promote uniform
terms in sentencing and to judge delinquent acts similarly based on their
characteristics. 170 Although the juvenile court judge retains discretion over
the commitment decision, he must base his decision on legislatively pre-
scribed offense-based criteria.17' The New Jersey code lists "aggravating
philosophy. Instead, it attempts to tread an equatorial line somewhere midway
between the poles of rehabilitation and retribution.
Id. at 393, 98 P.2d at 1150.
161 State v. Schaff, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 12-13, 743 P.2d 240, 245-46 (1987).
165 Id. at 23, 109 P.2d at 250-51 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 25, 743 P.2d at 252; see sources cited supra note 157.
167 Schajf, 109 Wash. 2d at 26, 743 P.2d at 252 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 27, 743 P.2d at 253 (emphasis added).
161, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4A-43(a), -44(a), (d) (West 1987).
170 Id. at § 2A:4A-20. (Senate Judiciary Committee Statement at § 25); see also
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY DISPOSITION COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE NEW JERSEY
CODE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 14 (1986):
One objective of the Code is to increase uniformity and equity in the handling
of juvenile cases. This lack of uniformity was viewed as a major pre-Code
problem. . . . [V]ariations in court practices had led to disparity in treatment
and, in some cases, to insufficient due process protections. . . . A series of
standards and "guidelines" require the court to weigh certain factors in arriving
at dispositions, prohibit the incarceration of certain offenders and relate the
terms of incarceration the court may impose to offenses.
171 In determining the appropriate disposition for a juvenile adjudicated delinquent
the court shall weigh the following factors:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense;
(2) The degree of injury to persons or damage to property caused by the
juvenile's offense;
1988]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68: 821
and mitigating factors" to guide the court's decision whether or not to
incarcerate a youth. 72 Finally, the legislation creates a "presumption of
nonincarceration for any crime or offense of the fourth degree or less"
where the juvenile has no record of a prior offense.17 1
As indicated in Table I, the New Jersey juvenile code authorizes substan-
tial sentences for the most serious crimes and proportionally shorter sen-
tences for less serious offenses.1 74 In addition, the legislation provides for
periods of incarceration beyond the statutory maximum if a juvenile is
convicted of a crime of the first, second, or third degree, has two prior
convictions of crimes of the first or second degree, and has been committed
previously to a correctional facility.17 5 The release of juveniles on parole
prior to the completion of at least one-third of their sentence requires the
approval of the sentencing court. 176
An evaluation of the New Jersey code's impact on juvenile adjudication in
that state reported relatively low overall use of incarceration sentences.177 A
(3) The juvenile's age, previous record, prior social service received and out-
of-home placement history ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-43(a) (West 1987).
172 id. at § 2A:4A-44(a), (b). Aggravating factors included the circumstances of the
crime, the injury to or special vulnerability of the victim, the juvenile's prior record
and its seriousness and whether the youth was paid for committing the crime. The
mitigating factors included youthfulness, lack of serious harm, provocation, restitu-
tion for damage, the absence of prior offenses, and likely responsiveness to non-
incarcerative dispositions.
173 Id. at § 2A:4A-44(b)(1).
174 The New Jersey juvenile code includes a table for sentences:
(a) Murder [first or second degree] .............................. 20 years
(b) M urder [other] ............................................. 10 years
(c) Crime of the first degree, except murder ..................... 4 years
(d) Crime of the second degree ................................. 3 years
(e) Crime of the third degree ................................... 2 years
(f) Crime of the fourth degree .................................. 1 year
(g) Disorderly Persons offense .................................. months
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-44(d)(1) (West 1987).
175 Id. at § 2A:4A-44(3). Youths with prior convictions who are convicted of
murder may have their 20-year term extended by five years. Youths with prior
records who are convicted of other crimes of the first, second, or third degree may
have their maximum sentence extended by an additional two years.
In response to criticism that the system was ineffective in dealing with serious or
repetitive offenders, the Code modifies the provisions for the waiver of juveniles
to adult court and provides increased deterrence capacity by authorizing ex-
tended incarceration terms. Early parole of incarcerated offenders is made
subject to court review. The Code was characterized as more punitive in dealing
with more serious offenders and less punitive in dealing with minor offenders.
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY DISPOSITION COMM'N, supra note 170, at 16.
176 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-44(d)(2) (West 1987).
177 JUVENILE DELINQUENCY DISPOSITION COMM'N, supra note 170, at 33. The
Commission found that incarceration sentences were only used in approximately six
percent of delinquency dispositions. Id.
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comparison of sentences imposed and served by youths before and after the
adoption of the new juvenile code indicates that changes in the actual lengths
of time served are "negligible: incarceration terms are actually declining in
length for the majority of offenders .... "178 To the extent that the legislature
sought to achieve uniformity and equality of sentencing throughout the state,
the revised code has had only limited success.1 79 The evaluation reports that
substantial county-by-county disparity in sentencing persists. 8 0
These facts suggest that it may be the county in which a juvenile
commits his or her crime, rather than characteristics of that juvenile or
the crime committed, which determines the probability of incarceration.
This may be because each county is incarcerating its serious offenders
and seriousness is a relative term. Our data base indicates that those
incarcerated from some counties ... are more often adjudicated delin-
quent for such serious offenses as Robbery, Aggravated Assault, and/or
Sexual Offenses. Conversely, other generally suburban counties incar-
cerate juveniles adjudicated delinquent for less serious offenses such as
Burglary, Theft, and Minor Assault.'"
This finding is consistent with other research on juvenile justice sentenc-
ing. 8 2 On the basis of the first-year evaluation, however, the Commission
178 The Juvenile Delinquency Disposition Commission reported:
[T]he new Code does, in fact, provide longer terms for a limited class of offenses
(e.g. first degree) but equal or lesser terms for the larger group of offenses
(second and third degree offenses). Assuming that pre-Code commitment pat-
terns are comparable, the net impact is shorter sentences for most offenders
Id. at 85-86. Comparing the sentences imposed before and after the adoption of the
Code, the Commission reported:
The sentences received by these two [pre- and post-Code] groups differed
considerably. The post-Code group, on average, received shorter sentences than
the pre-Code group.
Id. at 86. However, the Commission reports that post-Code juveniles are actually
serving a greater proportion of their total sentence, suggesting that "present parole
policy has toughened despite the less punitive provisions in the Code. The actions of
the Parole Board may reflect the fact that juveniles who are now incarcerated
represent increasingly severe cases." Id.
179 Id. at 83-84.
s0 Id. In attempting to account for the "significant" regional differences in rates of
incarceration, the Commission concluded that those differences could not be ex-
plained by: differences in county juvenile populations; variations in crime rates or
serious crime; degree of urbanization; variationsin juveniles' prior records; previous
use of diversion or other prior dispositions; or the level of prior social services. Id.
181 Id.
182 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 4, at 492-93 (noting county-by-county variations in
waiver of juvenile offenders for adult criminal prosecution).
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was reluctant to propose presumptive sentencing guidelines to structure
judicial commitment decisions. 183
3) Texas. In 1987, Texas adopted legislation providing for the determi-
nate sentencing of some juvenile offenders.'84 The prosecutor may submit
petitions to a grand jury alleging very serious offenses. If the petition is
approved and the youth is ultimately convicted, "the court or jury may
sentence the child to commitment in the Texas Youth Commission with a
transfer to the Texas Department of CorrectionsJbr any term of years not to
exceed 30 years ."85 Because of the seriousness of the sentences authorized,
the Texas legislation provides juveniles with a jury trial at adjudication and
sentencing.a16
(b) Mandatory Minimum Terms of Confinement Based on Offense. As
Table I indicates, in addition to experimenting with determinate sentencing,
a number of jurisdictions have altered their juvenile sentencing statutes and
practices, The changes emphasize characteristics of the offense rather than
the offender as the formal determinant of dispositions. This has been accom-
plished through the adoption of either offense-based determinate sentences
for some offenders, 8 7 offense criteria as sentencing guidelines' 88 or manda-
tory minimum sentences for certain offenses. 189 All of these limit individ-
ualized consideration of a juvenile's "real needs."
183 JUVENILE DELINQUENCY DISPOSITION COMM'N, supra note 170, at 87.
Since we have traditionally granted significant discretion to the courts and
other agencies in handling delinquency, there is increasing interest in how
discretion is used. Dispositional guidelines are often mentioned as a means to
encourage uniformity and equity, discourage bias or achieve other policy goals.
But guidelines can also restrict appropriate judicial discretion or have other
negative impacts. Some suggest that equity should be a central goal of the
system. Others note that the desire for equity must be balanced by an apprecia-
tion for local community values.
Id. While the Commission's research documented substantial variation in disposi-
tional decisionmaking, it recommended "a major study of the factors underlying
variation in sentencing and the implications of this variation be undertaken in coop-
eration with the judiciary." Id. at 88.
184 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.045, 54.04(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Determi-
nate sentences may be imposed upon youths charged with and convicted of murder,
capital murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, deadly assault on
a law enforcement official, or attempted capital murder. The new Texas legislation is
analyzed in Dawson, The Third Justice System: The New Juvenile Criminal System
of Determinate Sentencing Jfr the Youthfid Violent Offender in Texas, 19 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 943 (1988).
185 Id. at § 54.04(d)(3) (emphasis added).
186 Id. at § 54.03(b), (c), .04(a).
187 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-140(e) (West 1986).
188 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-113, -113.1, -113.2 (1986).
189 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 352.2, 353.5 (1987 & Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (Anderson
Supp. 1987).
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Under many of the mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, the judge
retains discretion to commit a juvenile to the state's department of correc-
tions. 190 If the judge does decide to incarcerate a youth, she may also
prescribe the minimum sentence to be served for that offense. 191 In several
jurisdictions, however, the mandatory sentence is non-discretionary, and
the judge must commit the juvenile for the statutory period. 192 These non-
discretionary mandatory minimum sentences are typically imposed on
juveniles charged with serious or violent present offenses' 9 or those who
have prior delinquency adjudications. 9 The mandatory minimum sentences
may range from twelve to eighteen months,' 95 until age twenty-one,' 196 or
until the adult maximum sentence for the same offense. 197
1) Colorado. While Colorado is, in general, an indeterminate juvenile
sentencing state, 9 8 it has several statutes, indicated at Table I, governing the
dispositions of "Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offenders,"' 99 "Mandatory
Sentence Offenders, ' ' 20 0 and "Aggravated Juvenile Offenders. ' 20 1 For
190 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-27-344 (1987 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 19-3-113, -113.1, -113.2 (1986).
"9" See e.g., id. (stating that the "juvenile court may commit the juvenile [con-
victed of a Class A Felony] ... for a minimum period of time to be set by the court,
not to exceed six months" (emphasis added)).
192 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937 (Supp. 1986) (requiring six months
institutionalization for a felony conviction within one year of a prior felony convic-
tion).
19' See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.2 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
19 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937 (Supp. 1986).
195 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-37 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
196 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 805-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
197 See, e.g., 1988 KY. REV. STAT. & R. SERV. § 640.030 (Baldwin).
'98 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-113 (1986).
199 Id. at § 19-3-113. 1. Under Section 19-1-103(28), "Violent Juvenile Offender" is
defined as a child 13 years of age or older who is adjudicated delinquent or has his
probation revoked "for an act which would constitute a crime of violence as defined
in section 16-11-309(2) [murder, assault; kidnapping, robbery, bodily injury or death
in the commission of a felony, rape, weapon use in a crime against the elderly or
handicapped, etc.] if committed by an adult . I..." ld. at § 19-1-103(28). A "Repeat
Juvenile Offender" is defined as a child with a prior delinquency adjudication who is
subsequently adjudicated delinquent or has his probation revoked for conduct that
would be a felony if committed by an adult. Id. at § 19-1-103(23.5).
200 Id. at § 19-1-103(19.5). A "Mandatory Sentence Offender" is a juvenile who
has either two prior delinquency adjudications or a delinquency adjudication and a
probation revocation, and who is subsequently adjudicated delinquent. Id.
2"I Id. at § 19-1-103(2.1). An "Aggravated Juvenile Offender" is defined as a child
12 years of age or older who is adjudicated delinquent or has his probation revoked
for committing first or second degree murder, or who is 16 years of age or older, with
a prior delinquency adjudication for a felony, who is subsequently convicted of a
crime of violence as defined in section 16-11-309(2). See supra note 199.
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juveniles sentenced as violent, repeat, or mandatory offenders, the statutes
mandate an out-of-home placement for a minimum of one year. 202 If the
judge decides to commit such an offender to an institution, he may specify
the minimum term to be served. If a youth is sentenced as an "Aggravated
Juvenile Offender," the court may "commit the child to the department of
institutions for a determinate period of five years. ' 203 A study on the pro-
cessing of violent and serious offenders by the Colorado juvenile justice
system reported that
the severity of the committing charge was significantly related to the
length of the minimum sentence in Denver, with the percentage of youth
receiving a minimum sentence of 12 or more months falling as offense
severity decreased. The use of special sentencing statutes for those
committed to [Division of Youth Services] was also significantly related
to offense severity in Denver, with the percent being adjudicated as
repeat, mandatory, or violent offenders falling as offense severity de-
creased .204
At the same time, however, the report noted that the most severe sentences
were imposed upon a broad, heterogeneous population of "delinquent"
offenders, concluding that "proportionality of disposition is neutralized
when broad categories of youth with different histories or severity of behav-
iors are treated alike. ' 205
In recognition of the length of the potential sentences for serious juvenile
offenders, Colorado has authorized twelve-member jury trials for delin-
quents tried as aggravated juvenile offenders.20 6 Among the states with
determinate sentences or mandatory minimum sentences, Colorado is in the
distinct minority in providing the protections of a jury trial.207 Moreover,
Colorado is one of the few states in which delinquency cases can be tried to a
jury and in which the right is regularly exercised.208
202 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-113.1(1), (2) (1986).
203 Id. at § 19-3-113.2(1).
204 E. HARTSTONE, E. SLAUGHTER, & J. FAGAN, PROCESSING OF VIOLENT AND
SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS BY THE COLORADO JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM:
FINAL REPORT 5 (1986). This research also reports that the Colorado Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Council's policy goals, which sponsored the research,
include a desire to: "[p]romote fairness and proportionality in juvenile justice deci-
sion making"; "[p.romote accountability for youth through sanctions which link
behaviors to consequences"; and "[p]romote accountability for agencies of the
juvenile justice system through consistent application of policies and statutes." id.
at 7.
205 Id. at 17.
2016 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-106.5(3)(a) (1986). Except for petty offenses in which
the district attorney waives the right to seek institutionalization, all juveniles are
entitled to a jury trial by a jury of six. See id. at § 19-1-106(4)(a).
207 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 549 (1971).
211 See Keegan, .Iury Trials Jhr Juveniles: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 PAC. L.J. 811,
834 (1977); McLaughlin & Whisenand, Jurv Trial, Public TI'ad and free Press in
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2) Connecticut. Connecticut is another indeterminate sentencing state,
with special offense-based provisions for the disposition of serious juvenile
offenders. 0 9 The definition of "serious juvenile offenses" in the Connecticut
juvenile code includes forty-four serious offenses such as homicide, assault,
sexual assault, kidnapping, and certain categories of burglary and larceny.21 0
If a juvenile is convicted of a serious juvenile offense, "the court may set a
period of time up to six months during which the department of children and
youth services shall place such child out of his town of residence at the
commencement of such child's commitment."2"' Connecticut law also re-
quires a transfer hearing to determine the appropriateness of transferring to
adult criminal courts youths charged with serious juvenile offenses who have
prior convictions for serious juvenile offenses."' When a serious juvenile
offender is considered for transfer to adult criminal court, but the juvenile
court ultimately retains jurisdiction, the determinate sentence law mandates
that the court place the youth out of his town of residence for a period of one
year at the commencement of the juvenile's commitment.2 13
3) Delaware. Delaware legislation provides that any youth who is ad-
judged delinquent for conduct that would be a felony if committed by an
adult within one year of a prior felony adjudication must serve a mandatory
Juvenile Proceedings: An Analysis and Comparison of the IJA/A BA, Task Force and
NAC Standards, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1979). But cf. Comment, Juveniles
and Their Right to a Jury Trial, 15 VILL. L. REV. 972, 995 (1970) (noting that in a
twenty-five year period, only two requests were made for jury trials in juvenile
proceedings and both were withdrawn before trial).
In 1986 there were 21,083 delinquency petitions filed in Colorado leading to 17,967
terminations. See OFFICE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COLORADO JUDICIARY 18 (1986). Of those cases, there were a total of 1,735
juvenile trials, of which 848 were jury trials and 887 were court trials. Letter from
James D. Thomas, Colorado State Court Administrator (Jan. 30, 1987) (copy on file
with author).
209 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-141(a) (1986). The Connecticut juvenile code pro-
vides that juvenile disposition "shall be for an indeterminate time up to a maximum
of two years, or, when so adjudged on a serious juvenile offense, up to a maximum of
four years at the discretion of the court ... ." Id. On the petition of the Commis-
sioner of Corrections, the committing court, after a hearing, may "continue the
commitment for an additional period of not more than two years." Id. at § 46B-
141(b).
210 Id. at § 46B-120.
211 Id. at § 46B-140(e)(1).
212 See id. at § 46B-126. But see id. at 46B-127 (requiring that if a youth is charged
with murder, or with a Class A felony and has a prior Class A felony conviction, or a
Class B felony and has two prior convictions of Class A or B felonies, then the
accused must be transferred to the criminal courts). In all other transfer proceedings
involving serious juvenile offenders, transfer is discretionary. See generally Feld,
supra note 4, at 488.
213 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-140(e)(2) (West 1986).
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minimum term of confinement. 214 Despite this offense-based mandatory
disposition, the Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed the contention that
such juvenile sentencing is an aspect of the rehabilitative effort. 215 However,
one commentator has concluded that the mandatory confinement of juvenile
offenders under this statute constitutes punishment:
The determinate nature of the restraint-a mandatory term fixed for at
least six months-strongly suggests a legislative intent to punish while
belying a rehabilitative purpose. The statute did not provide an indeter-
minate disposition, which is characteristic of therapeutic attempts to
alter undesirable status conditions, but rather fixed a term of confine-
ment based solely upon the offenses committed. . . .The punitive
purposes of retribution and deterrence are evident. 216
4) Georgia. Under Georgia's Designated Felony Act, 21 7 if a juvenile is
sentenced as a designated felon, then the Division of Youth Services retains
custody over the youth for an initial period of five years, and the judge must
order the child to be confined in a youth development center for "not less
than 12 nor more than 18 months. 2 1 8 Moreover, if a juvenile commits a
214 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937(c)(1) (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
215 See, e.g., State v. J.K., 383 A.2d 283, 289 (Del. 1977).
216 Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework fur As-
sessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791, 835-36
(1982) (footnotes omitted). As additional evidence of the statute's punitive purpose,
Professor Gardner notes that
the Delaware Legislature would later describe the purpose of the statute before
the J.K. court as follows: "[T]he general intention behind the enactment of a
mandatory commitment law for juveniles adjudicated delinquet [sic] for certain
delineated offenses was to serve as a warning to a first offender of the conse-
quences of a second conviction."
217 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-37(a)(2) (1985 & Supp. 1988). Under the Georgia code,
"Designated felony act" means an act which, if done by an adult would be one
or more of the following crimes:
(A) Murder, rape, kidnapping, or arson in the first degree, if done by a
juvenile 13 or more years of age;
(B) Aggravated assault, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated sodomy, arson
in the second degree, aggravated battery, robbery, or armed robbery, if done
by a juvenile 13 or more years of age;
(C) Attempted murder or kidnapping, if done by a juvenile 13 or more years
of age; or
(D) Burglary, if done by a juvenile 13 or more years of age who has previ-
ously been adjudicated delinquent at separate court appearances for an act
which, if done by an adult would have been the crime of burglary.
(E) Any other act which, if done by an adult, would be a felony, if the juvenile
committing the act has three times previously been adjudicated delinquent for
acts which, if done by an adult, would have been felonies.
Id.
218 Id. at § 15-11-37(e)(l)(A), (B). However, a juvenile court judge retains initial
discretion as to whether to sentence a juvenile as a designated felon or as a delin-
quent. Id. at § 15-11-37(b). See generally M. FORST, E. FRIEDMAN & R. COATES.
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designated felony that inflicts serious physical injury on a person aged
sixty-two years or older, or commits a burglary following two prior burglary
adjudications, the court must sentence the youth as a designated felon for
the mandatory twelve to eighteen-month term.2 19
5) Illinois. Illinois' Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides that a juvenile
with two prior felony convictions who is subsequently convicted of one of
the listed violent or serious felonies must be committed to the Department of
Corrections until age twenty-one without the possibility of parole.120 As a
practical matter, however, the Juvenile Court Act and its predecessor, the
Habitual Juvenile Offender statute, are seldom used. Several years after the
Act's adoption, Illinois passed waiver legislation that excluded several of
the listed offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.2 2 1 Following
the passage of the excluded offense legislation, there was a sharp increase in
the number of juveniles charged with those offenses who were tried in the
adult criminal courts. 2 2
6) Kentucky. Kentucky legislation provides that most youth offenders
charged with felonies be tried as youth offenders in circuit court. 223 If the
juvenile is convicted of a felony offense in a circuit court, he is subject to the
same type of sentencing procedures and duration of sentence as an adult
convicted of the same felony. 2 4 However, the decision to transfer the
juvenile to circuit court is still somewhat discretionary.
7) New York. New York's "designated felony" legislation, 225 charac-
terized as "one of the harshest juvenile justice [sentencing] systems in the
country,"22 6 provides mandatory sentences for youths convicted of certain
offenses.2 27 If a youth is convicted of a Class A designated felony act and a
discretionary restrictive placement is ordered, the juvenile is committed to
INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT AND RELEASE DECISION-MAKING FOR JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE APPROACHES,
GEORGIA-A CASE STUDY 1.
219 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-37(d) (1985 & Supp. 1988).
220 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 805-35 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988). The statute cur-
rently lists the serious offenses as: murder, manslaughter, criminal sexual assault,
battery with injury, burglary, robbery, or aggravated arson.
221 Id. at ch. 37, 805-4.
222 See Feld, supra note 4, at 515.
2231 1988 Ky. REV. STAT. & R. SERV. 635.020 (Baldwin).
224 Id. at 640.030.
225 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(8), (9) (Consol. 1987). The statute defines
designated felonies as offenses by a 14 or 15-year-old which, if done by an adult,
would constitute the crime of murder, manslaughter, robbery, kidnapping, arson,
burglary, assault, rape, or sodomy.
221 Woods, New York's Juvenile Ojfender Law: An Overview and Analysis, 9
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1,2 (1980); see also Whisenand & McLaughlin, Completing the
Cycle: Reality and the Juvenile Justice System in New York State, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1,
1 (1982).
227 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 353.5 (Consol. 1987).
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the Department for Youth (DFY) for an initial period Of five years, the first
twelve to eighteen months of which must be spent in a "secure facility." 2 If
the designated felony involved serious physical injury or a victim who is
sixty-two years of age or older, restrictive placement is mandatory. 229 If the
youth is convicted of any other designated felony act, the initial placement is
for three years, with the first six to twelve months spent in secure confine-
ment. 230 Finally, if a youth is convicted of a designated felony act and has a
prior conviction for a designated felony, the court must sentence the juvenile
under the five-year Class A provisions rather than the three-year provi-
sions. 231 At the request of the DFY, such secure placements can be extended
by court order for one-year intervals until the juvenile's twenty-first birth-
day.2 32 Special procedures have been provided to assure enforcement of the
designated felony legislation .233
In 1978, two years after the adoption of the designated felony act, New
York adopted additional legislation to transfer serious juvenile offenders to
criminal courts for adult prosecution.2 34 The new juvenile offender legisla-
tion only served to further confuse the judicial response to young, serious
offenders.2 35 Characterized by one commentator as "awkward and in-
efficient . . . [and] in many ways counterproductive, '2 36 both the concep-
228 Id. at § 353.5(4).
229 Id. at § 353.5(3).
230 Id. at § 353.5(5).
231 Id. at § 353.3(6).
232 Id. at § 353.5(5)(d).
23 See id. at § 311.1(5) (mandating that a petition must conspicuously note that the
juvenile is charged with a designated felony); id. at § 254-a (providing that district
attorneys, rather than corporate counsel or county attorneys, may prosecute
juveniles charged with designated felonies); id. at § 117(b)(i), (ii) (creating a separate
division of family court to hear designated felony petitions in New York City and
giving hearing preference to designated felony petitions in family courts outside New
York City).
234 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987). See generally Feld, supra
note 4, at 487 (discussing various ways juveniles are transferred to adult criminal
courts).
235 In a Practice Commentary to the Family Court Act, Professor Merril Sobie
notes:
In establishing a new classification of delinquency, the "designated felony," the
Reform Act added several definitions. The 1978 Juvenile Offender Act added yet
another classification, the "juvenile offense." Through the enactment of the two
acts [1976 and 1978] juvenile delinquency, which had been a relatively simple
cause of action, became a tripartite series of complicated measures with accom-
panying definitional nomenclature [juvenile offense, designated felony and de-
linquency].
Sobie, Practice Commentary, following N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2 (McKinney
1985).
236 Woods, supra note 226, at 37.
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tualization and implementation of the New York juvenile sentencing legisla-
tion has been uniformly criticized .1 7
8) North Carolina. North Carolina is an indeterminate sentencing jurisdic-
tion with special legislative provisions for sentencing repeat offenders.138 If a
juvenile delinquent is fourteen years of age or older, has two or more prior
felony adjudications and has been previously committed to a facility of the
Department of Corrections, the juvenile court may impose "a definite term
not to exceed two years. 2 13 9
9) Ohio. Ohio has adopted mandatory minimum terms of confinement
based on the seriousness of the offense for which a youth is committed.2 40
The purpose of the Ohio legislation was to discharge minor offenders, reduce
overcrowding, and reserve the institutions for the more serious offenders.2 41
Although the sentencing judge retains discretion over whether to commit a
youth convicted of a felony, once institutionalization is ordered the juvenile
must serve a mandatory minimum term of six months, one year, or until age
twenty-one, depending on the seriousness of the offense. 42 Moreover, if a
youth is convicted of murder or a first or second-degree felony, the commit-
ment must be served in a secure facility.2 13 One commentator has noted that
the Ohio legislation "tends to focus more on retribution for the offense
committed as opposed to the needs of the juvenile offender. '" 244
237 See, e.g., Roysher & Edelman, Treating Juveniles As Adults in New York:
What Does It Mean and How Is It Working?, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 265
(Hall, Hamparian, Pettibone & White co-eds. 1981); Whisenand & McLaughlin,
supra note 226; Woods, supra note 226. Indeed, Whisenand and McLaughlin con-
clude that the abolition of the juvenile court is to be preferred to further "reforms."
[I]t is time to seriously consider a complete overhaul of the juvenile justice
system. Rather than chip away at juvenile court jurisdiction and create a maze of
extremely complicated procedures which to date appear less than successful in
stemming the surge in juvenile crime, public debate should center around the
repeal of . . . the Family Court Act and the consolidation of jurisdiction over
criminal acts in the criminal courts.
Whisenand & McLaughlin, supra note 226, at 4.
238 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-652(b)(1), (2) (1987).
239 Id. at § 7A-652(b)(2).
240 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (Anderson Supp. 1987).
241 See Note, H.B. 440: Ohio Restructures Its Juvenile Justice System, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 237 (1982); see also FEDERATION FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING,
JUVENILES IN INSTS. OF THE OHIO DEP'T OF YOUTH SERVS. (May 1982) [hereinafter
JUVENILES IN INSTS.]; FEDERATION FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING, JUVENILES IN
INSTS. OF THE OHIO DEP'T OF YOUTH SERVS.: THE EARLY IMPACT OF OHIO H.B.
440 (September 1982); FEDERATION FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING, JUVENILES IN
INSTS. OF THE OHIO DEP'T OF YOUTH SERVS.: THE 1ST YEAR'S IMPACT OF OHIO
H.B. 440 (December 1982) [hereinafter THE 1ST YEAR'S IMPACT].
242 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355(A)(4)-(6) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
243 Id. at § 2151.355(5), (6).
244 Note, supra note 241, at 245.
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Evaluations of the Ohio mandatory minimum sentencing legislation report
that it has exacerbated institutional overcrowding. 245 Intended, in part, to
discharge minor offenders, the legislation has increased the average length of
stay for juveniles who are convicted of felonies and committed to institu-
tions. 24 6 The mandatory minimum provisions have also increased the overall
institutional populations .241
10) Tennessee. Tennessee is an indeterminate sentencing jurisdiction with
special determinate sentencing provisions for serious or repetitive offend-
ers.2 48 Normally an order committing a juvenile to the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Corrections "shall be for an indefinite time." However, if the
juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for a Class X felony,249 has three prior
delinquency adjudications for felony offenses at least one of which resulted
in institutional confinement, or is within six months of his nineteenth birth-
day, then the "commitment may be for a determinate period of time,"
limited only by the adult maximum sentence for the same offense and the
juvenile's twenty-first birthday. 210
11) Virginia. Virginia is an indeterminate sentencing jurisdiction with
245 See JUVENILES IN INSTS., supra note 241, at 22. Evaluations of the impact of
the legislation after one year also concluded that "[juvenile] institutions remain
seriously overcrowded as a whole; there is no evidence, as of yet, that the problem is
easing. Overcrowding is very severe in a few of the institutions and not a serious
problem in others." THE 1ST YEAR'S IMPACT, supra note 241, at 2.
246 See Note, supra note 241, at 247.
Prior to H.B. 440 [the Ohio juvenile code legislation], the average stay of a
juvenile in Department of Youth Service institutions was five to six months.
Under the new bill, the minimum sentence for a minor felony is six months. A
serious felony, such as rape or aggravated robbery, carries a minimum sentence
of one year. The H.B. 440 minimum sentence requirements increase the average
length of time that ajuvenile will be institutionalized. This increase could cause
overcrowding since commitment rates have not significantly decreased under
H.B. 440.
Id.
247 See JUVENILES IN INSTS., supra note 241, at 14. The Federation concluded that
"the increase [in juvenile institution populations] is attributable to institutionalization
of more adjudicated delinquents who are committed for serious property crimes.
These youths more than made up for the misdemeanants who were no longer
institutionalized after H.B. 440." Id.
248 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-131, -137 (Supp. 1987).
249 Id. at § 39-1-702. Class X felonies are defined as: murder; aggravated rape and
aggravated sexual battery; robbery with a deadly weapon; aggravated arson; con-
spiracy to murder or commit a felony against the person; assault with intent to
murder; assault from ambush with a deadly weapon; serious drug offenses; and injury
caused by explosives. Id. Adult sentences for Class X felonies are determinate with
no provisions for "good time" credit or early parole. Id. at § 39-1-703.
250 Id. at § 37-1-137(a)(l)(B).
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special provisions for sentencing "serious offenders. ' 251 A "serious of-
fender" is defined as a child sixteen years of age or older who is convicted of
a felony and has a recent prior record.2 52 Although the judge retains discre-
tion over whether to sentence under this statute, if she does commit the child
to the Department of Corrections, "the court may specify a minimum period
of commitment, not less than six nor more than twelve months.' '25 Addi-
tionally, a juvenile court judge may sentence juveniles to local detention or
secure facilities for up to six months. 25
(c) Administratively Adopted Determinate/Presumptive or Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Guidelines. Several states have repudiated traditional
individualized juvenile justice sentencing in favor of offense-based disposi-
tions. Washington, New Jersey, and Texas have done so by adopting deter-
minate sentencing schemes for some or all juvenile offenders. Others, such
as Georgia, New York, and Ohio have adopted mandatory minimum sen-
tencing statutes to govern the lengths of institutional confinement for those
youths committed to the state's departments of corrections.
Another trend in juvenile sentencing practices is the adoption of guidelines
for determining length of confinement by a state's department of corrections
or juvenile parole authority. These administrative guidelines use offense-
based criteria to structure institutional release decisions. While the adult
corrections process has employed parole release guidelines for several dec-
ades, 255 their use in the juvenile process is more recent.
1) Minnesota. Statutorily, Minnesota is an "indeterminate" sentencing
state. 256 In 1980, however, the Minnesota Department of Corrections ad-
251 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285 (1988).
252 Id. at § 16.1-285. I(A). "Recent prior record" is defined as either parole status
or a delinquency placement within the preceding year. Id.
253 Id. at § 16.1-285.1(C).
254 Id. at § 16.1-284.1(A) (allowing for placement of a child age 16 or older who
committed any offense for which an adult could be incarcerated and who is without
prior record in a secure facility for thirty days); id. at § 16.1-284. 1(B) (allowing for a
child age 16 or older who committed any offense for which an adult could be
incarcerated who has a prior record of delinquency to be placed in secure facility for
up to six months).
255 See, e.g., Federal Parole Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 2.1-.64 (1987).
256 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.185(4) (West 1982). In addition to providing the
customary range of dispositional options, Minnesota's dispositional statute includes
the following language that was adopted in 1976:
Any order for a disposition authorized under this section shall contain written
findings of fact to support the disposition ordered, and shall also set forth in
writing the following information:
(a) why the best interests of the child are served by the disposition ordered;
and (b) what alternative dispositions were considered by the court and why
such dispositions were not appropriate in the instant case.
Id. In In re Welfare of L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), the court
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ministratively implemented a determinate sentencing plan for youths com-
mitted to the state's juvenile institutions. Based on the juvenile's present
offense and prior record, the plan "provide[s] a more definite and distinct
relationship between the offense and the amount of time required to bring
about positive behavior change. ' 257 A juvenile's projected minimum length
of stay, based on the present offense and prior record, is established within
seven weeks after admission to an institution. 25 The actual parole release
within the minimum and maximum range is based upon both the presumptive
sentence, which reflects aggravating and mitigating factors associated with
the commitment offense, and subsequent institutional conduct, including the
completion of an agreed upon treatment plan. 5 9
The departmental decision to implement a determinate sentencing system
reflects concerns with the adequacy and equity of individualized treatment
dispositions. An evaluation of decisionmaking commitment and release of
juveniles in Minnesota's correctional institutions found that
there is no relationship between the juvenile's offense and the disposi-
tion of his case at either the State Training School or the Minnesota
Home School.
... Status offenders stay slightly longer in the institution than serious
offenders ...
All in all, there are no consistent or systematic criteria used in making
interpreted the language to require consideration of less restrictive alternatives and
proportionality of sanctions.
To measure what is necessary, a trial court must assess two factors, the severity
of the child's delinquency, and the severity of the proposed remedy, When the
severity of intervention is disproportionate to the severity of the problem, the
intervention is not necessary and cannot lawfully occur. The court must take the
least drastic necessary step.
Id. at 398; see also, Comment, Minnesota Articulates Standards for Delinquency
Disposition, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 247 (1987). But cf. In re Welfare of D.S.F.,
416 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (employing the analysis of L.K.W. but
noting that the preference of allowing children to remain at home applies only to
children adjudicated dependent or neglected, not to children found to be delinquent).
257 MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, JUVENILE RELEASE GUIDELINES 2-3
(1980) [hereinafter JUVENILE RELEASE GUIDELINES].
258 MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE RELEASE § 5-204.4
(June 1985).
The scheduling of parole consideration reviews shall be based on the severity,
recency, and chronicity of the juvenile's adjudicated offenses according to the
grid for projected length of stay. Using the severity, recency, and chronicity of a
juvenile's offense behavior as a starting point in projecting the length of stay
recognizes that state juvenile correctional facilities are expensive and restrictive
facilities, that the best predictor of future offending is the number of past
offenses and that the Minnesota Juvenile Code emphasizes public safety as well
as treatment.
Id. (citations omitted).
259 Id. at § 5-204.2.
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decisions about whether or not to institutionalize and when to parole
juveniles. 260
The study found that commitment and release decisions were so "individ-
ualized" that no factors could explain the differentiation in treatment of
youths by an institution. 261 There was no relationship between the most
serious offenses in ajuvenile's file and the youth's disposition. 262 The most
significant variable affecting the length of a youth's incarceration was the
institution to which the juvenile was committed. 263
These findings are consistent with studies in other jurisdictions that report
that within a nominally indeterminate juvenile sentencing system, incarcer-
ated youths serve "fixed sentences" based on the institutions to which they
are committed. 26 4 The studies conclude that a pattern of uniformity in sen-
tences, rather than individualized differentiation, prevails in such institu-
tions.265
Under the Minnesota Department of Corrections sentencing guidelines, a
juvenile's length of stay is based on the severity of the most serious offense
260 D. CHEIN, DECISION MAKING IN JUVENILE CORRECTIONS INSTITUTIONS: RE-
SEARCH SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1976); see also G. WHEELER,
COUNTER-DETERRENCE: A REPORT ON JUVENILE SENTENCING AND EFFECTS OF
PRISONIZATION (1978) [hereinafter COUNTER-DETERRENCE]; Wheeler, Juvenile Sen-
tencing and Public Policy: Beyond Counterdeterrence, 4 POLICY ANALYSIS 33 (1978)
[hereinafter Beyond Counterdeterrence]. Professor Wheeler reports that
[t]he juvenile sentencing structure is a paradox. Each institution ... appears to
have operationalized a sentencing procedure that often discriminated against the
youngest age group, the least serious offender, and the white offender in long-
term, "treatment-oriented" facilities. But generally, the institutional decision-
making process that determined release appeared more random than deliberate.
There is an absence of discrimination in release criteria with regard to offense at
commitment. The fact that felony offenders were treated equally or less strictly
than status and non-felony offenders resulted in disproportionately heavy appli-
cation of correctional resources on youngsters who were the least threat to the
community.
Id. at 44.
261 D. CHEIN, supra note 260, at 35.
262 Id. at 33.
263 Id. at 37.
264 See COUNTER-DETERRENCE, supra note 260, at 36 ("[i]nstitutional assignment
... appeared more important in determining the duration of confinement than the
offenders' social characteristics or committing offenses").
265 [T]he institutional effect ... is more random than deliberate. While release
practices in individual institutions tended to discriminate against whites, the
youngest age group, and the least serious offenders, these differences [are]
nullified by disparity observed in mean stay for each of these groups when ...
controlled for institutional assignment. . . . [I]nstitutional assignment emerges as
more important in terms of predicting length of incarceration than the offender's
social characteristics or offense.
Beyond Counterdeterrence, supra note 260, at 41.
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committed by the individual and the weight of "risk of failure" factors that
are "predictive to some degree of future delinquent behavior. ' 266 Factors
considered in the risk of recidivism include prior felony adjudications, and
probation and parole failures. Minnesota's sentencing guidelines for adult
offenders, which are explicitly punitive and expressly designed to achieve
"just deserts," rely on these same factors.267
Ironically, the Minnesota Department of Corrections' decision to imple-
ment presumptive determinate sentences for juveniles that are similar to
those mandated by the adult sentencing guidelines introduces greater "indi-
vidualization" of dispositions than the former "therapeutic" regime, in
which a youth's institutional assignment determined his length of stay.
Individualization, based on the present offense and prior record, represents
a step toward rationality and justice, albeit a departure from the "rehabilita-
tive" tradition.
Apparently, some of Minnesota's juvenile courts are using determinate
sentencing guidelines as well. In In re D.S.F. ,268 the juvenile received a
ninety-day sentence of incarceration for an assault. Rejecting a less restric-
tive disposition, the trial court asserted that confinement was required be-
cause "a specific consequence was necessary to impress upon D.S.F. the
seriousness of his behavior. ' 269 The majority in D.S.F. concluded that the
disposition was within the broad sentencing discretion that juvenile courts
enjoy. The dissent, however, characterized it as "a purely offense-based
determinate sentence of incarceration as a largely predetermined conse-
quence for a serious assault. '27 0
Judge Crippen's dissent in D.S.F. correctly perceived that determinate
sentencing strikes at the very heart of the traditional juvenile court sys-
tem.271 Judge Crippen suggested that punitive juvenile sentencing practices
266 See JUVENILE RELEASE GUIDELINES, supra note 257, at 7.
267 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. 1.2, 11.B (West 1988) (Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines and Commentary).
268 416 N.W.2d 772 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
269 Id. at 774.
270 Id. at 775 (Crippen, J., dissenting). Judge Crippen further noted that the
determinate sentence of incarceration imposed by the trial court was prompted
by unpublished sentencing guidelines, based singularly on the offense commit-
ted, and not by spontaneous exercise of discretion by the presiding judge. ...
[Where the sentence is based upon the type of offense committed,] we are
dealing . . .with a criminal justice sentence, not a juvenile court disposition
aimed at doing what is best for the individual. The juvenile has been ordered
incarcerated for a definite term as part of a predetermined sentencing practice.
Id. at 780.
271 Judge Crippen's analysis noted:
Deliberate acceptance of offense-based determinate sentencing categorically
belies the promises which are the foundation for the 1971 due process analysis of
the United States Supreme Court [in McKeiver]. Appellate affirmation of crimi-
nal justice sentencing in the juvenile court unravels the rationale underlying the
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posed three alternative options: restructuring juvenile courts to fit their
original rehabilitative purpose; extending to juveniles all of the procedural
safeguards afforded to adults in criminal cases; 72 or abolishing juvenile
courts altogether. 27 3 While Judge Crippen was reluctant to acknowledge his
"ultimate disillusionment" with the juvenile court experiment, neither could
he endorse the majority opinion's approval of punitive sentences for
juveniles without full procedural safeguards.
2) Arizona. Arizona's Department of Corrections has adopted Length of
Confinement Guidelines to govern juvenile release decisions. 274 The primary
objective of the administrative sentencing guidelines is to assure that a
juvenile "shall be retained in institutional confinement for a period which is
equal protection analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court [in In re K.A.A., 410
N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1987)]. A system already on the brink of its demise is pushed
still closer to a long postponed day of reckoning.
Id. at 777.
272 Id. Judge Crippen noted two fundamental procedural deficiencies in juvenile
justice administration: "the demonstrated need for jury trials in accusatory proceed-
ings where juveniles may be incarcerated, and the additional need for representation
by competent counsel in every case where a juvenile is faced with incarceration."
Id.; see also infra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
273 Judge Crippen concludes that
we could call for dismantling a system that openly exacts from our younger
citizens a sacrifice of liberties and gives in return a false promise to serve the best
interests of those who come before it. The federal and state constitutions do not
permit a criminal justice system without criminal justice safeguards .... Can
we accept as merely unfortunate a system meting out punishment without
fundamental constitutional safeguards?
Id.
274 See STATE OF ARIZONA, DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, LENGTH OF CONFINEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR JUVENILES (rev. ed. April, 1986). Arizona's legislature precipitated
the administrative decision to adopt the guidelines. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-241 (1987). The legislation prompting the guidelines included the following legisla-
tive findings and policy:
2. The deterrence of juvenile crime can be best achieved by instituting strict
rules and policies in the system of juvenile justice.
3. The loss of freedom of juvenile offenders must be meaningful in order to
achieve respect for the juvenile justice system and respect for the rights of others
in society....
6. The state department of corrections should strictly adhere to guidelines for
length of confinement of juvenile offenders.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-241 (Supp. 1988). Recent legislation explicitly states that
the Department of Corrections' responsibilities are to "adopt and enforce guidelines
for the length of confinement of a youth offender in secure institutions based on and
proportionate to the sentencing provisions of [adult criminal code]." Id. at § 41-
1608(A).
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proportionate to adult sentences for the same crimes. ' '27 5 The underlying
assumptions of these guidelines are explicitly punitive:
First, the length of confinement of juvenile offenders should be of
sufficient length of time to provide a deterrent to future delinquent/crim-
inal activity ...
Second, the primary purposes of the [Department of Corrections] is
protection of the public ...
Third, to conform to practices prevalent with adults, the period of
confinement should be related to the juvenile's committing offense .276
To accomplish these goals of deterrence, public protection, and propor-
tionality, the guidelines establish five sentencing categories based on the
seriousness of the commitment offense. For each of the five categories, the
sentencing guidelines specify a mandatory minimum term of confinement
ranging in length from three to eighteen months. No maximum limit on
institutional confinement is specified other than a youth's eighteenth birth-
day.277 Moreover, the guidelines specify that the offense-based mandatory
minimum is only a minimum, and ajuvenile's incarceration may be extended
"should such continued confinement be necessary . . . to protect the pub-
lic."27 Thus, Arizona's sentencing system provides for minimum sentences
proportional to the seriousness of the offense committed with a maximum
sentence constrained only by the age of the juvenile offender.
3) Georgia. As indicated in Table I, Georgia has two different types of
offense-based dispositional schemes for juvenile delinquents. Georgia's Des-
ignated Felony Statute fixes the length and type of stay for youths convicted
of specified serious offenses.27 9 In addition, Georgia has an administratively
created determinate sentencing framework adopted by the Division of Youth
Services ("DYS") in 1981.2 180 Under the DYS's Uniform Juvenile Classifica-
tion System, committed delinquents are placed in one of five classifications
based on "Public Risk," the primary determinant of which is the seriousness
275 STATE OF ARIZONA, DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 274, at 1 (emphasis
added).
276 Id. (emphasis added).
277 id. at 3.
278 Id. at 1.
279 See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-37. For an analysis of Georgia's Designated
Felony Statute, see supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
210 See GEORGIA DEPT. OF HUMAN RESOURCEs-DIv. OF YOUTH SERVS., POLICY
AND PROCEDURE MANUAL §§ 901.00-.06 (1985); M. FORST, E. FRIEDMAN & R.
COATES, supra note 218. The Georgia juvenile corrections agency's decision to adopt
determinate sentencing guidelines was influenced, in part, by Washington's "just
deserts" guidelines and the recommendations of the Juvenile Justice Standards
Project as well as by a desire to obviate any legislatively imposed determinate
sentencing statute. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note
113, at 34-35; M. FORST, E. FkIEDMAN & R. COATES, supra note 218, at 9-10.
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of the present offense. 81 A screening committee classifies youths and makes
decisions concerning a juvenile's commitment, length of stay, and release.
The committee's decisions are based on a juvenile's offense classification
level 282 and other "aggravating factors," such as being a "habitual" or
"multiple" offender.18 3
The impact of the Principle of Offense on juvenile sentences in Georgia is
evident. Research evaluating the impact of the DYS guidelines reports that
"[o]ffense-related variables are most consistently and most highly correlated
with the length of institutional stay. Five of the seven independent variables
listed deal directly with the seriousness of the commitment offense. ' 28 4 In
addition to the increase in offense-based determinacy, there was also an
increase in the proportionality of sentences; youths committed for more
serious offenses served longer periods than youths committed for less seri-
ous offenses.285
4) California. In California, a sentencing judge may opt to commit a
juvenile to the California Youth Authority, a division of the State Depart-
281 In classifying a juvenile for sentencing, the Georgia Division of Youth Services
considers:
Public Risk. The public risk scale rates the level to which the youth presents a
danger to the public and is the primary determinant in the decision to place a
youth in an institutional program or allow him to remain in the community. This
scale also sets the minimum and maximum length of stay for those youth who are
placed in YDC....
Public Risk Criteria. The following are the criteria by which the youth shall be
rated on the public risk scale: a) Committing offense b) Has escaped c) Commit-
ted for an offense which resulted in bodily injury d) Is a habitual offender e) Is a
multiple offender.
GEORGIA DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES-DIv. OF YOUTH SERVS., CLASSIFICATION
PROFILE 1 (rev. ed. 1986).
282 The Classification Profile contains extensive lists of offenses that are used to
classify juveniles. Under certain defined conditions, youths convicted of the most
serious offenses must be incarcerated. See supra note 219 and acompanying text.
The relationship between classification level, based on gravity of offense commit-
ted, and sentence is quite explicit:
a) Level Five .......................................... 18 to 20 m onths
b) Level Four ..................................... ... 12 to 18 months
c) Level Three ......................................... 9 to 12 m onths
d) Level Two ........................................... 6 to 9 m onths
e) Level One ........................................... 4 to 6 months
GEORGIA DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, supra note 281, at 1.
283 "Habitual Offender" is defined as a delinquent youth who has committed a
level two, three, or four offense and who is recommitted within 30 months of a prior
commitment for a level two, three, or four offense. Id. at 24. "Multiple Offender"
is defined as a youth convicted of four or more separate offenses at the time of his
commitment to DYS. Id.
284 M. FORST, E. FRIEDMAN & R. COATES, supra note 218, at 35.
285 Id. at 33-34.
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ment of Corrections.286 The Youth Authority is responsible for running the
state's training schools and receives both juvenile offenders committed by
juvenile courts and young adult offenders-individuals between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one-sentenced to the Youth Authority by criminal
courts. The majority of Youth Authority commitments come from juvenile
courts, and most of those committed to the Youth Authority were not
convicted for violent crimes. 28 7
Once a juvenile is sentenced to the Youth Authority, any release decision
is made by the Youthful Offender Parole Board. 28 At an initial hearing
following commitment, the Board either grants or denies parole. If parole is
denied, the Board establishes a parole consideration date. 2 9 While that date
is neither "a fixed term or sentence, nor ... a fixed parole release date," it
represents the time by which a youth "may reasonably and realistically be
expected to achieve readiness for parole.' '290 In establishing the parole
consideration date, the Board uses offense-based categories reflecting its
assessment of the "seriousness of the specific [offense] and the degree of
danger those committed to the Youth Authority pose to the public." 291 While
the maximum length of confinement is limited by the jurisdiction of the
Youth Authority, 292 within the Youth Authority's sentencing range, the
primary determinant of a youth's length of stay is the seriousness of the
commitment offense. 293 The Board classifies a youth into one of seven
286 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731 (West 1984).
287 See PRIVATE SECTOR TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 39
(1987). "Most of the CYA's first commitments come from the juvenile courts; in
1985, 88% of first commitments to CYA were from juvenile courts." Id. Juveniles
convicted of major offenses against the person-homicide, robbery, and rape-
accounted for about 22% of CYA commitments, while property crimes-burglary,
theft, and forgery-accounted for about 48%.
288 Id. at 40; see also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, §§ 4941, 4944-4945 (1987).
289 CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 4941(a).
290 Id. at § 4945(a).
291 Id.
292 "Every person committed to the Department of the Youth Authority by a
juvenile court shall ... be discharged upon the expiration of a two year period of
control or when the person reaches his or her 21st birthday, whichever occurs later
. ... CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1769(a) (West 1984). However, if ajuvenile has
been committed to the Youth Authority for committing one of a number of statutorily
delineated offenses, commitment may continue until age 25. Id. at § 707(b). A
discussion of § 707(b) may be found in Feld, supra note 4, at 507 n.3.
293 PRIVATE SECTOR TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 287, at 71.
Terms for wards in the CYA are set by the Youthful Offender Parole Board
(YOPB), using guidelines that are based almost exclusively on the seriousness of
the commitment offense. The average parole consideration date assigned by
YOPB in 1985 was 15.7 months, and the range was from 70.4 months (Murder 1)
to 12.6 months (crimes in Category VII).
Id. (emphasis added); see infra note 295 for a definition of Category VII offenses.
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categories based on the offense for which the juvenile is being committed.2 94
Typically, youths convicted of the most serious offenses will not be consid-
ered for parole for seven years, while youths classified in the least serious
category may be eligible for parole in less than one year.2 95
One consequence of the Board's jurisdiction over the release of committed
juvenile offenders, independent of the Youth Authority, has been a dramatic
increase in institutional overcrowding.2 96 The Youth Authority institutions
have filled beyond capacity as the average length of a juvenile's stay has
increased. 297 This, in turn, has led to recommendations that the Board either
develop risk assessment criteria that respond to a youth's dangerousness
more reliably than purely offense-based criteria, or adopt juvenile sentenc-
ing guidelines based on present offense and prior record. 298
3. Empirical Evaluations of Juvenile Court Sentencing-De Facto
Dispositional Decisionmaking
Assessing the relative impact of the Principle of Individualized Justice or
the Principle of Offense on dispositions requires ascertaining the relation-
ships between legal variables-present offense and prior record-and dis-
Statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating factors provide some discretionary
basis for deviations from and modification of parole consideration dates. See CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 4945(h)-() (1987).
294 CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, §§ 4951-4957 (1987).
29' See id. California's administrative laws classify juvenile offenses in the follow-
ing seven categories, with their respective suggested periods until parole: Category I
Offenses: first and second degree murder-seven years; Category II Offenses: man-
slaughter, rape-four years; Category III Offenses: armed robbery, armed assault,
armed burglary-three years; Category IV Offenses: vehicular manslaughter, as-
sault, burglary, drugs-two years; Category V Offenses: robbery, theft-eighteen
months; Category VI Offenses: weapons, unlisted felonies-one year; Category VII
Offenses: technical violations of parole, any offenses not listed in Categories I
through VI-less than one year.
296 See, e.g., PRIVATE SECTOR TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note
287, at 2.
297 Id. -[The Youth Administration] institutions are filled beyond capacity ....
The primary pressure feeding population levels ... is length of stay. The mean length
of stay in [Youth Administration] institutions for 1985 was 17.1 months, up from 12.9
months five years earlier." Id.
298 Id. at 73. One report on California's juvenile justice system recommended that
[t]he legislature recognize punishment, along with treatment and incapacitation,
as an appropriate juvenile justice system objective and charge the [Sentencing]
Commission with the gradual development of prescriptive sentencing guidelines
as a means of articulating the appropriate balance between these competing
sentencing objectives and available resources. Such guidelines are now used for
the sentencing of juveniles in Washington and for adults in Minnesota.
P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, A. ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, YOUTH CRIME AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE vi-vii (1983).
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position, and social characteristics or "extra-legal" variables-race and
social class-and dispositions. However, "even a superficial review of the
relevant literature leaves one with the rather uncomfortable feeling that the
only consistent finding of prior research is that there are no consistencies in
the determinants of the decisionmaking process."2 99 The studies, having
been conducted in different jurisdictions at different times and employing
different methodologies and theoretical perspectives, yield contradictory
results;300 however, two general findings emerge from this research. The first
is that the Principle of Offense accounts for most of the variance in disposi-
tions that can be explained. 30 The second is that after controlling for present
offense and prior record, discretionary individualization is often synony-
mous with racial discrimination.3 0 2
Juvenile court judges answer the question "what should be done with this
child?" in part, by reference to explicit statutory mandates. The discretion-
ary decisionmaking powers of the judge, however, are also tempered by
practical and bureaucratic considerations. 303 Administrators of justice in
juvenile courts enjoy greater discretion than do their adjudicatory counter-
parts at the adult criminal level because of the presumed need in juvenile
justice proceedings to look beyond the present offense to the "best interests
of the child" and because of paternalistic assumptions about the ability to
rehabilitate children.3 4
299 Thomas & Sieverdes, Juvenile Court Intake: An Analysis of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 413, 416 (1975).
300 For methodological critiques of prior juvenile sentencing research, see Fagan,
Slaughter & Hartstone, Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile Justice
Process, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 224, 229-30 (1987); McCarthy & Smith, The Concep-
tualization of Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process: The Impact of Admin-
istrative Factors and Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24
CRIMINOLOGY 41, 43-47 (1986).
301 See, e.g., Ferdinand & Luchterland, Inner-City Youth, The Police, The
Juvenile Court, and Justice, 17 Soc. PROB. 510 (1970); McCarthy & Smith, supra
note 300; McEachern & Bauzer, Factors Related to Dispositions in Juvenile Police
Contacts, in JUVENILE GANGS IN CONTEXT 148 (M. Klein & B. Myerhoffeds. 1964);
Terry, Discrimination in the Handling of Juvenile Offenders by Social Control
Agencies, 4 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 218 (1967) [hereinafter Discrimination by
Agencies]; Terry, The Screening of Juvenile Offenders, 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIM. & P.S.
173 (1967) [hereinafter Screening of Juvenile Offenders]; Thomas & Cage, The Effect
of Social Characteristics on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 18 Soc. Q. 237 (1977).
302 See, e.g., Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra note 300; Krisberg, Schwartz,
Fishman, Eisikovits, Guttman & Joe, The Incarceration of Minority Youth, 33 CRIME
& DELINQ. 173 (1987) [hereinafter Incarceration of Minority Youth 1; McCarthy &
Smith, supra note 300.
303 See, e.g., M.A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL
OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE (1982); A. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE (1968); R. EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CONTEXT AND
PROCESS IN JUVENILE COURTS (1969); D. MATZA, supra note 8; see also infra notes
328-29 and accompanying text.
304 Feld, supra note 32, at 587. Two scholars note that the juvenile justice
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The relevance given to individualized justice in the adjudication of
juvenile offenses, however, raises concerns about the impact of discretion-
ary decisionmaking. Lower-class and nonwhite youths are substantially
overrepresented in the juvenile justice system. 3 5 Basing the severity of a
juvenile's sentence on social characteristics such as race or socioeconomic
status raises issues of fairness, equality, and justice .30 6 When practitioners of
"individualized justice" base discretionary judgments on social characteris-
tics or race, rather than legal variables, their decisions frequently redound to
the disadvantage of the poor and minorities and lead to charges of discrimi-
nation. 30 7 This discrimination is reflected in differential processing and more
severe sentencing of minority youths relative to whites. 30 8
system differs significantly from its adult counterpart in its express incorporation
of highly differential processing of alleged delinquents. The separate juvenile
court system emerged from a pervasive belief that the goal of rehabilitation best
could be served by permitting juvenile courts to maximize flexibility, informal-
ity, and discretion, especially at the dispositional or sentencing stage. Thus, the
dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court are extremely broad.
Thomas & Fitch, An Inquiry into the Association Betwi'een Respondents' Personal
Characteristics and Juvenile Court Dispositions, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 61, 64
(1975).
305 See, e.g., Dannefer & Schutt, Race and Juvenile Justice Processing in Court
and Police Agencies, 87 AMER. J. Soc. 1113 (1982); Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone,
supra note 300; The Incarceration of Minority Youth, supra note 302; McCarthy &
Smith, supra note 300; Thornberry, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Sentencing in
the Juvenile Justice System, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1973).
306 Thornberry, Sentencing Disparities in the Juvenile Justice System, 70 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 164 (1979).
107 Feld, supra note 32, at 591. Professor Thornberry notes that
[s]uch a finding [of discrimination] would raise questions about the ability of the
American criminal justice system to dispense fair and equitable justice for all. In
turn, that unfairness would raise questions about the ability of correctional
institutions to rehabilitate offenders who doubt the legitimacy of the system
because of its perceived bias.
Thornberry, supra note 306, at 164; see also Chiricos, Jackson & Waldo, Inequality
in the Imposition of a Criminal Label, 19 Soc. PROBS. 553 (1972); Green, Race,
Social Status, and Criminal Arrest, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 476 (1970). See generally
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 61. Research analyzing earlier studies
that found racial differentials in sentencing practices have found "clear and consis-
tent evidence of a racial differential operating at each decision level. Moreover, the
differentials operate continuously over various decision levels to produce a substan-
tial accumulative racial differential which transforms a more or less heterogeneous
racial arrest population into a homogeneous institutionalized black population."
Liska & Tausig, Theoretical Interpretations of Social Class and Racial Differentials
in Legal Decision-Making for Juveniles, 20 Soc. Q. 197, 205 (1979); accord Fagan,
Slaughter & Hartstone, supra note 300; McCarthy & Smith, supra note 300.
308 See, e.g., Bishop & Frazier, The Influence of Race in Juvenile Justice Process-
ing, 25 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 242 (1988); Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra
note 300; Incarceration of Minority Youth, supra note 302; McCarthy & Smith, supra
note 300, at 59.
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An alternative explanation for the disproportionate overrepresentation of
minorities in the juvenile justice process is that, despite the juvenile system's
nominal commitment to individualized justice, dispositional decisions are
based on the Principle of Offense rather than on an assessment of individual
needs. If that is the case, then overrepresentation of minority and lower-
class youths in the juvenile system may be attributed to real differences in
rates of delinquent activity by these youths. 30 9
An obvious question, then, is to what extent legal factors-present of-
fense and prior record-or social characteristics-race, sex, or social
class-influence judges' dispositional decisionmaking. Evaluations of dispo-
sitional practices suggest that the Principle of Offense pervades practical
decisionmaking throughout the juvenile justice system, whether the decision
is made by the police, during intake, or at adjudication. 310 Historically, the
309 One group of observers note that "official delinquents," those whose contacts
with law enforcement personnel resulted in official records, are disproportionately
concentrated in poor and minority communities and that in every socioeconomic
category black youths engaged in delinquency to a greater extent than their white
counterparts. See W. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A
BIRTH COHORT 246 (1972); see also Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common
Law Personal Crimes, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 93 (1978) (racial differentials in criminal
justice system may reflect real differences in behavior rather than effects of discrim-
inatory decisionmaking). Alternatively, others have concluded that
it does not appear that differences in incarceration rates between racial groups
can be explained by differences in the proportions of persons of each racial
group that engage in delinquent behavior. Even if the slightly higher rates for
more serious offenses among minorities were given more importance than is
statistically indicated, the relative proportions of whites and minorities involved
in delinquent behavior could not account for the observed differences in incar-
ceration rates.
Huizinga & Elliot, Juvenile Offenders: Prevalence, Offender Incidence, and Arrest
Rates by Race, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 206, 212 (1987); see also Incarceration of
Minority Youth, supra note 301, at 196 (noting that "differences in incarceration rates
by race cannot be explained by the proportions of each racial group that engage in
delinquent behavior").
310 A number of individuals make dispositional decisions concerning the welfare
and status of a youth engaged in the juvenilejustice process. Police officers may refer
a case to intake for formal processing, adjust it informally on the street or at the
station-house, or divert it. Intake, in turn, may refer a youth to the juvenile court for
formal adjudication or dispose of the case through informal supervision or diversion.
Finally, even after formal adjudication, the juvenile court judge may choose from a
wide array of dispositional alternatives ranging from continuing a case without a
finding of delinquency, probation, or commitment to a state training school. See
generally S. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE (1972); F.
MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, supra note 141; J. SENNA & L. SIEGEL,
JUVENILE LAW (1976); Harris, Is the Juvenile Justice System Lenient?, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ABSTRACTS 104 (March, 1986).
Recent research indicates that the dispositional decisionmaking process is cumula-
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juvenile justice system premised its dispositional decisions on the charac-
teristics of the offender. Contemporary research, however, suggests the
system has shifted its emphasis from the characteristics of the offender to
the offense committed. As a corollary, juvenile courts increasingly seek
formal rationality in decisionmaking by using general rules applicable to
categories of cases rather than pursuing individualized substantive justice. 311
tive; decisions made by the initial participants-police or intake-affect the types of
decisions made by subsequent participants. See, e.g., Barton, Discretionary Deci-
sion-Making in Juvenile Justice, 22 CRIME & DELINQ. 470 (1976); Bishop & Frazier,
supra note 308; McCarthy & Smith, supra note 300; Phillips & Dinitz, Labelling and
Juvenile Court Dispositions: Official Responses to a Cohort of Violent Juveniles, 23
Soc. Q. 267 (1982).
Assessing judicial decisionmaking requires familiarity with decisionmaking by
other juvenile justice actors. Evaluations of police dispositional decisionmaking are
reported by: Bittner, Policing Juveniles: The Social Context of Common Practice, in
PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 69 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976); Black & Reiss,
Police Control of Juveniles, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 63 (1970); Ferdinand & Luchterhand,
Inner-City Youth, the Police, the Juvenile Court, and Justice, 17 Soc. PROB. 510
(1970); Hohenstein, Factors Influencing the Police Disposition ofJuvenile Offenders,
in DELINQUENCY: SELECTED STUDIES 138 (T. Sellin & M. Wolfgang eds. 1969);
McEachern & Bauzer, Factors Related to Dispositions in Juvenile Police Contacts,
in JUVENILE GANGS IN CONTEXT 148 (M. Klein & B. Myerhoffeds. 1964); Piliavin &
Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. Soc. 206 (1964); Discriminating by
Agencies, supra note 301, at 218; The Screening of Juvenile Offenders, supra note
301, at 173; Thornberry, supra note 305; Weiner & Willie, Decisions by Juvenile
Officers, 77 AM. J. Soc. 199 (1971); Werthman & Piliavin, Gang Members and the
Police, in THE POLICE 56 (D. Bordua ed. 1970); Williams & Gold, From Delinquent
Behavior to Official Delinquency, 20 Soc. PROB. 209 (1972).
If the police refer a case to juvenile court, typically an intake probation officer will
screen it to decide whether to process the case formally or informally. About half of
the cases referred to intake are closed-or informally adjusted. See E. NIMICK, H.
SNYDER, D. SULLIVAN & N. TIERNEY, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1982 12 (1985).
Between 1957 and 1982, the percentage of delinquency referrals resulting in formal
petitions has ranged from 41% to 54%. In 1982, 44% of referrals resulted in formal
petitions, the lowest rate in a decade. Some research suggests that a child's social
characteristics, demeanor, or race, rather than the referral offenses, influence intake
decisionmaking, thereby amplifying racial and class disparities in processing youths
referred to juvenile court. See Bell & Lang, The Intake Dispositions of Juvenile
Offenders, 22 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 309 (1985); Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone,
supra note 300; McCarthy & Smith, supra note 300; Thomas & Sieverdes, supra note
299, at 425-26; Thornberry, supra note 305, at 94; Williams & Gold, supra, at 299.
311 See, e.g., M. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (M.
Rheinstein ed. 1954). Weber's typology of law distinguishes between formal legal
rationality and substantive rationality. Formal rationality is characterized by the
application to legal problems of explicit, universal rules. By contrast, substantive
rationality prevails when decisions are made on the basis of principles not derived
from the legal system but from some other authoritative source or belief system. See
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A number of studies report that minority or lower-class youths receive
more severe dispositions than white youths even after controlling for rele-
vant legal variables. 312 One report notes that initial decisions as to screening,
detention, charging, and adjudications are strongly influenced by the Princi-
ple of Offense. The report concludes, however, that as cases progress in the
adjudicatory process, race and class directly affect dispositions, with minor-
ity youths receiving more severe sentences.3 1 3 Another study, conducted
with a control for legal and processing variables, found that a juvenile's race
had a direct effect on decisions made at several processing junctures.3 14
Others have concluded that when legal variables are held constant, the
juvenile court's individualized justice "typically applies harsh sanctions to
blacks, those who have dropped out of school, those in single parent or
broken homes, [and] those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds
.... ,''31 A study of the impact of extralegal factors, particularly race, on
generally J. INVERARITY, P. LAUDERDALE & B. FELD, supra note 4, at 112-16.
Decisions made within the juvenile court system tend to be the result of Weberian
substantive rationality.
Decision-making in systems of substantive justice is guided by reference to a
substantive goal or by the best decision in the individual case, not by the
application of abstract rules. The ideal in the juvenile court has been one of
"individualized" justice whereby each offender should be treated as unique and
as deserving such treatment. The framework of relevant criteria of decision-
making is far broader than only the "legal" factors relevant in adult courts, and
encompasses a variety of social background variables that are indicative of the
offender's personal, home, and community situations.
Horwitz & Wasserman, Some Misleading Conceptions in Sentencing Research: An
Example and Reformulation in the Juvenile Court, 18 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 417 (1980);
see also D. MATZA, supra note 8; A. PLATT, supra note 4; Schultz, The Cycle of
Juvenile Court History, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 457 (1973).
3'2 See, e.g., Arnold, Race and Ethnicity Relative to Other Factors in Juvenile
Court Dispositions, 77 AM. J. Soc. 211 (1971); Thomas & Cage, supra note 301;
Dannefer & Schutt, supra note 305, at 1129; Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra
note 300; Incarceration of Minority Youth, supra note 302; McCarthy & Smith, supra
note 300; Thomas & Fitch, supra note 304; Thornberry, supra note 306; cf. Carter,
Juvenile Court Dispositions: A Comparison of Status and Nonstatus Offenders, 17
CRIMINOLOGY 341, 356 (1979) (finding social class bias at all levels of juvenile court
disposition); Carter & Clelland, A Neo-Marxian Critique, Formulation and Test of
Juvenile Dispositions as a Function of Social Class, 27 Soc. PROBS. 96 (1979) (finding
discrimination against youths from unstable working class backgrounds.
313 McCarthy & Smith, supra note 300.
314 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 308, at 257-58. The study also reported indirect
and cumulative effects of race on dispositional decisionmaking; noting, for example,
that reliance on a juvenile's record of prior offenses implicates previous decisions
influenced by a juvenile's race as well. Id. at 259.
31 Thomas & Cage, supra note 301, at 250; see also Thomas & Fitch, supra note
304, at 82-83.
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decisionmaking at six points in the juvenile process found that "minority
youth receive consistently harsher dispositions. ' 316 The study concluded
that
[t]he evidence for racial discrimination .. . is compelling. Its sources
may lie in the individual attitudes of decisionmakers in the system's
independent agencies, but it is unlikely that these seemingly isolated
decisionmakers of substantially different backgrounds would produce
such consistent, systemic behaviors. Rather than a chance convergence
of independent behaviors, they seem to reflect a sociological process, if
not a generalized perspective, shared across decisionmakers of dispa-
rate backgrounds. Like other societal institutions, the justice system is
not blind to ethnic and racial differences. 317
Other research has found race affects only the dispositions of minor
offenders, while for serious or repeat offenders, sentencing disparities be-
tween the races decline. 318 Contrary to expectations, -a few studies report
that white youths receive more severe dispositions than blacks. 31 9 Some
studies report that substantive factors such as "family and school prob-
lems," along with legal criteria, explain variations in sentencing. 320 Sum-
marizing this research, the Principle of Offense appears to be the most
significant factor influencing juvenile court dispositions, with a substantial
amount of sentencing variation related to a juvenile's race. 32 1
The elevation of the Principle of Offense to a dispositional standard
received tacit endorsement in 1967 from the report of the President's Com-
316 Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra note 300, at 252.
317 Id. at 253.
318 See Carter, supra note 312., at 355; Clarke & Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or
Crime Control, and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 263
(1980); Cohen & Kluegel, Determinants of Juvenile Court Dispositions: Ascriptive
and Achieved Factors in Two Metropolitan Courts, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 162 (1978);
Ferdinand & Luchterhand, supra note 310, at 521; Screening o f Juvenile Offenders,
supra note 301.
319 See, e.g., Ferster & Courtless, Pre-Dispositional Data, Role of Counsel and
Decisions in a Juvenile Court, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 195 (1972); Scarpitti & Stephen-
son, Juvenile Court Dispositions: Factors in the Decision-Making Process, 17 CRIME
& DELINQ. 142 (1971).
321) See. e.g., Horwitz & Wasserman, supra note 311, at 421; Thomas & Fitch,
supra note 304, at 77, 83.
32, See supra notes 312-18 and accompanying text. Phillips and Dinitz report that
in addition to present offense and the number of prior arrests, prior court responses
tend to predict subsequent dispositions; there is a strong correlation between prior
institutionalization and the probability of subsequent institutionalization independent
of both past and present behavior. Phillips & Dinitz, supra note 310, at 275-76; see
also Kowalski & Rickicki, Determinants of Juvenile Postadjudication Dispositions,
19 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 66 (1982) (reporting that correctional administrators in a
postadjudication context use present offense and prior record for making placements
in institutions or the community).
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mission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, which
explicitly recognized the punitive character of juvenile court intervention.3 22
Subsequently, several juvenile justice policy groups have recommended the
replacement of indeterminate sentences with formal dispositional criteria
and sentences proportional to the seriousness of the offense; 23 in short, a
shift from substantive justice to formal legal rationality.
The elevation of the Principle of Offense has also received practical
administrative impetus from bureaucratic imperatives-the desire of
juvenile and criminal justice agencies to avoid scandal and unfavorable
political and media attention. Several scholars have noted the constraint that
"fear of scandal" imposes on juvenile court dispositions.324 One such
scholar has observed that
juvenile court decision-making comes to be pervaded by a sense of
vulnerability to adverse public reaction for failing to control or restrain
delinquent offenders. . . . [Fear of scrutiny and criticism increases
pressures] to impose maximum restraints on the offender-in most
instances incarceration. Anything less risks immediate criticism. But
more than this, it also exposes the court to the possibility of even
stronger reaction in the future. For given any recurrence of serious
illegal activity, former decisions that can be interpreted as "lenient"
become difficult to defend.
325
The Principle of Offense and scandal avoidance encourage formal and re-
strictive responses to the more serious forms of juvenile deviance.3 2 6
322 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
supra note 13, at 2:
Court adjudication and disposition of [juvenile] offenders should no longer be
viewed solely as a diagnosis and prescription for cure, but should be frankly
recognized as an authoritative court judgment expressing society's claim to
protection. While rehabilitative efforts should be vigorously pursued in defer-
ence to the youth of the offenders and in keeping with a general commitment to
individualized treatment of all offenders, the incapacitative, deterrent, and con-
demnatory aspects of the judgment should not be disguised.
323 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 129, at
5.1-5.2; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3.181
(1980).
314 See, e.g., M.A. BORTNER, supra note 303; A. CICOUREL, supra note 303; R.
EMERSON, supra note 303; D. MATZA, supra note 8.
325 Emerson, Role Determinants in Juvenile Court, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOL-
OGY 624 (D. Glaser ed. 1974); see also R. EMERSON, supra note 303.
326 Matza notes that the juvenile court judge is
ultimately responsible to the public. He will have to explain ... why the
17-year-old murderer of an innocent matron was allowed to roam the streets, on
probation, when just last year he was booked for mugging. This is no easy
question to answer. Somehow, an invoking of the principle of individualized
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"[W]hether a juvenile goes to some manner of prison or is put on some
manner of probation .. .depends first, on a traditional rule-of-thumb as-
sessment of the total risk of danger and thus scandal evident in the juvenile's
''327current offense and prior record of offenses ....
Finally, juvenile courts necessarily develop bureaucratic strategies to
reconcile their need for highly individualized assessments with their pursuit
of often contradictory formal goals. 328
Time after time after time procedures emerge which permit officials in
these organizations to classify and categorize those who come to their
attention as swiftly and simply as they can. The form of these categori-
zation processes is commonly defined by the types of information which
organizations routinely capture as a basis for forming or, equally often,
defending the decisions they are obligated to make. 32 9
Because the present offense and the prior record of delinquency are among
the types of information routinely and necessarily collected in juvenile court
processing, it is hardly surprising that they provide a type of decisional rule.
justice and a justification of mercy on the basis of accredited social-work theory
hardly seems appropriate on these occasions.
D. MATZA, supra note 8, at 122.
327 Id. at 125.
328 Internal and external organizational factors constrain judicial autonomy. While
exercising discretion, the judge
is restricted by the peculiar bureaucratic setting in which it appears. His judg-
ment and wisdom may reign but only precariously since he is simultaneously the
manager of the court and must thus concern himself with public relations,
internal harmony, efficient work flow, and the rest.... Within the limits set by
the demands of time, efficiency, and work flow, the kadi's wisdom and judgment
may operate. He must decide which portion of the wide frame of relevance to
invoke in each case, and in every case he is subjected to the remaining cross-
pressures; one calling for severity, the other for mercy; one emanating from
far-off and occasional critics, the other from nearby and ever-present underlings
with whom he must work; one irrelevant to the day-to-day administration of an
efficient court, the other crucially relevant; but one representing what he takes to
be public opinion, the other what he takes to be professional opinion; and one
holding the sanction of public scandal, the other of professional criticism.
Id. at 122-23. In a quest to balance these internal and external considerations, the
juvenile courts have restored the Principle of Offense, at least in part, as a form of
decisional rule. Matza argues that
[tjhe court's solution [to its dispositional dilemma] contains two elements. One,
the main part of the solution, is to more or less reinstore-sub rosa-the
principle of offense.... [T]he concern with individual characteristics and with
treatment is not completely surrendered by the court ... but they are trans-
formed .... The workable bureaucratic equivalents of the stress on extraordi-
nary individual characteristics-equity-and the philosophy of treatment are
the doctrines of parental sponsorship and residential availability.
Id. at 124-25 (emphasis in original).
329 Marshall & Thomas, Discretionary Decision-Making and the Juvenile Court,
Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 55-57 (1983).
1988]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68: 821
. A survey of juvenile sentencing practices in California reported that,
despite claims of individualization, juvenile dispositions appear to be based
primarily on the youth's present offense and prior record. The study con-
cluded that
comparisons of juvenile and adult sentencing practices suggest thatjuvenile and criminal courts in California are much more alike than
statutory language would suggest, in the degree to which they focus on
aggravating circumstances of the charged offense and the defendant's
prior record in determining the degree of confinement that will be
imposed .330
While legal variables exhibit a stronger statistical relationship to disposi-
tions than do social variables, a substantial amount of variation in the
sentencing of juveniles cannot be explained. Present offense and prior rec-
ord are the best predictors of dispositions, yet they only account for approx-
imately one-quarter of the variance in sentencing.3 3' With respect to the large
amount of unexplained variation, commentators have observed that "the
juvenile justice process is so ungoverned by procedural rules and so
haphazard in the attribution of relevance to any particular variables or set of
variables that judicial dispositions are very commonly the product of an
arbitrary and capricious decision-making process. ' 3 32 The absence of any
explanatory relationship between legal or social variables and dispositions
may be interpreted as true "individualized justice," where every child
receives a unique disposition tailored to his or her individual needs. "Given
the philosophy of the juvenile court system, this finding might be interpreted
as quite positive in the sense that it could imply that judges consider a broad
spectrum of both legal and social variables in their attempt to individualize
decisions. ' 333 This discretionary "individualization" has important conse-
quences, however, such as the disproportional affects of race on sentencing.
An equally plausible interpretation, however, is that there is no rationale
330 P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, A. ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, YOUTH CRIME
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 51 (1983). This study further reports:
The evidence suggests that the juvenile system is becoming increasingly puni-
tive, particularly for the more serious offenders. Between 1978 and 1981 the
number of juveniles placed in secure county facilities jumped by 23 percent while
CYA placements increased by more than 10 percent. All this is occurring at the
same time that arrest rates for most crime categories are either leveling off or
declining.
Id. (emphasis added).
:313 Feld, supra note 32, at 598-99; see also Clarke & Koch, supra note 318, at 286;
Horwitz & Wasserman, stepra note 311, at 411; Marshall & Thomas, supra note 329,
at 57; Thomas & Cage, supra note 301, at 244; Thomas & Fitch, supra note 304, at 75.
33 2 Marshall & Thomas, supra note 329, at 57.
:133 Thomas & Cage, supra note 301, at 244.
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to dispositional decisionmaking; it consists of little more than intuition,
guesswork, and hopes, constrained marginally by the youth's present of-
fense and prior record. In such a case, individualization is simply a
euphemism for arbitrariness and discrimination:
[T]hese findings also suggest the possibility that those who share vari-
ous social characteristics will be treated in a significantly different
fashion from those drawn from other categories in the population; those
against whom complaints are filed by one type of complainant will be
treated differently than those who have engaged in comparable behav-
ior, but whose offense has been brought to the attention of social control
agencies by a different complainant; and those who come before one
judge will be disposed of differently than those who appear before
another judge, regardless of who they are or what their present and past
offense record might be.3 34
A system of justice in which the most powerful explanatory variables-
present offense and prior record-have a relatively low correlation to varia-
tions in sentencing remains highly discretionary and, perhaps, discrimina-
tory. It means that there is substantial attenuation between a youth's crimi-
nal behavior and the severity of the disposition; minor offenders can receive
much more severe dispositions than serious offenders. Similarly situated
offenders, in terms of their present offense or prior record, can receive
markedly dissimilar dispositions. To a substantial degree, the recent legisla-
tive changes summarized in Table I represent legislative uneasiness with the
underlying premises of individualized justice, the idiosyncratic exercises of
judicial discretion to achieve that goal, and the invidious inequities that
result.
4. Summary of Changes in Juvenile Court Sentencing Practices
The preceding analysis of de jure and de facto juvenile justice sentencing
practices demonstrates a very strong nationwide movement, both in theory
and in practice, away from therapeutic, individualized dispositions toward
determinate or mandatory sentences based on the Principle of Offense. This
very strong trend has emerged only since the McKeiver decision. When
McKeiver was decided in 1970, no states used determinate sentencing stat-
utes, mandatory minimum sentencing statutes for serious juvenile offenders,
or administratively promulgated sentencing and release guidelines. Today,
nearly one-third of the states employ one or more of these sentencing
strategies.
As indicated in Table I, in 1976, New York and Kentucky adopted desig-
nated felony legislation. In 1977, Washington adopted determinate sentenc-
ing guidelines for juveniles, and Colorado passed the first of a series of
serious juvenile offender laws. The Washington experiment, with its exten-
334 Id.
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sive evaluation research, provided a model for other jurisdictions. In 1979,
Connecticut, Illinois, and North Carolina adopted serious offender sentenc-
ing legislation, and California's Youth Parole Board and offense-based re-
lease guidelines were passed. Since 1980, nine more states-Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Delaware, Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Virginia-have adopted either serious juvenile offender legislation, determi-
nate sentencing guidelines, or administrative commitment and release guide-
lines.
Viewed as a whole, the various legislative and administrative changes and
operational practices described thus far have eliminated virtually all of the
significant distinctions between sentencing practices in the juvenile and adult
criminal processes. The use of determinate sentences based on the present
offense and prior record of the juvenile, whether de jure or de facto, calls
into question any possible therapeutic "alternative purpose" for juvenile
dispositions. The use of mandatory minimum statutes to sentence on the
basis of the seriousness of the juvenile's offense avoids any reference to the
offender's "real needs" or "best interests." The revision of purpose clauses
in juvenile justice statutes, with greater emphasis placed on the integrity of
the substantive criminal law or the need to protect public safety, eliminates
even rhetorical support for the traditional rehabilitative goals of juvenile
justice. These changes were succinctly summarized by a California court in
In re Javier A. 335 which concluded that "the purposes of the juvenile
process have become more punitive, its procedures formalistic, adversarial
and public, and the consequences of conviction much more harsh. 336
One of the most comprehensive studies of state juvenile sentencing prac-
tices reports:
Numerous states have, by statute, adopted determinate sentencing poli-
cies for serious or violent offenders, and several states have now either
adopted determinate sentence statutes or have created administrative
release guidelines that establish explicit time or ranges of time to be
served for any delinquent who has committed an act that would be a
crime if committed by an adult.
These policies contradict some of the basic assumptions of the origi-
nal juvenile court: that juvenile offenders should be handled quite
differently than adult offenders, that the juvenile court and youth cor-
rections are designed to operate and therefore function in the best
interest of the child, that the objective of the juvenile justice system is
rehabilitation of the youth and not applying fixed time of punishment,
and that rehabilitation is an open-ended process requiring treatment of
each youth as an individual, thus "time served," as it were, is indeter-
minate depending on the successful rehabilitation of the youth .3
335 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1984).
336 Id. at 963-64, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
337 R. COATES, M. FORST & B. FISHER, INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT AND RE-
LEASE DECISION-MAKING FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF DE-
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In short, these changes call into question the underlying rationale of the
McKeiver decision that juvenile dispositions are for the "alternative pur-
pose" of rehabilitation.
C. "Get Tough" Legislation and Conditions of Confinement in Juvenile
Institutions
Formal legislative and administrative sentencing criteria, as well as the
operational practices they foster, contradict the traditional individualized,
offender-oriented sentencing rationales of the juvenile court. This conflict is
further reflected in the conditions of confinement in the institutions to which
juvenile offenders are committed for rehabilitation. Studying the institu-
tional reality of juvenile corrections, the supposed locus of "rehabilitation,"
advances the punishment versus treatment inquiry.
Examining juvenile correctional facilities helps to determine whether in-
stitutional confinement constitutes punishment or a therapeutic "alternative
purpose." Indeed, it was the reality of institutional conditions that moti-
vated the Court in Gault to afford juveniles procedural safeguards. There,
the Supreme Court noted:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiv-
ing home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of
confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser
time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, reg-
imented routine, and institutional hours . .." Instead of mother and
father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is
peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents"
confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and
homicide.338
In Gault, the Court belatedly recognized conditions that have long persisted.
The Gault Court's emphasis on incarceration and institutional confinement
is relevant to the issue of punishment and underlies its fifth amendment
holding. The Court has never held that involuntary confinement per se
constitutes punishment. 3 9 The Gault Court, however, correctly perceived
incarceration per se as a severe penalty, a substantial deprivation of auton-
omy, and a continual reminder of one's delinquent status, all of which are
punitive in nature.
The contradictions between the rhetorical affirmation of rehabilitation and
TERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE APPROACHES-A CROSS-STATE ANALYSIS 1 (1985)
(emphasis added).
338 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (footnotes omitted) (quoting in part Holmes'
Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 616, 109 A.2d 523, 530 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting)).
'39 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) ("In a civil commit-
ment state power is not exercised in a punitive sense."); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S.
364, 374 (1986) ("We ... cannot say that the conditions of petitioner's confinement
themselves amounted to 'punishment.' ").
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the reality of custodial institutional confinement have characterized the
juvenile court since its inception. Rothman's study of the early juvenile
training schools describes institutions that not only failed to rehabilitate but
were scarcely distinguishable from their adult penal counterparts.3 40
Schlossman provides a similarly pessimistic account of the reality ofjuvenile
correctional programs under the aegis of Progressivism. 341 Indeed, the
juvenile court's lineage of punitive, custodial confinement in the name of
rehabilitation can be traced back to its institutional precursors in the Houses
of Refuge.3 42
Gault's criticism of the adequacy of juvenile correctional programs is not
simply a historical artifact. Evaluations of juvenile correctional facilities in
the years since Gault reveal a continuing gap between the rhetoric of re-
habilitation and its punitive reality.3 43 The author's study of juvenile institu-
tions in Massachusetts describes facilities in which staff physically abused
inmates and were frequently powerless to prevent the worst aspects of
inmate abuse by other inmates.
[T]he lives of the low-status inmates in the custody-oriented cottages
were miserable. . . . The direct physical assaults and abuse were sub-
stantial and real. The attendant psychological trauma was equally ap-
parent. These victims of terrorization were afraid of other inmates.
Their fear emboldened others who, by their aggression, reinforced their
fear.
34 4
A study in Ohio reveals a similarly violent and oppressive institutional
environment for the "rehabilitation" of young delinquents. 345
340 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 261-89.
341 S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT (1977).
342 See, e.g., J. HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SOCIETY: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1971); R. MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES:
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1825-1940 276 (1973); R. PICKETT,
HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF JUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE (1969); D.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC 235 (1971).
343 See generally C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER & S. DINITZ, JUVENILE VICTIMIZA-
TION 259 (1976); B. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFEND-
ERS IN INSTITUTIONS (1977); S. LERNER, BODILY HARM: THE PATTERN OF FEAR
AND VIOLENCE AT THE CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY (1986); D. STREET, R.
VINTER & C. PERROW, ORGANIZATION FOR TREATMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR DELINQUENTS 8 (1966); K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE
PLAYTIME OF OTHERS: AMERICA'S INCARCERATED CHILDREN 97 (1976); Feld, A
Comparative Analysis of Organizational Structure and Inmate Subcultures in In-
stitutions for Juvenile Offenders, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 336, 352-56 (1981); Poole &
Regoli, Violence in Juvenile Institutions: A Comparative Study, 21 CRIMINOLOGY
213, 213 (1983).
344 B. FELD, supra note 343, at 160.
345 See C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER & S. DINITZ, supra note 343, at 152-64.
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Extensive scrutiny of the Texas juvenile correctional system during the
1970s revealed patterns of staff and inmate violence and the subjection of
inmates to degrading make-work tasks.346 The California Youth Authority
conducted extensive reviews of its institutions and concluded that "a young
man convicted of a crime cannot pay his debt to society safely. The hard
truth is that the CYA staff cannot protect its inmates from being beaten or
intimidated by other prisoners. ' 347 The research attributed the violence to
inappropriately designed facilities, inadequate staffing, and substantial over-
crowding, all of which "promote the formation and ascendancy of prison
gangs. ' 348 Despite the rhetoric of rehabilitation, the daily reality of juvenile
offenders confined in many "treatment" facilities is one of staff and inmate
violence, predatory behavior, and all of the attendant punitive consequences
of custodial incarceration.
During the period of these post-Gault evaluation studies, a number of
lawsuits challenged the conditions of confinement in juvenile correctional
facilities, alleging that the conditions violated the committed inmates' "right
to treatment" and inflicted "cruel and unusual punishment. ' 349 The "right
to treatment" is a logical extension of the state's invocation of its parens
patriae power to intervene for the purported benefit of the individual. 350 In
settings other than juvenile correctional facilities, such as institutions for the
mentally ill and mentally retarded, states confine individuals "for their own
good" without affording them the procedural safeguards required for crimi-
nal incarceration. In all of these settings, it is the promise of benefit-a
therapeutic "alternative purpose"-that justifies the less stringent pro-
cedural safeguards.3 51 Thus, failing to deliver the promised treatment results
346 See Guggenheim, A Call to Abolish the Juvenile Justice System, 2 CHILDREN'S
RTs. REP. No. 9, June 1978, at 6-7.
347 S. LERNER, supra note 343, at 12.
348 Id. at 14.
349 See Feld, supra note 2, at 260 n.461; Feld, supra note 32, at 535-39.
350 Incarcerating an individual without treatment is punishment; subjecting a per-
son to punishment requires full criminal procedural safeguards. Thus incarceration
without the benefit of criminal procedural safeguards is justified only if rehabilitative
treatment is forthcoming. See generally Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treat-
ment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 752-53 (1969) (commenting on the judicial need for a
"right to treatment"); Goodman, Right to Treatment: The Responsibility of the
Courts, 57 GEO. L.J. 680, 697 (1969) (arguing that the promise of treatment must be
fulfilled in aparens patriae proceeding); Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy
the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEO. L.J. 848, 850 (1969) (noting that broken
parens patriae promises gave the "right to treatment" new life); Note, Developments
in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1316-57
(1974) (examining rights and obligations of individuals who are involuntarily commit-
ted).
351 See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.O. Ala. 1971).
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in simple custodial confinement-punitive incarceration and a loss of
liberty-which is the essence of a due process violation. 312
The "right to treatment" and "cruel and unusual punishment" cases
provide another view of the reality of juvenile corrections. In Nelson v.
Heyne, 353 the court found that inmates were routinely beaten with a "frater-
nity paddle," injected with psychotropic drugs for social control purposes,
and deprived of minimally adequate care and individualized treatment. In
Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck,3 4 the court found inmates
confined in dark, cold, dungeon-like cells in their underwear, routinely
locked in solitary confinement, and subjected to a variety of punitive prac-
tices.3 55 In Morales v. Turman ,356 the court found numerous instances of
physical brutality and abuse, including hazing by staff and inmates, staff-
administered beatings, exposure of inmates to tear gas, homosexual as-
saults, extensive use of solitary confinement, repetitive and degrading
make-work, and minimal clinical services. 357 In Morgan v. Sproat, 35 the
court found that youths were confined in padded cells with no windows or
furnishings and only flush holes for toilets, and denied access to all services,
programs, or materials except a Bible. 35 9 In State v. Werner, 360 the court
found that inmates were locked in solitary confinement, beaten and sprayed
352 See Feld, supra note 32, at 535-39. The constitutional rationales that underlie
the civil commitment cases have been invoked to secure treatment for juveniles
incarcerated in state training schools. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 358-60 (7th
Cir. 1974) (holding that juveniles have a fourteenth amendment due process right to
rehabilitative treatment), cert. den., Heyne v. Nelson, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Mar-
tarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that state-imposed
detention underparens patriae must include adequate treatment to meet the constitu-
tional requirement of due process and prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment);
Inmates of Boy's Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (D.R.1. 1972)
(holding that due process requires post-adjudicative institutionalization in the
juvenile justice system to further the goal of rehabilitation); Note, Recent Devel-
opments-Limits on Punishment and Entitlement to Rehabilitative Treatment o1
Institutionalized Juveniles: Nelson v. Heyne, 60 VA. L. REV. 864, 865 (1974) (dis-
cussing the growing judicial trend towards the recognition of the rights of in-
stitutionalized youths).
353 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
den., Heyne v. Nelson, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). For a discussion of Nelson v. Heyne, see
Comment, Constitutional Right to Treatment Jor Juveniles Adjudicated to be Delin-
quent-Nelson v. Heyne, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 209 (1974); Note, supra note 352.
354 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
355 Id. at 1358-62.
356 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir.
1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977), reh'g den., 430 U.S. 988 (1977).
157 Id. at 72-85.
358 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
359 Id. at 1138.
360 161 W. Va. 192, 242 S.E.2d 907 (1978).
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with mace by staff, required to scrub floors with a toothbrush, and subjected
to punitive practices such as standing and sitting for prolonged periods
without changing position. 361
Unfortunately, these cases are not atypical, as the list of judicial opinions
documenting institutional abuses demonstrates a62 Rehabilitative euphe-
misms, such as "providing a structured environment" and a therapeutic
"alternative purpose," cannot disguise the punitive reality that charac-
terizes confinement in a juvenile institution. Although not as uniformly bad
as adult prisons, juvenile correctional facilities are certainly not so benign
and therapeutic as to justify depriving those who face commitment to them
of procedural safeguards. While the prospect of incarcerating juveniles in
barbarous adult facilities is not appealing, the well-documented prevalence
of violence, aggression, and homosexual rape in juvenile facilities is hardly
consoling. 363
Evaluations of juvenile corrections have consistently found violent inmate
subcultures to be a function of institutional security arrangements; the more
authoritarian controls are imposed to facilitate security, the higher the level
of covert inmate violence within the subculture. 36 Juveniles sentenced to
long terms under "get tough" legislation are the most serious and chronic
offenders, yet facilities designed to handle them often suffer from limited
physical mobility, inadequate program resources, and intense interaction
among the most problematic youths in the system. The result is a situation
that can easily give rise to ajuvenile corrections "warehouse" with all of the
worst characteristics of adult penal incarceration. 36
The changes in juvenile court sentencing legislation have exacerbated all
of the deleterious side effects that institutional overcrowding produces. 36
Changing sentencing practices without simultaneously accounting for their
impact on the correctional system is a prescription for disaster.
Not only were more youth being sent to training schools, they were also
staying longer. Whereas training school average length of stay declined
from 260 days in 1974 to 238 in 1979, length of stay rose back up to 256
days by 1982 ...
361 Id. at 196-97, 242 S.E.2d at 909-10.
362 See, e.g., Krisberg, Schwartz, Litsky & Austin, The Watershed of Juvenile
Justice Reform, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 5, 32 (1986) (summarizing additional unre-
ported cases and concluding that there is "growing evidence that harsh conditions of
confinement continue to plague juvenile detention centers and training schools").
363 See, e.g., C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER & S. DINITZ, supra note 343; B. FELD,
supra note 343; H. POLSKY, COTTAGE SIX-THE SOCIAL SYSTEM OF DELINQUENT
Boys IN RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT 55-68 (1962).
364 See, e.g., B. FELD, supra note 343, at 132-38, 163-69; D. STREET, R. VINTER &
C. PERROW, supra note 343, at 199.
36' See, e.g., Rolde, Mack, Scherl & Macht, The Maximum Security Institution as
a Treatment Facility Jbr Juveniles, in JUVENILE DELINQ. 437 (J. Teele ed. 1970).
366 See supra notes 149-50, 245-47, 296-98 and accompanying text.
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... [T]he proportion of minority youth in the nation's training schools
has [also] increased. In 1977 whites made up 53% of the public training
school population; by 1982 the proportion of whites in training schools
had declined to 46%.367
Longer terms of confinement in custodial warehouses increasingly populated
by minority youths is hardly the therapeutic "alternative purpose" en-
visioned in McKeiver.
IV. PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT, AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES-THE
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING SENTENCING PRACTICES FOR JUVENILES AND
JUSTICE
The shift in juvenile sentencing strategies from the offender to the offense
and from treatment to punishment has implications for the juvenile court as
an institution as well as for juveniles and justice. The explicit emphasis on
punishment implicates underlying assumptions about youthful culpability
and criminal responsibility. Acknowledging that punishment plays an in-
creasing, if not dominant, role in juvenile court sentencing practices raises
issues of procedural justice that the Court in McKeiver conveniently ig-
nored.
A. Juveniles' Criminal Responsibility- Offense-Based Sentencing
Regimes, Youthful Culpability, and Criminal Responsibility
The shift from indeterminate to determinate sentences based on charac-
teristics of the offense rather than the offender requires a reassessment of
the criminal responsibility of young people. The imposition of substantial
penalties in juvenile court, as well as the execution of juveniles waived to
and convicted in criminal courts, provides a stark indicator of changes in
attitudes about the criminal responsibility of adolescents. 36
The juvenile court, as originally conceived, was premised on the immatu-
rity and irresponsibility of children. The deterministic assumptions of
positivism and the view that juveniles lack criminal capacity followed from
367 Krisberg, Schwartz, Litsky & Austin, supra note 362, at 23; see also JUVENILE
JUSTICE BULLETIN, CHILDREN IN CUSTODY: PUBLIC JUVENILE FACILITIES 1987
(Oct. 1988) (noting that minority youths comprise more than half the juveniles in
public custody facilities).
368 The most dramatic examples of attributing criminal responsibility to youths
arise in the cases in which juveniles convicted of serious crimes may receive capital
punishment in adult courts. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1987)
(vacating death sentence of a juvenile who committed murder at age 15); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (vacating death sentence of ajuvenile who committed
murder at age 16). See generally V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES (1987);
Feld, supra note 4, at 487-99 (discussing the waiver of juvenile offenders for criminal
prosecution).
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the earlier common law's infancy mens rea defense. 369 Because criminal
liability is premised on rational actors who make blameworthy choices and
are responsible for the consequences of their acts, the common law recog-
nized and exempted from punishment categories of persons who lacked the
requisite moral and criminal responsibility. 370 Children less than seven years
old were conclusively presumed to lack criminal capacity, while those four-
teen years of age and older were treated as fully responsible. Between the
ages of seven and fourteen years, there was a rebuttable presumption of
criminal incapacity.3 7 1 Juvenile court legislation simply extended by a few
years the general presumption of youthful criminal incapacity.
The emergence of the Principle of Offense in sentencing statutes chal-
lenges the juvenile court's basic assumptions about young peoples' lack of
criminal responsibility. 37 12 Such legislation constitutes a legislative judgment
that young people are just as responsible, culpable, and blameworthy as
369 See generally Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 659, 659-61 (1970) (examining the infancy and insanity defenses under the
common law); McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsibility in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 181, 184-87 (1977) (describing the
relationship between the mens rea requirement and the juvenile's capacity to form
intent); Walkover, The Infancy Defense In the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 503 (1987) (proposing that the state have the burden of proving that a seven to
fourteen-year-old defendant had the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his
conduct); Weissman, Toward an Integrated Theory of Delinquency Responsibility,
60 DEN. L.J. 485 (1983); see also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
370 See Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 274 (1968).
371 See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 46, at
351 (1972); Fox, supra note 369, at 660; Westbrook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court,
5 J. FAM. L. 121 (1965); McCarthy, supra note 369, at 184-85; Weissman, supra note
369, at 490. Kadish, analyzing the insanity and infancy defense, explains that
[iun requiring mens rea in the sense of legal responsibility, the law absolves a
person precisely because his deficiencies of temperament, personality or matu-
rity distinguish him so utterly from the rest of us to whom the law's threats are
addressed that we do not expect him to comply.
Kadish, supra note 370, at 275.
372 The issue of the criminal responsibility of youths should be seen in the broader
context of deserved punishments and the tension between retributivist and utilitarian
rationales. See generally PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-70
(1968); H.L.A. HART, supra note 50 (describing criminal punishment "as a compro-
mise between distinct and partly conflicting principles"); N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982) (examining the criminal law's treatment of the responsi-
bility of the mentally ill); Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
343 (1983) (discussing the justifications for punishment); Weinreb, Dessert, Punish-
ment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1986); Leven-
book, Responsibility and the Normative Order Assumption, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 81 (1986).
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their somewhat older counterparts; therefore, they are just as deserving of
punishment .3 3
The extent to which young offenders, like their adult counterparts, de-
serve punishment hinges on the meaning of culpability. The underlying
rationale of deserved punishments--"just deserts"-derives from Von
Hirsh's writings in moral philosophy. 37 4 The notion of punishment as cen-
sure, condemnation, and blame is central to the contemporary "just de-
serts" theory, which explicitly addresses only adult offenders. "[P]unishing
someone conveys in dramatic fashion that his conduct was wrong and that
he is blameworthy for having committed it."1371 Penalties proportionate to
the seriousness of the crime reflect the connection between the nature of the
conduct and its blameworthiness.
While the principle of commensurate punishment apportions sanctions-
condemnation and blame-in scale with the seriousness of the offense, it
shifts the analytical focus to the meaning of seriousness.. The seriousness of
an offense is the product of two components-harm and culpability.376
Evaluations of harm focus on the degree of injury inflicted, risk created, or
value taken. 377 When assessing the harmfulness of a criminal act, the age of
the perpetrator is of little consequence.
Assessments of seriousness, however, also include the quality of the
actor's choice (mens rea) to engage in the conduct that produced the harm. It
is with respect to the culpability of choices-the blameworthiness of acting
in a particular harm-producing way-that the issue of youthfulness becomes
especially troublesome.
Psychological research concerning legal socialization indicates that young
people move through developmental stages of cognitive functioning with
respect to legal reasoning, internalization of social and legal expectations,
and ethical decisionmaking. 378 This developmental sequence and the
373 See, e.g., E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY
OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 173-75 (1975) (arguing that juveniles should be pun-
ished under the same laws as adults).
171 See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 53; A. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE
CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS
(1985).
375 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 53, at 48; see also Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
376 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 52, at 79.
117 Id. See generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 212-22 (2d
ed. 1960) (describing "harm" and its role in penal theory).
"I See Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach
to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (D.
Goslin ed. 1969) (presenting a social-psychological development model to analyze the
legal reasoning of the individual); J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD
(1932); Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in LAW,
JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 90 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977); Tapp
& Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1974).
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changes in cognitive processes are strikingly parallel to the imputations of
responsibility associated with the common-law infancy defense. Develop-
mental psychology research indicates that individuals acquire most of the
legal and moral values and reasoning capacity that will guide their behavior
through later life by the age of fourteen.3 19
If a youth fourteen years of age or older knows "right from wrong," that
is, possesses the requisite mens rea, then the courts may find the juvenile as
criminally responsible as any adult offender facing the same charges. In the
mens rea-as-capacity formulation, if one is criminally responsible for making
blameworthy choices, then one deserves the same punishment as any other
criminal actor making comparable choices.380 Mens rea as a criminal law
grading principle is characteristically binary; it is either present or not.381 In
theory, there should be no special doctrinal protections for youths older than
fourteen who are tried in criminal courts absent some "diminished responsi-
bility" doctrine .382
Even if it were acknowledged that juveniles are capable of inflicting harm
identical to that of older offenders, whether they are as culpable is a more
difficult question. Developmental psychological research suggests that while
minors may be abstractly aware of "right from wrong," they are less capable
than adults of making sound judgments or moral distinctions.3 8 3 Relative to
378 See, e.g., Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a
Moral Order, 6 VITA HUMANA 11, 16 (1963) (noting that by the age of fourteen, most
adolescents employ the same or nearly the same level of moral reasoning as they will
as adults); Tapp, Psychology and the Law: An Overture, 27 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY
359, 374 (1976) (noting that "crystallization occurs during the adolescent years and
... substantial consistency is demonstrated during adulthood").
380 See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 377, at 98-104 (2d ed. 1960) (arguing that mens
rea must be given an objective ethical meaning).
38 1 Apart from the infancy defense, the presence or absence of criminal responsi-
bility, i.e., the knowledge of right from wrong, is typically litigated in the context of
an insanity defense. See generally H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL
INSANITY 142 (1972) (describing criteria for assessing knowledge of wrong); A.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 15-20 (1967) (describing the insanity defense
and the "reasonable man" standard); N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 29 (1982) (discussing the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill); Morse,
Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 779,
782-83 (1985) (arguing that there is no morally just punishment without responsibil-
ity).
382 For a general discussion of diminished capacity doctrine, see Arenella, The
Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a
Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1977); Morse, Undiminished Confusion
in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984).
383 See supra note 379; see also G. MANASTER, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND
THE LIFE TASKS 53-67 (1977); M. RUTTER, CHANGING YOUTH IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY 43-45 (1980) (detailing changing patterns of disorder during adolescence);
Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in REVIEW OF
CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 402-05 (M. Hoffman & L. Hoffman eds. 1964)
. 89919881
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68: 821
adults, juveniles are less able to form moral judgments, less capable of
controlling their impulses, and less aware of the consequences of their acts.
Juveniles are less responsible, hence less blameworthy, than adults; their
diminished responsibility means that they "deserve" a lesser punishment
than an adult who commits the same crime. 38 In part, this lessened capacity
stems from a lower appreciation of the consequences of their acts. 385 More-
over, the crimes of children are seldom their fault alone; society shares at
least some of the blame for their offenses as a result of their truncated
opportunities to learn to make correct choices. 386 Indeed, to the extent that
the ability to make responsible choices is learned behavior, the dependent
status of youth systematically deprives them of opportunities to learn to be
responsible. 387 Finally, even where a youth is aware of the general criminal
prohibition, juveniles are more susceptible to peer group influences and
group process dynamics than their older counterparts. 3m
The Supreme Court recently analyzed the culpability of young offenders
in Thompson v. Oklahoma.3 9 Thompson presented the issue of whether the
execution of an offender for a heinous murder committed by the individual
when he was fifteen years old violated the eighth amendment prohibition on
"cruel and unusual punishments." In vacating the capital sentence, the
(concluding that large groups of moral concepts acquire meaning only in late child-
hood and adolescence).
384 See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 355 (1978).
385 See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY To-
WARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978).
[A]dolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnera-
ble, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by
youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons,
but they deserve less punishment because adolescents have less capacity to
control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults.
Id.
386 -[Y]outh crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, which share
responsibility for the development of America's youth.'"'.Id. Another researcher has
noted:
The socialization of the young is an obligation of the whole society, not just of
the parents involved; school attendance is compulsory, and courts have the
power to take children away from parents who neglect or abuse them. Thus
society bears a responsibility for youth crime that it does not have in the case of
adults.
C. SILBERMAN, supra note 384, at 355.
387 See, e.g., F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 21-22
(1982) (noting that increased periods of economic dependency have delayed adoles-
cent social development).
381 Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Secret,
72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 874-75 (1981) (noting that group participation of
juveniles in criminal activity overstates the age contribution to overall crime rates).
389 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
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plurality concluded that "a young person is not capable of acting with the
degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty." '3 90
Although the Court provided several rationales for its decision,391 it
explicitly concluded that juveniles are less culpable for their crimes than are
their adult counterparts.3 92 This was consistent with earlier decisions that
had emphasized the youthfulness of an offender as a mitigating factor at
sentencing.393 The Court emphasized that deserved punishment must reflect
individual culpability and concluded that "It]here is also broad agreement on
the proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible
than adults. ' '3 9 Significantly, even though Thompson was found to be re-
sponsible for his crime, the Court concluded that he could not be punished as
severely as an adult, simply because of his age.
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psycho-
logical damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition
that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature
and responsible than adults. Particularly "during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspec-
tive, and judgement" expected of adults. . . . [T]he Court has already
endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime
committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an
adult .395
390 Id. at 2692.
391 The Court used three indicators to guide its eighth amendment analysis of
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at
2691. It reviewed death penalty legislation setting minimum ages for execution and
concluded that a societal consensus disfavors execution of those under 16 years of
age. Id. at 2691-96. The Court reviewed the behavior of juries in actually imposing
capital sentences as additional evidence that executing juveniles is "abhorrent to the
conscience of the community." Id. at 2697. The Court also considered "whether the
juvenile's culpability should be measured by the same standard as that of an adult."
Id. at 2698.
392 Id. at 2698.
393 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (giving full consider-
ation to all mitigating factors). The Lockett Court noted that "the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded from consider-
ing, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record ... that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604. The
Court invalidated the Ohio death penalty statute because "considerations of defen-
dant's . . . age would generally not be permitted, as such, to affect the sentencing
decision." Id. at 608. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Supreme
Court noted that "just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing." Id. at 116.
39 Thompson, 108 S.Ct. at 2698.
395 Id. (citations omitted).
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that even though a youth
may be capable of inflicting blameworthy harm, the culpability of the choice
may be less than that of an adult.39 6
Contemporary changes in juvenile court sentencing legislation ignore
many of these apparent differences in criminal responsibility and culpability
between adolescents and adults. By punishing juveniles for criminal choices
"as if" they were criminally responsible adults, such legislation denies the
deterministic premises of the juvenile court that ajuvenile's crime is "not his
fault." While ajuvenile sentence may be shorter than an adult sentence for
comparable crimes, it is substantial nonetheless.
B. The Quality of Procedural Justice in the Juvenile Court- The
Consequences of Acknowledging Punishment
To base juvenile sentences on the seriousness of the present offense and
prior record raises questions about the quality of procedural justice in
juvenile courts. The decades since Gault have witnessed a substantial pro-
cedural convergence between juvenile courts and adult criminal courts.
Many of the formal procedural attributes of criminal courts are now routine
aspects of the administration of juvenile justice as well. The greater pro-
cedural formality and adversary nature of the juvenile court reflects the
attenuation between the court's therapeutic mission and its social control
functions. The many instances in which states choose to treat juvenile
396 Id. at 2699. The Court noted:
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to
evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she
is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an
adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and respon-
sibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.
Id. The Court cited numerous other instances in which juveniles' lack of experience
and judgment results in their being treated differently from adults; for example,
serving on a jury, voting, marrying, driving, and drinking. Id. at 2693, Appendices
A-F. In all of those instances, the State acts paternalistically and imposes disabilities
because of youths' presumptive incapacity to "exercise choice freely and ra-
tionally." id. at 2693 n.23. The Court emphasized that it would be both inconsistent
and a cruel irony to suddenly find juveniles as culpable as adult defendants for
purposes of capital punishment.
It would be ironic if these assumptions that we so readily make about children as
a class-about their inherent differences from adults in their capacity as agents,
as choosers, as shapers of their own lives-were suddenly unavailable in deter-
mining whether it is cruel and unusual to treat children the same as adults for the
purposes of inflicting capital punishment.... [T]he very assumptions we make
about our children when we legislate on their behalf tells us that it is likely cruel,
and certainly unusual, to impose on a child a punishment that takes as its
predicate the existence of a fully rational, choosing agent ....
Id.
THE PRINCIPLE OF OFFENSE
offenders procedurally like adult criminal defendants is one aspect of this
process.
3 97
Despite the criminalizing of juvenile justice, it remains nearly as true
today as two decades ago that "the child receives the worst of both worlds
... receiving neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children. '3 9  Most state
juvenile codes provide neither special procedural safeguards to protect
juveniles from the consequences of their own immaturity nor the full
panoply of adult criminal procedural safeguards to protect them from puni-
tive state intervention. Instead, juvenile offenders are treated like adult
criminal defendants when formal equality redounds to their disadvantage
and subjected to less effective juvenile court procedures when those pro-
cedural deficiencies redound to the advantage of the state.
1. Jury Trials in Juvenile Court
Although the Supreme Court's decision to deny juveniles a right to a jury
trial in McKeiver emphasized factual accuracy and parity between the qual-
ity of juvenile and adult adjudications, 399 the assertion that such factors
'9' See generally Feld, supra note 2.
398 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). In an earlier article, the author
identified a number of instances in which the procedural safeguards afforded to
juvenile offenders are not comparable either formally or functionally to those pro-
vided to adult criminal defendants. Juveniles are found to waive their Miranda rights
and their right to counsel under a standard that, in practice, is unlikely to discern
whether they adequately understand the rights they relinquish. Feld, supra note 2, at
169-90. The high rate of waiver of counsel, in particular, is an indictment of the entire
juvenile adjudicative apparatus because the effective assistance of counsel is a
necessary prerequisite to the invocation of all other procedural safeguards. Id. at
189-90. Similarly, preventive detention, deplorable in its own right, further disadvan-
tages a youth at adjudication and disposition. Id. at 201-04. The inadequate screening
and charging practices in juvenile court result in more youths being drawn deeper
into the process. Id. at 226-29. The absence of counsel to challenge deficient petitions
leads many youths to admit allegations that could not be proved. To combine the
suppression hearing with the trial on the merits is also a highly prejudicial practice
that increases the likelihood of erroneous determinations of guilt. Id. at 232-43. The
denial of jury trials and public trials raises troubling questions about the factual
accuracy of delinquency adjudications. Id. at 243-46. At the same time, analysis of
sentencing practices and conditions of institutional confinement indicate that what-
ever the rehabilitative justifications for these procedural deficiencies may have been,
such justifications are increasingly untenable in a juvenile court that is explicitly
punitive and offense oriented rather than rehabilitative and offender oriented. Id. at
258-60. Finally, while the procedural deficiencies noted above were analyzed sepa-
rately, their prejudicial consequences are cumulative-the whole is far worse than
the sum of its parts. Id. at 273-74.
399 McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528, 543-48; see also supra notes 51-61 and accompanying
text.
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compensate for lesser procedural rights is subject to question. Judges and
juries apply Winship's "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard differ-
ently .400
Juries serve special protective functions in assuring the accuracy of
factual determinations, and studies show that juries are more likely to
acquit than are judges. Substantive criminal guilt is not just "factual
guilt" but a complex assessment of moral culpability. The power ofjury
nullification provides a nexus between the legislature's original
criminalization decision and the community's felt sense of justice in the
application of laws to a particular case. These tendencies are attribut-
able to various factors, includingjury-judge evaluations of evidence,jury
sentiments about the "law" (jury equity), and jury sympathy for the
defendant [of which youthfulness garnered the greatest support]. 40 ,
As a result of the McKeiver Court's decision to deny juries, there is an
increased probability that a youth on trial will be convicted, because given
the same evidence a judge in juvenile court is more likely to convict than a
jury of detached citizens in a criminal proceeding. 402
Moreover, the McKeiver decision simply ignores the additional function
of procedural safeguards, namely preventing governmental oppression. 403 In
Duncan v. Louisiana ,4 4 the Court held that fundamental fairness in adult
criminal proceedings requires both factual accuracy and protection against
governmental oppression. The Duncan Court identified the manifold benefits
of a jury trial: protections from a weak or biased judge; injection of the
community's values into the decisionmaking process; and providing visibil-
ity and accountability for the workings of the process. 40 5 All of these consid-
400 Feld, supra note 2, at 244-46.
401 Id. at 245. See generally R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE
THE JURY 121-34 (1983) (studying the characteristics of juror behavior).
402 See, e.g., P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, A. ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, YOUTH
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 30-31 (1983) (comparing the attrition
rates of similar types of cases in juvenile and adult courts in California and conclud-
ing that "it is easier to win a conviction in the juvenile court than in the criminal
court, with comparable types of cases"). See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 182, 185-90, 209-13 (1966) (noting the differences in interpreta-
tion of "reasonable doubt" between judge and jury and the role of the youthfulness
of defendant in eliciting sympathy).
403 See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
404 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
405 The Court in Duncan identified the multiple safeguards provided by a jury in
criminal proceedings:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppres-
sion by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history
and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal
charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the
voice of higher authority .... Providing an accused with the right to be tried by
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erations are equally applicable in juvenile proceedings. 40 6
The increasingly punitive nature of juvenile justice raises a dilemma of
constitutional dimensions:
Is it fair, in the constitutional sense, to expose minors to adult sanctions
for crimes, without granting them the same due process rights as adults?
... The campaign to impose adult-type sanctions on children will
collide with advocates who argue that children exposed to adult sanc-
tions must have the same due process rights as adults. 40 7
Very few of the states that sentence juveniles on the basis of the Principle of
Offense provide juveniles with jury trials. 40 8 Several states that use offense-
based sentencing schemes have explicitly rejected requests for jury trials. 40 9
For juvenile justice operatives, the jury trial has symbolic implications out of
proportion to its practical impact.4 10 Providing jury trials would acknowledge
a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If
the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have
it. Beyond this, the jury trials provisions . . . reflect a fundamental decision
about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group ofjudges. Fear of
unchecked power . . . found expression in the criminal law in this insistence
upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 155-56.
406 See In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 970, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 426 (1984);
R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971). But cf. In re T.M., 742 P.2d 905, 910 n.4
(Colo. 1987) (declining to follow R.L.R.). See also Feld, supra note 2, at 258-66.
407 PRIVATE SECTOR TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 287, at 7.
408 Currently, about a dozen states provide for jury trials in juvenile court: ALASKA
STAT. § 47.10.070 (Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-106(1)(a) (Supp. 1987);
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 119 § 55A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS.
§ 712A.17 (Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1-31A (Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110 (West 1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-31 (1984); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.243(g) (West 1977);
and Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-224(a) (1986).
409 See, e.g., In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924) (no jury trial); In re
JaVier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 967, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 424 (1984) (Daedler is
"overripe" for reconsideration); see also supra notes 151-68, 214-16, 256-73, 286-98
and accompanying text.
410 While opponents of jury trials in juvenile court argue that the right would
substantially disrupt juvenile proceedings, there is apparently no basis for such an
objection, as evidenced both by the dozen jurisdictions that provide juvenile juries
and empirical studies. See Burch & Knaup, The Impact of Jury Trials Upon the
Administration of Juvenile Justice, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 345, 358 (1970) (finding
that the number of jury trials accounted for less than 2% of total volume of cases
heard); Note, The Right to a Jury Under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, 14
GONZAGA L. REV. 401, 420-21 (1979) (noting that the rate of jury trials ranged
between 0.5% and 3% of total petitions).
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the punitive reality of juvenile justice as well as the need to provide
safeguards against even benevolently motivated governmental coercion.4 ,
Providing jury trials in juvenile court requires candor and honesty about
what actually transpires in the name of rehabilitation. Benevolence, therapy,
and rehabilitation are expansive concepts that may widen the net of social
control.4 2 Who can be critical of "doing good"? Punishment, by contrast,
acknowledges the harmfulness of coercion and carries with it a sense of
limits and proportionality. 413 "[S]anctioning culpable conduct on a principle
of proportionality, severely limiting the amounts and types of deprivations
that are available, and honestly recognizing that the deprivation is a 'hurt'
has less chance for preversion [sic] than the perpetuation of the system we
now have. ' 41 4
If one is hesitant to accept the juvenile justice system's purported objec-
tives of benevolence and a therapeutic "alternative purpose," is there any-
thing about juveniles or justice that justifies denying jury trials in delin-
quency proceedings? This Article demonstrates a fundamental shift in the
underlying assumptions of juvenile justice administration. Proponents of the
traditional juvenile court should demonstrate why juvenile court procedures
should not be structured like other institutions that administer punishment.
Is there anything about a criminal justice system for youth that justifies or
requires different procedures than for similarly situated adults? If there is,
does the difference lie in characteristics of juveniles or the nature of the
"I See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
412 See Allen, supra note 7, at 149-51 (arguing that the juvenile court system
continually imposes middle-class values on poor and oppressed groups); Cohen,
supra note 114, at 5 (arguing that the rehabilitative ideal is a "noble lie"). Professor
Allen has elaborated on this theme, observing:
It is important ... to recognize that when, in an authoritative setting, we
attempt to do somethingfor a child "because of what he is and needs," we are
also doing something to him. The semantics of "socialized justice" are a trap for
the unwary. Whatever one's motivations, however elevated one's objectives, if
the measures taken result in the compulsory loss of the child's liberty, the
involuntary separation of a child from his family, or even the supervision of a
child's activities by a probation worker, the impact on the affected individuals is
essentially a punitive one. Good intentions and a flexible vocabulary do not alter
this reality. This is particularly so when, as is so often the case, the institution to
which the child is committed is, in fact, a peno-custodial establishment. We shall
escape much confusion here if we are willing to give candid recognition to the
fact that the business of the juvenile courts inevitably consists, to a considerable
degree, in dispensing punishment. If this is true, we can no more avoid the
problem of unjust punishment in the juvenile court than in the criminal court.
Allen, supra note 7, at 18 (emphasis in original).
413 See, e.g., Fox, The Rejbrm of Juvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punish-
ment, 25 Juv. JUST. 2, 4 (August 1974) (noting that the juvenile justice system
requires a compromise between punishment and treatment); Cohen, supra note 114,
at 5.
414 Cohen, supra note 114, at 5.
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punishments imposed? In light of the unalloyed punitiveness of contempo-
rary juvenile justice, the burden of proof must rest with proponents of the
traditional juvenile court to justify with evidence, not just rhetoric, differ-
ences between juvenile and criminal proceedings.
2. The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court
A second issue of procedural justice hinges on access to and competence
of legal counsel in the juvenile court. Since Gault, juveniles have been
constitutionally entitled to representation by counsel. The Gault Court ob-
served that "a proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found
to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution." 415 Despite Gault's man-
date, however, the right to counsel has been refused more often than
granted. In the two decades since Gault, the promise of counsel remains
unrealized; in many states less than fifty percent of juveniles adjudicated
delinquent receive the assistance of counsel to which they are constitution-
ally entitled. 416 In the immediate aftermath of Gault, researchers examined
institutional compliance and found that juveniles were neither adequately
advised of their right to counsel nor provided with counsel. 417 Although
national statistics are not available, surveys of representation by counsel in
several jurisdictions suggest that "there is reason to think that lawyers still
appear [in juvenile court] much less often than might have been ex-
pected." 418 In many of the states where data is available, statistics indicate
that the majority of all youths prosecuted as delinquents are not represented
by counsel during the juvenile judicial process. 419 There are several possible
411 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). The Court noted that "the juvenile needs the
assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the
facts, [and] to insist upon regularity of the proceedings .... The child 'requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.' " Id. (quoting
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). See generally Feld, supra note 2, at
186-90.
416 See Feld, supra note 2, at 187-90; see also Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A
Cross-State Comparison of the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME &
DELINQ. 393 (1988) (finding that in half of the six jurisdictions studied, a majority of
juveniles were unrepresented); see also infra note 418.
417 See., e.g., Lefstein, Stapleton, and Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice:
Gault and Its Implementation, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 491, 505-16 (1969).
418 D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 185-86 (1977). Although the
rates of representation vary widely from county to county within a state, Horowitz's
survey of the available data failed to find one state in which even 50% of the juveniles
were represented by counsel. Accord Feld, supra note 416.
4,9 See generally Feld, supra note 416 (presenting data on appointment and impact
of counsel on juvenile courts in six states). In an evaluation of legal representation in
North Carolina, Clarke and Koch reported that the juvenile defender project rep-
resented 22.3% of juveniles in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and 45.8% in Char-
1988]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68: 821
explanations for why so many youths are unrepresented. Despite Gault's
promise of the right to counsel, most juveniles face potentially coercive state
action without having seen a lawyer, waive their right to counsel without
consulting an attorney or appreciating the legal consequences, and face the
prosecutorial power of the State alone and unaided. 420 While waiver Of the
right to counsel is the most common explanation, the variations in rates of
representation within a state suggest that nonrepresentation reflects judicial
policies, especially the continuing hostility of juvenile court judges towards
lawyers, rather than any systematic differences in youthful competencies. 42 1
The Supreme Court in Gault noted that the appointment of counsel is the
prerequisite to procedural justice in the juvenile court. 4 1 "[I]n order to
assure 'procedural justice for the child,' it is necessary that '[c]ounsel. . . be
appointed as a matter of course wherever coercive action is a possibility,
without requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent.' "423 The Court
also observed that the President's Crime Commission emphasized that the
right to counsel was the cornerstone of the entire procedural apparatus of
juvenile justice, " 'the keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a
minimum system of procedural justice requires.' ",424 As the possibility of
lotte, North Carolina. Clarke & Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control.
and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAW & Soc'v REV. 263, 297 (1980). An
evaluation of a large, midwestern county's juvenile court reported that "[o]ver half
(58.2 percent) [of the juveniles] were not represented by an attorney." M. BORTNER,
INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 139
(1982). Evaluations of rates of representation in Minnesota also report that a majority
of youths are unrepresented. K. FINE, OUT OF HOME PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN
MINNESOTA: A RESEARCH REPORT 48 (1983) ("In the majority of delinquency/status
offense cases (62%) there is not representation."); Feld, supra note 2, at 189. Like
virtually all juvenile justice research, these evaluations report enormous county-by-
county variations in the rates of nonrepresentation, ranging from a high of over 90%
to a low of less than 10%. Feld, supra note 2, at 190 n.162.
420 See generally Feld, supra note 2, at 169-90 (noting that juveniles are permitted
to "waive" their constitutional rights, including the right to counsel, provided that
their waiver is "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" under the "totality of the
circumstances"). Although the competence of children to fully understand and waive
their rights has been questioned by researchers, courts reviewing waivers of rights
assume that children are capable of "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily"
relinquishing their constitutional rights and that trial courts are capable of discerning
when they do not. See id. at. 174 n.113, 176 n.121.
421 See supra notes 215-420 and accompanying text; see also Feld, The Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the
Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY-(1989).
422 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38 (1967).
423 Id. (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86-87 (1967)).
424 Id. at 38 n.65 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86-87 (1967)).
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coercive action in juvenile court increases with the elevation of the Principle
of Offense, Gault's insistence on the right to counsel and procedural justice
acquires even greater salience.
4 2 5
C. The "Punitive" Juvenile Court
The historical justifications for the procedural deficiencies of the juvenile
court are increasingly untenable in an institution that is explicitly punitive
and offense-oriented. Legislative and administrative changes in juvenile
sentencing practices reflect a basic philosophical ambivalence about the
continued role of the juvenile court. 426 The current status of the juvenile
court system, which has become increasingly criminalized and more like its
adult counterpart, raises the question whether there is any reason to main-
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), based its
decision that a request for a probation officer was not a per se invocation of the right
to counsel on the role of counsel in the criminal and juvenile processes. The Fare
Court elaborated on the crucial role of counsel by noting that
the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of his unique
ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial
interrogation .... The per se aspect of Miranda was thus based on the unique
role the lawyer plays in the adversary system of criminal justice in this country.
Whether it is a minor or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one
person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of
that person in his dealings with the police and the courts.
Id. at 719.
425 Professor Cohen has noted the relationship between proportionality of sanc-
tions and the importance of counsel.
By adopting a system which responds to harm-producing conduct and which
frankly recognizes that deprivations of liberty are painful sanctions, we can
legally recognize the adversary stance of the parties, emphasize the importance
offactfinding and diminish the scientific jargon which parades as expertise; we
can bring some visibility to decision-making, further tighten procedures, and
give some focus to the requisite training of system functionaries.
Cohen, supra note 114, at 6 (emphasis added).
426 A number of commentators have questioned the justification for a separate
juvenile court. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 3, at 171-72; Feld, supra note 2, at 190;
Guggenheim, A Call to Abolish the Juvenile Justice System, 9 CHILDREN'S RTS. REP.
1 (1978); McCarthy, Should Juvenile Delinquency Be Abolished?, 23 CRIME &
DELINQ. 196 (1977) [hereinafter Delinquency Abolished?]; McCarthy, Delinquency
Dispositions Under the Juvenile Justice Standards: The Consequences of a Change
of Rationale, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1093, 1115-19 (1977) [hereinafter Delinquency
Dispositions]; Shepherd, Challenging the Rehabilitative Justification for Indeter-
minate Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System: The Right to Punishment, 21
ST. Louis U.L.J. 12, 14-19 (1977); Simpson, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a
Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 984, 1012-13 (1976); Wizner &
Keller, The Penal Model ofJuvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdic-
tion Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120, 132-35 (1977); Wolfgang, Abolish the
Juvenile Court System, 2 CAL. LAW., November 1982, at 12.
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tain a separate juvenile criminal court whose sole distinguishing characteris-
tic is its persisting procedural deficiencies.4 2
7
The juvenile court as an institution is at a philosophical crossroads that
cannot be resolved by reference to simplistic treatment versus punishment
formulations. 42 In the contemporary juvenile court, there are no practical or
operational differences between the two-"sometimes punishment is treat-
ment." 429 Once the fundamentally penal character of juvenile court interven-
tion is recognized, the strongest justification for the preservation of a sepa-
rate juvenile court system is that the sentences that a juvenile delinquent
receives are typically shorter than those received by adult felony offenders
for comparable crimes. 43 0 Indeed, even under the offense-based determinate
or mandatory minimum sentencing regimes, juvenile sentences are substan-
tially shorter than their adult counterparts'. Since most young offenders will
return to society, it is highly desirable that they have an opportunity to
survive the mistakes of adolescence with their life chances intact. This
policy goal is threatened by the draconian sentences frequently inflicted on
eighteen-year-old "adults."
Shorter sentences for young people do not require separate juvenile courts
in which to adjudicate them as offenders. Quite apart from specific juvenile
court legislation, there are a variety of doctrinal and policy justifications for
427 On the procedural deficiencies of the juvenile court, see Feld, supra note 2, at
272-76; McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457 (1981); Rosenberg, The Constitu-
tional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So
Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656 (1980).
428 Contemporary legislative changes in regard to the judicial treatment of
juveniles are the product of three, highly disparate critiques of juvenile justice.
Proponents of "law and order" and "get tough" legislation contend that "youth
must be held more accountable and punished for their delinquent acts, particularly
acts of a violent nature or acts against the person." R. COATES, M. FORST & B.
FISHER, supra note 337, at 1. Others question the juvenile justice system's ability to
rehabilitate and the use of open-ended institutional confinement for treatment pur-
poses. Id. A third group supports determinacy as a means of promoting equal justice
by treating similarly situated offenders similarly. Id. at 2. See generally Krisberg,
Schwartz, Litsky & Austin, supra note 362 (presenting an overview of current policy
debates surrounding reform in the juvenile system).
429 State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 656-57, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (1979).
430 Feld, supra note 2, at 275. Others have observed that
[t]he only real differences between these [juvenile justice standards relating to
delinquency and sanctions] and the adult criminal codes are that the former
provide for shorter sentences and introduce certain special defenses. That an
adult court is capable of dispensing lenient sentences when appropriate, how-
ever, is self-evident. And the principles represented by the standards' special
defenses are already taken into consideration by adult criminal courts in those
instances in which they have dealt with youthful offenders.
Wizner & Keller, supra note 426, at 1133.
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sentencing young people less severely than their adult counterparts. For
example, the common-law mens rea infancy defense, a variant of "di-
minished responsibility," provides a conceptual basis for shorter sentences
with or without a juvenile court. 431 The common-law infancy gradations
reflect developmental differences that render youths less culpable or crimi-
nally responsible than their adult counterparts for the same types of criminal
harms. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Thompson provides addi-
tional support for shorter sentences based upon the reduced culpability of
youths even for juveniles older than the common-law infancy threshold of
age fourteen.
When sanctioning within a "just deserts" or deserved punishment frame-
work, it would be fundamentally unjust to impose the same penalty upon a
juvenile as upon an adult. Quite apart from differences in culpability for the
quality of criminal choices, the ways in which a penalty is subjectively
experienced will differ. In general, criminal penalties-whether adult pun-
ishment or juvenile "treatment"-are measured in units of time: days,
months, or years. However, youths and adults conceive of and experience
similar lengths of time differently. 432 The progression from children to adults
in thinking about and experiencing time follows a developmental sequence
similar to the development of responsibility for making blameworthy
choices. 433 Indeed, without a mature and developed appreciation of future
time, juveniles may be less able to understand the consequences of their acts
and therefore be less responsible. Because juveniles do not have an adult
"objective" sense of the duration of time, an objectively equivalent sen-
tence may be subjectively unequal. While a three-month sentence may be
lenient for an adult offender, for a child it represents the equivalent of an
entire summer vacation, a very long period of time. Because of these
developmental differences in time concepts, it would be unjust to sentence
adults and juveniles to similar terms even for similar types of offenses.
Shorter sentences based upon reduced culpability or the subjective ex-
perience of punishment is a more modest rationale for treating young people
differently than adults than the rehabilitative justifications advanced by the
Progressive childsavers. Moreover, it recognizes the punitive realities of
juvenile court intervention.
431 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
432 Youths and adults may differ in their subjective and objective assessments of
time both with respect to "future time perspective" and "present duration." See
generally T. COTTLE, PERCEIVING TIME: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION WITH
MEN AND WOMEN 85-130 (1976); W. FRIEDMAN, THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL-
OGY OF TIME (1982); J. PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF TIME (A. Pomerans
trans. 1969).
433 See, e.g., B. INHELDER & J. PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING
FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE (A. Parsons trans. 1958); Klineberg, Changes
in Outlook on the Future Between Childhood and Adolescence, 7 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 185 (1967).
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Acknowledging that juvenile court intervention is punishment carries the
concomitant obligation to provide appropriate procedural safeguards, since
"the condition of being a [child] does not justify a kangaroo court. ' 43 4 If full
procedural parity is afforded to young offenders, then the McKeiver Court's
fear of sounding the death-knell of the juvenile court may well be realized. 43 5
To abolish the juvenile court's jurisdiction over criminal misconduct, how-
ever, may be desirable from the standpoint of both juveniles and society as a
whole .436
A therapeutic "alternative purpose" is an untenable justification for the
punitive nature of juvenile justice institutions. If shorter sentences for re-
duced culpability is the principal remaining rationale for juvenile courts,
providing youths with fractional reductions of adult sentences could just as
readily meet that goal. This could take the form of an explicit "youth
discount" at the time of sentencing. 437 Many contemporary juvenile justice
statutes provide appropriate models to determine sentence length for young
offenders that would be considerably shorter than sentences for their adult
counterparts. 4 3 1 Using the seriousness of the offense to grade proportionality
would also limit some of the abuses of indeterminacy. 43 9 For youths below
the age of fourteen, the common-law mens rea infancy defense would
acquire new vitality.
Trying young people in criminal courts with full procedural safeguards
would not especially diminish judges' expertise about appropriate disposi-
131 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
435 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
436 Feld, supra note 2, at 275; see, e.g., Delinquency Abolished?, supra note 426,
at 203; Delinquency Dispositions, supra note 426; Feld, supra note 3; Wizner &
Keller, supra note 426.
437 A proposal for fractional reductions in juvenile sentences can only be made
against the backdrop of realistic, humane, and determinate adult sentencing prac-
tices. Adult presumptive sentences in Minnesota, for example, are specified in terms
of months rather than years, and "truth in sentencing" prevails. Minnesota Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, supra note 257, at IV (sentencing grid); Knapp, Impact of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines on Sentencing Practices, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 237,
244 (1982); Von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelines Jor Sentencing: The Critical
Choices for the Minnesota Sentencing Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164, 188-89,
191-92 (1982). Not only are Minnesota's sentences realistic and determinable in
advance, but Minnesota has one of the lowest rates of incarceration of any state in
the nation. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS IN 1982 5 (1984).
438 An additional rationale for shorter sentences for juveniles has been suggested:
[B]ecause juveniles are emotionally dependent on their parents in ways that
adults are not, removal from the home tends to be a more severe punishment. I
also mean significantly shorter terms, for time has a wholly different dimension
for children than it does for adults.
C. SILCERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 355 (1987).
439 See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 426, at 35-40; Fox, supra note 413, at 6-9.
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tional options for young people. To a considerable degree the information
necessary for a just disposition resides with the court services personnel
who advise the judge on sentences, rather than with the court itself. Follow-
ing criminal conviction, a youth's case could be transferred to a family court
judge if a "welfare" disposition is contemplated. Even a punitive sentence
does not require incarcerating juveniles in adult jails and prisons. The
existing training schools and institutions provide the option of age-segre-
gated dispositional facilities. Moreover, insisting explicitly on humane con-
ditions of confinement could do at least as much to improve the lives of
incarcerated youths as has the "right to treatment" or the "rehabilitative
ideal." 440 To provide for expunction of criminal records and the elimination
of any collateral civil disabilities following the successful completion of a
sentence could afford equivalent relief from an isolated youthful folly as
does juvenile court confidentiality. 441 A recognition that most young offend-
ers will return to society at some point will impose an obligation to provide
the resources for self-improvement. The point is simply that the coerced and
inadequate treatment that characterizes most juvenile dispositions can no
longer justify indeterminate, nonproportional, and ultimately punitive in-
carceration.
Full procedural parity in criminal courts, coupled with alternative
safeguards for children, can provide the same protections as does the current
juvenile court. However, the case for abolishing the juvenile courts rests on
the experience of two decades of procedural reform, "constitutional domes-
tication," and now criminalization. It remains nearly as true today as when
the Supreme Court first undertook reform of juvenile courts that juveniles
receive the worst of both worlds. Juvenile courts have shown a distressing
capacity to deflect, co-opt, ignore, and absorb ameliorative procedural re-
form with minimal institutional change. Two decades after Gault guaranteed
the right to counsel to every juvenile, for example, many unrepresented
juveniles continue to appear in juvenile courts, including many who are
subsequently sentenced to terms of institutional confinement. 442 The general
quality of procedural justice routinely afforded to youths would be intoler-
able for adult defendants facing incarceration. And yet, as this Article
demonstrates, both in principle and in practice, the end result of juvenile
court intervention is scarcely distinguishable from its adult criminal coun-
terpart. Even "punishment" is fully subsumable in the Orwellian world of
440 See B. FELD, supra note 42, at 197-205 (arguing that the primary goal of
correctional programs must be the minimization of brutalization and victimization of
inmates); cf. supra notes 344-45 and accompanying text (discussing the currently
inadequate conditions of juvenile confinement).
441 Some proponents of the juvenile court contend that it is the reduced stigma,
rather than the shorter sentences, that justify a separate juvenile court. See C.
SILBERMAN, supra note 438, at 356.
442 See supra notes 416-21 and accompanying text.
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juvenile justice "treatment" as simply one more tool to effect behavioral
change.
The juvenile court is the product of two nineteenth-century historical
developments: changes in strategies of social control and changes in the
cultural conception of children." 3 The contemporary procedural and sub-
stantive convergence between juvenile courts and criminal courts consti-
tutes a repudiation of the Progressive's offender-oriented strategy of social
control in favor of a more punitive, criminal model of juvenile justice. Thus,
one of the two conceptual premises of the juvenile court is no longer
available.
At the same time, however, the remaining gap between the quality of
justice in juvenile courts and criminal courts can be conveniently ra-
tionalized on the grounds that "after all, they are only children," and
children are entitled only to custody, not liberty. 44 So long as the mythology
prevails that juvenile court intervention is "benign" coercion and that in any
event children should not expect more, youths will continue to receive "the
worst of both worlds." Abolishing the juvenile court would force a long
overdue and critical reassessment of the entire social construct of "child-
hood." As long as young people are regarded as fundamentally different
than adults, it becomes too easy to rationalize and justify a procedurally
inferior justice system.
Professor David Rothman concluded his analysis of the Progressive ori-
gins of the juvenile court with trenchant insights and questions:
In sum, one searches in vain for any thorough reappraisal of the Pro-
gressive ideology or any coherent effort to review reform postulates in
light of their marginal relationship to actual practice.
It is difficult to trace this record without some impatience and disap-
pointment. Our predecessors should have known better. But rather than
second-guess them, it is appropriate to analyze why they remained so
dedicated to their principles, so unwilling to entertain self-doubt. In
part, it may be inevitable that reformers become partisans, unable to
examine the outcome of their efforts. In part, [they] ... were frightened
that the obvious alternatives to their design would generate even worse
abuses ...
The past was so bleak and so lacking in humanitarian spirit, that to
undermine the Progressive program would be to return to barbarism.
Reformers did have one last defense: how could anyone condemn
their principles or search for alternatives when their recommendations
had never been truly implemented? Failures reflected not faulty concep-
tualization but inadequate funding. Hence it was appropriate to call for
44' See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
444 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 260, 265 (1984) (noting that "juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody. Children, by definition, are not assumed
to have the capacity to take care of themselves.").
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more clinics, better probation officers, smaller cottages, and better
trained house parents ....
All of these contentions had a point. Given the many flaws in im-
plementation, there was no shortage of corrective measures that might
be adopted, and then perhaps rehabilitation would occur. And Progres-
sives were entitled to believe that only an ethic of rehabilitation could
dampen the spirit of retribution. The points certainly were fair-but
they did not reach to the heart of the problem, to the tension between
punishment and treatment. How condemn a court's casual indifference
to the child when it claimed to be helping him? How condemn the
severity of an institution when it purported to be acting in the child's
best interest? But these were issues that could not be raised on the
Progressive agenda.445
Any assessment of the contemporary juvenile court must answer these same
questions and address the procedural and substantive implications of the
fundamental tension between punishment and treatment. With the explicit
emergence of retribution in juvenile courts coupled with a continuing lack of
public and political willingness to commit scarce social resources to the
welfare of children in general, much less to those who commit crimes, is
there any remaining reason to believe that the juvenile court system can be
rehabilitated?
41 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 288-89.
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